Charles Murray Klaas Loopstra

The moving party brought a motion to strike a solicitor's affidavit filed in support of an estates motion.

The moving party argued the affidavit was an improper use of a solicitor's affidavit, contained scandalous and vexatious material, and breached settlement privilege.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the affidavit was properly used to provide non-contentious background facts, did not contain scandalous material, and that any potential settlement privilege issues were too intertwined with non-privileged material to be struck at this stage.

Following a successful application for judicial review where the court found a denial of procedural fairness by the Town, the applicant sought costs on a full indemnity basis for the application and several related motions.

The Divisional Court held it lacked jurisdiction to award costs for the related motions or to set aside a previous costs order.

However, the court awarded the applicant substantial indemnity costs of $44,329.66 for the judicial review application, citing the Town's conduct that unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding and the denial of procedural fairness.

A municipal elector sought a declaration under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act alleging that the mayor contravened s. 5 by speaking and voting on a motion requiring him to personally repay an alleged municipal budget over‑expenditure.

The court considered whether the application was brought within the limitation period under s. 9 and whether any exceptions under s. 4 applied.

The court held that although the application was timely and the statutory exceptions did not apply, the mayor did not possess a real pecuniary interest because the municipality lacked legal authority to require personal repayment.

As the proposed financial sanction was ultra vires and therefore a nullity, there was no genuine pecuniary interest engaging s. 5.

The application seeking removal from office and restitution was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a development charges by-law passed by the respondent municipality, arguing that the municipality failed to provide adequate notice of public meetings, thereby denying procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court found that while the municipality failed to strictly comply with statutory notice requirements for the first meeting, procedural fairness was not denied.

However, the court held that the applicant was denied procedural fairness regarding the second meeting because the Mayor had explicitly promised further notice and an opportunity to be heard, which was not provided.

The court declined to quash the by-law but ordered the municipality to refund development charges paid by the applicant and other affected landowners during an 18-month transition period.

Following a prior decision involving an application and contempt motion to enforce compliance with municipal zoning and site alteration by-laws, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The applicant municipality was substantially successful on the application but unsuccessful on the contempt motion.

Applying the principles governing costs under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant appellate authorities, the court emphasized that costs must be fair and reasonable rather than a strict calculation of actual legal fees.

The court reduced the claimed amount due to duplication of counsel and excessive preparation time.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $30,000 inclusive.

A municipality brought an application seeking declarations and injunctive relief regarding alleged contraventions of zoning and site alteration by-laws relating to two rural properties.

The municipality alleged that the respondents operated a landscape supply operation, stockpiled fill, and used one property as a contractor’s yard and waste disposal site in a rural zone where such uses were not permitted.

The respondents argued that the activities constituted a lawful continuation or expansion of a pre-existing nursery operation and therefore qualified as legal non-conforming use.

The court held that the respondents’ activities constituted a fundamentally different commercial landscape supply and haulage operation rather than an intensification of the prior nursery use.

Declarations and a permanent injunction were granted restraining the unlawful uses and requiring removal of fill, although the municipality failed to prove civil contempt of a prior interlocutory injunction.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their defamation action for delay.

The action arose from statements published during a 1997 municipal election.

The motion judge found inordinate delay, noting that no steps had been taken by the appellants since 2005 and that a presumption of prejudice arose, reinforced by the loss of witnesses.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable or overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellants appealed an order granting a permanent injunction that restrained them from dumping fill or altering the grade of their property.

They argued the application judge erred in finding their activity was not a 'normal farm practice' and in not deferring to the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge's factual findings were supported by ample evidence and that he had jurisdiction to grant the injunction since neither party had applied to the Board.

The appellant, a municipal election candidate, appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice directing a compliance audit of her campaign finances.

The applicant elector had alleged the candidate undervalued her campaign office rent, thereby exceeding expense limits.

The compliance audit committee had initially refused the audit, finding no reasonable probability of a breach.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the OCJ judge erred in his application of the reasonableness standard of review by substituting his own interpretation of the valuation requirements under the Municipal Elections Act.

The committee's decision to accept the candidate's explanation and refuse the audit was reasonable and was restored.

