Chris de Sa

The Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence (the "Toronto Allegations") and to permit a witness (Ms. H.M.) to testify remotely via Zoom in a criminal trial for sexual assault and related charges.

The defence opposed the admission of similar fact evidence, arguing it was prejudicial and lacked probative value, and also opposed remote testimony for the trial proper.

The court partially granted the Crown's application, allowing Ms. H.M. to testify remotely due to childcare responsibilities and the COVID-19 pandemic, and permitting her to testify regarding the accused's observation/perception of a firearm and his utterances about its contents.

However, the court excluded other aspects of the Toronto Allegations, such as the proposition for sex and credit card purchases, finding them irrelevant and overly prejudicial.

The defendant, Nima Priyeshakbari, brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's claim, which asserted allegations of fraud, conspiracy, fraudulent conveyance, and insufficient particularity regarding an interest in land and documents/conversations.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired to unlawfully convert a property in which she had invested, selling it below market value to deprive her of her investment.

The court applied the "plain and obvious" test for striking pleadings, accepting the plaintiff's alleged facts as true unless patently ridiculous.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim met the necessary particularity requirements for fraud and conspiracy, noting that knowledge can be alleged as a fact without pleading circumstances.

The court also clarified that the Land Titles Act does not ban trusts but rather defines how third parties deal with registered owners.

The motion to strike was dismissed.

This criminal trial concerned Samuel Yzraiib, charged with aggravated assault and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace, stemming from a fight at a mall.

The court considered video evidence, witness testimony, and forensic findings, which confirmed Yzraiib's involvement and possession of a knife.

The defence argued self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code, contending that Yzraiib was defending himself against a larger assailant and other attackers.

The court found that Yzraiib's actions, including the use of a knife, were not unreasonable given the circumstances.

Due to the absence of clear evidence regarding the intent behind obtaining the knife and the incomplete video footage, the court concluded there was reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on both charges.

The appellant, Douglas Sharpley, appealed a Small Claims Court judgment, arguing the Deputy Judge erred in concluding the respondent's claim was not statute-barred and provided inadequate reasons.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed with the appellant, finding the Deputy Judge's reasons deficient for meaningful appellate review, particularly concerning credibility findings and overlooked evidence.

The appeal was granted, the judgment set aside, and the matter remitted for a new trial.

The plaintiff and defendant entered into a business partnership to purchase and develop a property.

The defendant unilaterally terminated the partnership and sold the property.

Following this, the parties signed "Minutes of Protocol" agreeing to compensate the plaintiff $240,000 for expenses, time, and lost profits.

The court found the Minutes of Protocol to be a valid contract.

It determined that the $240,000 was intended to cover expenses and future loss, but also agreed that expenses already compensated by the defendant should be deducted.

The plaintiff was ultimately awarded $82,425 after deducting a portion of the construction loan that the plaintiff had received but the defendant subsequently repaid.

The defendant, Noah Poisson, was convicted of impaired driving causing death after his vehicle veered off the road, resulting in the death of his passenger, Parker Pautsch.

The defendant's blood alcohol concentration was between 129 to 171 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood at the time of the accident.

At the sentencing hearing, the Crown sought a 7-year jail sentence, while the defence argued for 2-3 years, citing the defendant's youth, remorse, and community support.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as paramount sentencing objectives for impaired driving offences, acknowledging the increasing range of sentences for such crimes.

While considering mitigating factors like the defendant's youth and genuine remorse, the court found that these could not outweigh the serious nature of the offence and the tragic loss of life.

A sentence of 5 years in custody was imposed, along with a DNA sample order and a 7-year driving prohibition.

The applicant sought to exclude drug evidence obtained by police, arguing violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the police unlawfully questioned the applicant, conducted an unreasonable safety search, and delayed providing the right to counsel.

Given the flagrant nature and significant impact of these breaches, the court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, leading to the dismissal of all charges.

The applicant, Neil Davis, brought an application seeking a declaration that the trial judge had lost jurisdiction and an order of prohibition, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

This application automatically suspended the ongoing criminal trial.

The Crown requested a summary dismissal or an order for the trial to continue.

The court reviewed the underlying trial record and found no merit to the applicant's claim of reasonable apprehension of bias, emphasizing the high threshold for such claims.

Consequently, the court ordered the criminal trial to continue as scheduled, effectively denying the suspension sought by the applicant, and noted that the issues raised in the application might become moot if the trial concluded, leaving appeal as the appropriate avenue.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings or, alternatively, an exclusion of evidence (blood samples and medical records) due to an alleged violation of his Section 7 Charter right to a fair trial.

The application was based on the conduct of two Crown witnesses who communicated with each other in breach of a court order excluding witnesses.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused's Section 7 rights were not violated.

The judge determined that while the communication was improper, it was not subversive or contemptuous, did not materially affect the witnesses' credibility or the reliability of their evidence, and did not warrant a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence, particularly as there was no Crown or police involvement in the alleged impropriety.

The applicant sought to exclude medical records, blood, and urine samples seized by police with a warrant in an impaired driving investigation.

The applicant argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained omissions and mischaracterizations, and that blood was drawn without permission in contravention of Charter rights.

The court found minor, unintentional errors in the ITO that did not affect warrant issuance, and that the blood was drawn for medical purposes, not at police behest, thus no Charter breach occurred.

