Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters

The accused, François Gauthier, was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm following a multi-vehicle collision on Highway 17.

The court found Gauthier's testimony regarding mechanical issues and controlled maneuvers to be incredible, concluding that his driving was objectively dangerous and a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable driver, largely due to his excessive speed and unsafe lane changes.

However, the court acquitted Gauthier on the impaired driving charges, finding that the expert toxicological evidence, while showing the presence of drugs, could not definitively establish impairment at the time of driving due to individual variability and lack of specific testing.

The defendant, Lenny Alexandre, was charged with operating a conveyance while prohibited.

The defence challenged the Crown's proof of identity, the connection of the license suspension to a criminal conviction, and argued that the Crown must prove the defendant was not registered in an ignition interlock program.

The court found that identity was proven by circumstantial evidence, the license suspension was sufficiently connected to a prior criminal conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol, and that registration in an interlock program is a defence, not an element of the offence, placing an evidentiary burden on the defendant.

The defendant was found guilty.

This is an appeal of convictions under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

GMJ Electric Inc. was convicted for failing to provide a scaffold and failing to provide adequate information, instruction, and supervision to a worker who fell from a ladder.

Gino Martignago was convicted as a supervisor for failing to ensure a worker used prescribed protective devices.

The appellants argued that the trial justice erred by adopting an absolute liability approach, crafting an unworkable protocol, and applying a narrow definition of "supervisor." The appeal court upheld the trial justice's findings, confirming that a fall hazard existed, due diligence was not established, and the employer failed in its duty to inform and instruct.

The court also affirmed the broad definition of "supervisor," finding that multiple individuals could hold supervisory roles without excusing the appellant's obligations.

The appeals were dismissed.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having excess alcohol in his system.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of his vehicle, intoxicated, with the vehicle stopped in the middle lane of eastbound traffic on Sheppard Avenue East at Don Mills Road at approximately 2:00 a.m.

The Crown's case was that the accused had care or control of the vehicle.

The defence argued that the accused's girlfriend had been driving and that the accused was placed in the driver's seat by his girlfriend while she cleaned up vomit, and that he was waiting for his father to pick them up.

The trial judge found that although the accused did not drive the vehicle to the location, he engaged in a course of conduct associated with the motor vehicle that posed a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, thereby establishing care or control under the third route identified in case law.

The accused was found guilty on both counts, with the impaired care or control charge stayed to avoid double punishment.

A foreign-trained Chartered Accountant from India was charged with eight regulatory offences under three Ontario accounting statutes for unlawfully using professional accounting designations and initials (CPA, CA, CMA, FCA, FCMA) on multiple websites and social media platforms while not being a member of the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario.

The defendant was a student of CPA Ontario who failed the Common Final Examination three times and was deregistered.

Despite receiving a cease-and-desist letter in March 2017, the defendant continued to publicly display his foreign designations on websites, LinkedIn, Kijiji advertisements, and other platforms, implying he was qualified to practice accounting in Ontario.

The court found the defendant guilty on all eight counts after determining the prosecution proved the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant failed to establish a due diligence defence.

The court also dismissed the defendant's Charter application challenging the constitutionality of the prohibitions, finding that while the restrictions infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b), they were reasonable limits justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The defendant was charged with speeding at 135 kilometres per hour in a 100 kilometres per hour zone on the Queen Elizabeth Way in Hamilton on May 22, 2016.

The prosecution relied on lidar speed measurement evidence from a trained officer.

The defendant testified that he was traveling at approximately 90 kilometres per hour based on his constant observation of his speedometer, having limited his speed due to vehicle damage from a deer collision earlier that morning.

The court found that while the prosecution's evidence was prima facie reliable, the defendant's exculpatory evidence, when considered in the context of the totality of evidence and identified frailties in the prosecution case, raised a reasonable doubt as to guilt.

The defendant was acquitted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for using invalid fare media contrary to section 2.3(a) of the Toronto Transit Commission By-Law.

The original conviction was based on three alleged breaches: failure to take the most direct route, improper re-entry into the subway system, and using the transfer outside a reasonable time period.

The appellate court found that the trial was procedurally unfair because the prosecution introduced a new theory of liability regarding travel time during re-examination without proper notice, and the trial judge improperly prevented the appellant from cross-examining the witness on the evidentiary basis for the travel time estimate.

The court also found that the conviction could not be sustained on the re-entry theory alone due to insufficient evidence.

A new trial was ordered.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown conceded that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle.

The court found that the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code was not engaged because the Crown failed to prove the defendant actually occupied the driver's seat.

However, applying the risk analysis from R. v. Boudreault, the court found a realistic risk that the defendant would drive while impaired, based on her intoxication, proximity to her vehicle, possession of keys, and lack of a concrete and reliable alternative plan.

The defendant was found guilty.

The applicant brought Charter applications under sections 8 and 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the context of a trial on Highway Traffic Act charges.