The defendants brought a motion under r. 24.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a libel action for delay.

The action arose from allegedly defamatory statements published during a 1997 municipal election campaign.

Although the action was commenced in 1998, little progress occurred beyond limited discoveries in 1998, and no steps were taken after the Court of Appeal dismissed a related appeal in 2005.

The court held that the plaintiffs were responsible for inordinate and inexcusable delay and that a presumption of prejudice arose, reinforced by the death of witnesses and the unavailability of key participants.

The plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, and the action was dismissed for delay; the defendant’s counterclaim was also dismissed by consent.

Following the dismissal of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs totaling $17,234.66 plus HST, while the defendant argued the plaintiff should recover only $6,795.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principle of proportionality, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the full amount claimed.

The requested costs were reasonable, particularly as they were less than the amount originally claimed by the defendant when it anticipated success on the motion.

A municipality sought a permanent injunction restraining landowners from depositing large quantities of fill on property located on the Oak Ridges Moraine.

The respondents argued the dumping of approximately 300,000 cubic metres of fill constituted a normal farm practice intended to improve agricultural land and therefore was protected from municipal bylaw restrictions under provincial legislation.

The court held that the scale of the fill operation constituted a prohibited site alteration under the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan and did not qualify as a normal farm practice.

The respondents had also ignored multiple municipal orders and a prior agreement restricting fill placement.

A permanent injunction was granted restraining further site alteration except as permitted under the building permit and applicable bylaws.

The appellant landowner sued the Town of Newmarket for negligence after its tenant allowed third parties to deposit significantly more fill on the demised land than the appellant had authorized.

The source of some of the fill was a subdivision within the municipality.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding the municipality owed no duty of care to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal agreed, distinguishing the case law relied upon by the appellant, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant Township appealed a decision setting aside a master's order that required the respondent to deliver a further and better affidavit of documents.

The master's order was based on admissions made by the respondent in response to a request to admit regarding the existence of documents proving damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that using a request to admit to force a party to state whether it has documents evidencing damages is improper and a nullity.

Consequently, the respondent's admissions were also a nullity, and the appeal judge did not err in setting aside the master's order.

The parties made written submissions on costs following an appeal where success was substantially divided.

The appellants succeeded on the issues of the base period of reasonable notice and prejudgment interest, while the respondent succeeded on Wallace damages and bonus compensation.

The Court of Appeal held that the divided success did not warrant a departure from the general rule that no costs should be awarded.

The court also considered the respondent's settlement offer but found it did not propose a sufficiently meaningful compromise.

No costs of the appeal were awarded.

The appellants, defendants in a libel action, sought a stay of proceedings or security for costs after one of the plaintiffs disappeared with unpaid costs orders.

The motion judge denied the stay but ordered the remaining plaintiffs to post security for costs under rule 56.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court set aside the order, holding that the Libel and Slander Act exclusively governed security for costs in such actions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Act and the Rules can co-exist, the motion judge erred in applying rule 56.09 because no relief was being granted to the plaintiffs to which a security term could attach.

The appellant limited partnership appealed the dismissal of its application for declaratory and mandatory relief regarding a Sale and Dissolution Agreement.

The dispute centered on whether a conditional offer to purchase real estate satisfied the agreement's requirement that the property be 'sold' before the listing period expired.

The Court of Appeal held that in the commercial context of the agreement, which aimed to provide a clear end to the listing period and trigger a standstill obligation, the word 'sold' meant an unconditional sale.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, plaintiffs in a defamation action against a newspaper and others, appealed an order requiring them to post security for costs under Rule 56.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge erred in law by not applying section 12 of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Court held that section 12 provides a specific, more onerous procedure for security for costs in libel actions involving newspapers, which takes precedence over the general provisions of Rule 56 pursuant to Rule 1.02(1)3.

The parties appealed and cross-appealed a trial judgment arising from the dissolution of their horse business relationship.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in awarding unjust enrichment for foal expenses, dismissing the claim for purse monies, overcompensating for a horse's reduced value, and denying damages from an interlocutory injunction.

The court also awarded the appellant solicitor and client costs based on a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The cross-appeal was allowed in part to grant the respondent pre-judgment interest.