Brendan Fitzpatrick Morrison

The applicant physician sought judicial review of an interim order by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario imposing strict practice conditions pending a discipline hearing for alleged sexual abuse.

The allegations involved inappropriate comments and touching during an auscultation.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and set aside the interim order, finding that the Committee lacked evidence to conclude the physician was likely to expose patients to harm or injury.

The court held that the Committee improperly relied on its own clinical assumptions rather than evidence to reject the physician's explanation of his examination technique.

The appellant, a police officer who pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death in a 2008 collision that killed an 18-year-old, posted comments on Facebook in 2015 after completing his sentence.

The respondents, relatives of the deceased, commenced a defamation action.

The appellant brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action, arguing his posts related to matters of public interest.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the posts did not relate to public interest but rather constituted an attempt to shift blame to the deceased and her family.

The motion judge awarded costs to the respondents despite the statutory presumption against such awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the dismissal of the s. 137.1 motion and the costs award.

The plaintiff underwent a nephrectomy performed by the defendant urologist after being diagnosed with suspected renal cell carcinoma.

Post-surgery pathology revealed the mass was a benign renal abscess.

The plaintiff sued for medical malpractice, alleging breach of the standard of care, lack of informed consent, and that the unnecessary removal of her kidney accelerated her end-stage renal failure.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the defendant met the standard of care as the clinical presentation and imaging strongly indicated malignancy and a biopsy was not the standard of care.

The court also found that informed consent was obtained and that the plaintiff failed to prove causation, as her pre-existing poorly controlled diabetes would have necessitated a kidney transplant regardless of the nephrectomy.

Indigenous peoples from Ecuador obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation for environmental devastation caused by oil exploration.

After failing to enforce the judgment in the United States due to findings of fraud by the plaintiffs' counsel, they sought to enforce it in Ontario against Chevron Canada, a seventh-level subsidiary.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding that Chevron Canada's shares and assets were not exigible under the Execution Act and that the corporate veil should not be pierced.

The appellants appealed, arguing both that the Execution Act permitted seizure of Chevron Canada's assets and that the corporate veil should be pierced in the interests of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits but reduced the costs award, recognizing the litigation as public interest litigation.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their motion to stay the action pending the disposition of a separate oppression application involving the respondent's shareholders.

The oppression application included orders prohibiting the respondent from settling the current action.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal and stayed the action, finding that the inability to settle the action severely undermined the respondent's authority to pursue it and prejudiced the appellants.

The court also found palpable and overriding errors in the motion judge's assessment of conflicting evidence regarding the respondent's corporate control.

Indigenous Ecuadorian villagers obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation in Ecuador for environmental pollution.

They sought to enforce the judgment in Ontario against Chevron Corporation and its seventh-level indirect subsidiary, Chevron Canada.

The motion judge granted an order requiring the plaintiffs to post security for costs of approximately $942,951 before the appeal could proceed.

The appellants moved to vary this order.

The Court of Appeal set aside the security for costs order, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to conduct a holistic analysis of the justness of the order in all circumstances.

The court emphasized that security for costs orders must be just and should not be used as a litigation tactic to prevent cases from being heard on their merits.

The Ecuadorian plaintiffs sought to enforce a judgment of approximately 9.5 billion dollars from an Ecuadorian court against Chevron Corporation and its subsidiary, Chevron Canada Limited, in Ontario.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's affirmation of Ontario's jurisdiction to hear the enforcement action, the motion judge granted summary judgment in favor of Chevron and Chevron Canada, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims on the basis of separate corporate personality.

The plaintiffs appealed.

Chevron and Chevron Canada brought a motion for security for costs.

The court held that security for costs was warranted because the plaintiffs were ordinarily resident outside Ontario, had not demonstrated impecuniosity, and had not established a good chance of success on appeal.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a new approach to security for costs should apply to foreign judgment enforcement actions, finding that comity does not require foreign litigants to be treated more favorably than domestic litigants.

The defendants were successful on a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court and sought costs of $8,421.09.

The plaintiff opposed the quantum, arguing the hourly rates and time spent were excessive, and challenging the disbursements.

The court found the fees reasonable but reduced the disbursements because they were undocumented.

Costs were fixed at $7,431.70 payable forthwith.

The Holmes defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their fourth motion to set aside a Mareva injunction and ancillary orders.

The motion judge had dismissed the Mareva order challenge on grounds of waiver and res judicata.

The applicant argued for leave based on conflicting decisions and doubt regarding the order's correctness.

The court denied leave, finding no conflicting decision on principle and no serious debate about the order's correctness, emphasizing the unique circumstances and the history of repeated, unsuccessful motions.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision that refused to strike out several paragraphs of the defendant's statement of defence.

The underlying action involved the recognition and enforcement of a $9.5 billion Ecuadorian judgment.

The defendant pleaded defences of fraud, public policy, and lack of natural justice, alleging the foreign judgment was ghostwritten and obtained through bribery.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, as the pleaded defences were recognized in law and not plainly and obviously bound to fail.