Even if a breach existed, the evidence would be admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to the low seriousness of state conduct, high privacy interest, and strong societal interest in adjudication on the merits of a serious offence.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death, excess blood alcohol causing death, and dangerous driving causing death following a fatal motor vehicle collision.

The Crown successfully applied to amend the indictment to remove a reference to "drug" from the impaired driving charge, which the court granted, emphasizing substance over form and the absence of prejudice.

The court found the accused was the driver, established continuity of blood samples, and concluded that the accused was impaired by alcohol, which materially contributed to the accident and the victim's death.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving causing death, with the other two counts conditionally stayed under the *Kienapple* principle, as the wrongful conduct for all charges was deemed to overlap.

The Plaintiffs moved to have the Defendant found in contempt for allegedly breaching an interim order by making statements in a private chat group.

The Defendant argued the Plaintiffs breached the implied undertaking rule by relying on these posts and that the postings did not contravene the order.

The court granted the Plaintiffs leave to rely on the postings but dismissed the contempt motion, finding that the Defendant's conduct was not clearly in breach of the order, which should be narrowly construed given the importance of free expression in defamation cases.

The court also noted the Defendant's immediate removal of the post upon request demonstrated an intention to comply.

The defendant lawyer, John McGarrity, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a solicitor's negligence claim brought by the plaintiffs, Donald Jesse James and Elsie Maria James.

The plaintiffs alleged that McGarrity failed to properly advise them regarding an agreement to add their daughter, Janice James, to the title of their farm property, which included a non-alienation clause preventing them from selling the property.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding that the solicitor's negligence claim was inextricably tied to the main action to set aside the agreement and that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial, particularly concerning the plaintiffs' understanding of the agreement and potential undue influence from their daughter.

This addendum addresses the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, which was not formally decided in the court's prior reasons.

The plaintiffs sought the return of a $50,000 deposit for a property purchase, arguing the agreement was invalid due to technicalities, including a lack of initials on an amendment, an uncrossed-out irrevocability clause, and incomplete written terms.

The court rejected these technical arguments, affirming that contract formation relies on an objective test of whether parties reached a meeting of the minds, considering both words and conduct, rather than strict adherence to formalities.

However, due to factual ambiguities and credibility issues arising from conflicting affidavits regarding whether an agreement was reached and the role of a key individual, the court determined that the issues were more properly resolved at trial.

Consequently, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

This motion concerned a request by the respondent to set aside outstanding child and spousal support arrears and conclude his support obligations, citing a material change in income since the original 2010 settlement agreement.

The applicant opposed, seeking to add to arrears for post-secondary expenses and enforce a life insurance policy requirement, while also requesting ongoing child support for a dependent adult child.

The court partially granted the respondent's request, fixing total arrears at a reduced amount, ordering ongoing child support for the dependent adult child at a reduced rate, and terminating spousal support, while dismissing the applicant's request to add further arrears for post-secondary expenses and for compensation related to the life insurance policy.

The plaintiff, Gerry VandePol, brought an action for wrongful dismissal against the defendant, Cowan Buick GMC Limited.

The defendant admitted dismissal without cause, leaving the notice period and mitigation as the main issues.

The court determined a reasonable notice period of 6 months, calculated at an annual salary of $50,000, after considering the plaintiff's age, length of service, position, and difficulty in finding comparable employment.

The court also found that the defendant failed to prove the plaintiff did not make adequate efforts to mitigate.

The plaintiff was awarded $19,974 after deducting termination pay.

The Applicant, Colleen Conkie, sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $24,312.01 after successfully obtaining an easement.

The Respondent, Susan Bugow, opposed the award, citing financial hardship, disputing the Applicant's conduct regarding a culvert, and claiming interference with her property.

The court, exercising its discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found the Applicant's requested costs reasonable given the complexity but reduced the award to $12,000, all inclusive, due to the Respondent's financial situation and the nature of some expenses incurred for obtaining the easement.

The applicant solicitor brought a motion to set aside an Assessment Officer's decision that reduced his contingency fees and imposed tax liability on him.

The Assessment Officer had reduced fees for accident benefit claims due to the clients' misunderstanding of net settlement proceeds.

The court confirmed the fee reduction, finding the solicitor responsible for ensuring client understanding of settlement terms.

However, the court set aside the Assessment Officer's decision to impose the increased HST amount on the solicitor, deeming it inappropriate as the tax was collected for remittance to the government and the increase was not the solicitor's responsibility.

The Plaintiffs moved for answers to undertakings and refusals, leave to amend their Statement of Claim, and a timetable.

The Defendants cross-moved for answers to refusals, access to the Plaintiffs' former solicitor's file, and leave to examine the solicitor, arguing waiver of solicitor-client privilege.

The court granted the Plaintiffs' request to amend their Statement of Claim and ordered various undertakings and refusals to be answered by both parties.

However, the court denied the Defendants' request for the solicitor's entire file and examination, finding that privilege was waived only for the specific legal letter disclosed, not the underlying advice or file.

The court also addressed costs for an aborted discovery and set a timetable for continued discoveries.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's action, arguing the plaintiff repeatedly failed to pursue arbitration as mandated by court orders and the Condominium Act.

The plaintiff sought to have an arbitrator appointed before dismissal.

The court dismissed the action, struck the notice to arbitrate as time-barred, and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the defendants, finding the plaintiff wilfully ignored court orders and limitation periods.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to strike portions of its Status Certificate was left for the parties to resolve.