The applicant challenged the validity of a search warrant for cellular telephone records on the basis that the Information to Obtain was misleading and that the Justice of the Peace erred in issuing the warrant.

The applicant also sought a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The court found that while the Information to Obtain contained minor inaccuracies, it was not materially misleading and the Justice of the Peace did not err in issuing the warrant.

However, the court excluded evidence relating to the actual text or content of SMS messages as an unreasonable breach of section 8 rights.

The court dismissed the section 11(b) application, finding that the delay of approximately 7.5 months from trial readiness to trial date fell within constitutionally tolerable limits for provincial offences matters.

The accused pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL causing death.

The accused, aged 24, consumed alcohol at a bar and then drove his father's vehicle through the Western University campus at excessive speed, striking and killing an 18-year-old first-year student.

The accused's blood alcohol concentration was 171 mg/100 mL, more than twice the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment and a ten-year driving prohibition, emphasizing general deterrence as the paramount sentencing principle in impaired driving causing death cases.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood following a motor vehicle incident on September 20, 2013.

The Crown established that the accused was driving during the operative two-hour window and that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

Although the statutory presumption of care or control was rebutted due to the vehicle being inoperable, the Crown proved de facto care or control based on the accused's ongoing intentional course of conduct with the vehicle in circumstances creating a realistic risk of danger.

The court found the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, evidenced by observations of impairment, alcohol on breath, stumbling, red-rimmed eyes, and impaired judgment in standing on a live traffic lane.

Both charges were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed a conviction for Proceed Contrary to Sign at Intersection under Section 144(9) of the Highway Traffic Act, which was entered in her absence at an Early Resolution Meeting on March 22, 2013.

The appellant claimed she received no notice of the Early Resolution Meeting and never requested one.

Following an initial conviction on December 13, 2013, the appellant successfully applied for re-opening on January 31, 2013, after which the court directed an Early Resolution Meeting to be scheduled.

The appellant contended she was not notified of this rescheduled meeting.

The court found that absent evidence of proper notice to the appellant of the proceeding that directly affected her rights, and given her uncontested assertion that she was unaware of the proceeding, the conviction must be set aside and a new trial ordered.

An appeal from a conviction for failing to comply with a property standards order issued pursuant to the Building Code Act.

The appellant raised four Charter grounds on appeal: trial within a reasonable time (s.11(b)), disclosure and trial fairness (s.7), cruel and unusual punishment (s.12), and equality under the law (s.15).

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the delay was primarily attributable to the appellant's own requests for adjournments and irrelevant disclosure, that disclosure was adequate, that s.12 did not apply to a conviction appeal, and that the mere fact that other bylaw violations existed did not engage s.15 equality rights.

The accused was charged with driving while prohibited from doing so contrary to s. 259(4) of the Criminal Code.

A police officer observed a vehicle idling in the driveway of a residence on a list related to prohibited drivers.

The officer stopped the vehicle and identified the driver as the accused using an expired driver's license.

The accused had been prohibited from operating a motor vehicle for three years following a 2010 sentencing.

The accused raised Charter challenges regarding arbitrary detention, unreasonable search, and right to counsel.

The court rejected all Charter arguments and found the Crown had proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in a conviction.

Appellant appealed his conviction for driving while suspended contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial Justice of the Peace found that the appellant failed to establish due diligence on a balance of probabilities.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in finding that he had not proven a postal strike occurred and that he had failed to establish due diligence.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, finding that driving while suspended is a strict liability offence, and once the Crown proves the actus reus, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove due diligence.

The court found the appellant's evidence regarding the postal strike was vague and insufficient, and his failure to follow up on an unpaid ticket demonstrated a lack of due diligence.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and carrying a concealed weapon.

The Crown alleged that the accused pursued another vehicle at high speed on Second Line, made contact with it multiple times, and sprayed bear mace at the driver.

The court found significant credibility issues with the complainant's testimony, particularly regarding the relative positions of the vehicles and the sequence of events.

The testimony of two teenage witnesses corroborated the accused's version that the complainant's vehicle was behind the accused's vehicle.

The court acquitted the accused on the dangerous driving charge due to reasonable doubt.

The court adjourned the concealed weapon charge for further consideration.

The Crown appealed a fine imposed by a justice of the peace for a speeding offence.

The respondent pleaded guilty to speeding 45 kilometres per hour in a 30 kilometre per hour zone contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The justice of the peace imposed a reduced set fine of $37.50 instead of the statutory fine of $45.00.

The Crown appealed, arguing the justice of the peace lacked authority to impose a set fine rather than the statutory fine.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to impose the statutory fine of $45.00 plus costs and victim fine surcharge.

A numbered company operating as an entertainment establishment/nightclub was charged with operating without the required municipal license under the City of Toronto Municipal Code.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that its right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The Crown opposed the motion.

The court found that the total delay of 17 months, comprising 12 months of Crown and institutional delay, exceeded the acceptable threshold for a routine Part III provincial offence.

The court granted the motion and stayed the proceedings.