The appellants appealed the motion judge's decision to strike paragraph 25 of their statement of claim, which alleged that the respondent West Face distributed a defamatory report to unnamed third parties whose identities were known to West Face.

The appellants had already established a prima facie case of defamation by alleging publication to named persons at a specified time and place.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in striking the paragraph, finding that the appellants had demonstrated they were proceeding in good faith with a prima facie case and were not on a fishing expedition.

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the order striking paragraph 25.

The plaintiffs moved to add Chevron Canada Capital Company (CCCC) as a party defendant to their action seeking to enforce an Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron Corporation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendment was not legally tenable and disclosed no cause of action against CCCC, as the court had previously ruled that Chevron Canada's corporate veil could not be pierced.

Furthermore, the court found no basis for jurisdiction over CCCC, a Nova Scotia company with no assets or operations in Ontario, and noted that Rule 17.02(o) regarding necessary parties had been repealed.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce a US$9.5 billion Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron Corporation and its seventh-level indirect subsidiary, Chevron Canada Limited.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim against Chevron Canada, arguing it was a separate legal entity not liable for the judgment.

The plaintiffs argued Chevron Canada's assets were exigible under the Execution Act or that the corporate veil should be pierced.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim against Chevron Canada, finding the Execution Act does not override corporate separateness and there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil absent allegations of wrongdoing by the subsidiary.

The plaintiffs also moved to strike Chevron's statement of defence.

The court struck defences relating to retroactive legislation and international law, but permitted defences alleging the Ecuadorian judgment was procured by fraud, bribery, and a denial of natural justice to proceed to trial.

The defendants sought security for costs against the plaintiff, alleging outstanding costs orders and that the action was frivolous and vexatious.

The court granted the motion for security for costs against three of the four defendants, finding the claims against them to be frivolous and vexatious and rejecting the plaintiff's plea of impecuniosity due to unexplained resources.

The claim against the fourth defendant was not deemed frivolous or vexatious at this stage due to unresolved credibility issues.

The successful moving parties were deprived of their costs for the motion due to a procedural breach.

This endorsement addresses costs for several prior motions.

The plaintiffs (Nicholson Group) were awarded costs for a successful motion for leave to amend their statement of claim.

The Janza group and Horbatiuk defendants were awarded costs for their successful motions regarding abandoned motions and contempt proceedings.

Andrey Pinsky was awarded costs against the plaintiffs for successfully opposing an indemnity motion brought by Mr. Nicholson.

The court applied principles under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1), declining substantial indemnity where no egregious conduct was found.

The defendants brought a motion to stay the proceeding, arguing that the plaintiff corporation lacked authority to continue the action due to ongoing litigation (the "Newmarket application") concerning its ownership and management.

They also contended that two court orders from the Newmarket application, which restrained settlement of the Barrie action, effectively constituted a stay.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting its proper authority to proceed and arguing that the Newmarket orders only restricted settlement, not the progress of litigation.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the Newmarket orders did not stay the Barrie proceedings and that the plaintiff's sole director and majority shareholder possessed the requisite authority to retain and instruct counsel for the action.

The plaintiff sued two doctors for medical malpractice, alleging that a failure to notify her of a referral appointment led to prolonged casting of her fractured fingers and a poorer outcome.

The court found that the referring doctor's office had properly notified the plaintiff of the appointment, which she failed to attend.

Furthermore, the court accepted expert evidence that the prolonged casting met the standard of care given the severity of the fractures, and that any delay in mobilization did not cause the plaintiff's permanent impairment.

The action was dismissed.

In a foreign judgment recognition and enforcement appeal, the Court held that an enforcing forum need not establish a real and substantial connection between itself and either the dispute or the judgment debtor.

The only jurisdictional prerequisite is that the foreign court issuing the judgment had proper jurisdiction under the real and substantial connection framework or traditional grounds.

The Court also held that traditional presence-based jurisdiction over a corporate defendant is established where the corporation carries on business in the province and is served there.

Questions about ultimate enforceability against related corporate entities were left for later procedural stages.

The parties separated in 1999 after a 17-year marriage.

Following the wife's death in 2011, her estate obtained a summary judgment order declaring that all property owned by either party at separation was co-owned equally and held in trust.

At trial to determine the equalization payment, the court rejected both experts' extreme interpretations of the summary judgment order.

The court found the order did not impose retroactive trust obligations that would penalize post-separation consumption or require compounding interest.

The court also determined that substantial bonuses paid to the husband by his company post-separation were remuneration for his active management services, not shareholder distributions, and thus were not subject to equal division.

After valuing the respective assets, the court ordered the husband to pay the estate an equalization payment of $7,932,647.50.

The applicants sought costs following a motion for the production of documents.

Both parties claimed success on the motion.

The court found that the applicants were substantially more successful, as the respondent's principal position was that no disclosure should be ordered, forcing the applicants to bring the motion.

The court awarded the applicants costs fixed at $11,500 on an all-inclusive basis, reflecting a reduction for their lack of success on an alternative argument.