Todd R. Christensen

The court considered a motion by msi Spergel Inc., as Administrator, for approval of Danny Angelatos’s consumer proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Canadian Tire Bank opposed, arguing Angelatos was not eligible because his assets exceeded his liabilities and creditors were willing to make arrangements outside the proposal.

The court found Angelatos met the definition of “insolvent person” under the BIA, as he was unable to meet his obligations as they became due, and distinguished the authorities relied on by the Bank.

The court also found the proposal was reasonable and fair to both debtor and creditors, given the family’s circumstances and the creditors’ approval.

The proposal was approved, and costs awarded to the Administrator.

The defendant, Capital One Bank, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action as an abuse of process under Rule 21.01(3)(c) and (d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the issues were res judicata.

The court found that the issues raised in the current action were previously decided or could have been raised in a prior Small Claims Court action and its subsequent appeal.

Applying the principles of res judicata and issue estoppel, the court dismissed the action as an abuse of process, finding no reason to exercise discretion to allow it to continue.

The Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS), as judgment creditor, brought a motion seeking an order for a reference to conduct the sale of the judgment debtor's real property, as an alternative to a sheriff's sale, and an order to sever the joint tenancy of the property.

The court reviewed its previous decisions and other jurisprudence regarding "special circumstances" required for a judicial sale.

The court clarified that "special circumstances" must be of a legal nature, such as impediments created by legislation like PIPEDA, and not merely the perceived inconvenience or ineffectiveness of the sheriff's sale process.

The court also reiterated that the mere filing of a writ of execution does not by itself sever a joint tenancy, requiring further steps to execute the judgment against the debtor's interest.

Consequently, the motion for a reference and for severance of the joint tenancy was dismissed without costs.

The applicant bank, a judgment creditor, brought a motion seeking an order directing a reference to conduct the sale of the judgment debtor's real property, rather than proceeding by way of a sheriff's sale under the Execution Act.

The bank relied on previous case law suggesting the court had inherent jurisdiction to order a judicial sale due to impediments caused by privacy legislation.

The court dismissed the motion, noting that the Supreme Court of Canada had since resolved the privacy legislation impediment.

The court held that absent special circumstances or injustice, the statutory sheriff's sale process prescribed by the Legislature must prevail over common law or regulatory processes.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision refusing his request for an adjournment and granting judgment to the respondent for outstanding credit card debt.

The appellant argued the Deputy Judge failed to consider his vulnerability as a self-represented litigant.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had raised no valid defence to the debt and that an adjournment would only delay the inevitable and prejudice the respondent.

The court also ordered the severance of the joint tenancy on the appellant's property to allow the respondent to register the debt.

A judgment creditor applied for orders directing a reference to inquire into issues relating to the sale of real property owned by judgment debtors as a means of enforcing unpaid money judgments.

The court considered whether the sheriff’s sale mechanism under the Execution Act constituted the exclusive method for enforcing judgments against land.

Applying principles of equitable execution and the court’s inherent jurisdiction, the court held that a judicially supervised sale process could be used where appropriate.

The court also recognized that privacy restrictions under PIPEDA may impede the sheriff’s sale process by preventing mortgagees from providing discharge statements to execution creditors.

The application was granted and a reference ordered to determine the interests in the properties and the propriety of a judicially supervised sale.