Anna M. Hampson

The defendants were charged with violating the Huron County Conservation By-Law by destroying trees in a woodland and failing to comply with a stop work order.

The prosecution proved that approximately 6.8 acres (2.75 hectares) of woodland containing thousands of trees was destroyed between March and July 2023, and that burning and grading activities continued after a stop work order was issued on June 8, 2023.

The court found that the cleared area met the statutory definition of woodland under the by-law and convicted both defendants on both counts.

Following conviction for violating the Huron County Conservation By-Law 38-2013 (Forest Conservation By-Law) by destroying a woodland and failing to comply with a stop work order, the court imposed significant monetary penalties and a two-year probation order.

The defendants were found guilty of destroying approximately 10,450 trees on property owned by the corporation and directed by the sole director.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the proposed fines were excessive and found substantial aggravating factors, including prior knowledge that the land could not be cleared and continued destruction after a stop work order was issued.

The Ontario Court of Justice found Joris Salverda guilty of operating a milk plant without a licence contrary to s. 15(1) of the Milk Act and breaching a probation order under s. 75 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The Defendant challenged the applicability of the Milk Act to his private raw milk operation via a Notice of Constitutional Question, arguing that the Act did not apply to his private dealings with customers who assumed risks.

The Court dismissed the constitutional challenge, relying heavily on the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in R v. Schmidt, which held that the Milk Act applies to private operations and that there is no constitutional right to sell unpasteurized milk products.

The Court found no violation of s. 7 Charter rights and confirmed the Defendant's guilt on both charges.

The defendant, Holly Broeckel, brought an application for a stay of charges for failing to yield to through traffic, alleging unreasonable delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 24.9 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established by R. v. Jordan.

The prosecution argued the delay was due to the COVID-19 public health crisis as an exceptional circumstance.

The defence contended the delay was primarily due to a lack of judicial resources.

The court found no defence delay and identified a discrete event of 4.9 months due to counsel's family tragedy.

Taking a holistic view, the court attributed 12.5 months of the delay to the ongoing impact of the COVID-19 public health crisis and an additional 6.4 months to a lack of judicial resources.

After accounting for these factors, the remaining delay was 13.9 months, which is below the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed, as the delay was deemed not unreasonable given the exceptional circumstances and systemic challenges.

The defendant, Nina Nodwell, facing charges of careless driving causing death and bodily harm, brought two pretrial applications: one for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, and another for a stay due to abuse of process by the Crown.

The court found the total delay was 19.6 months, but a significant portion was attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, which was deemed an exceptional circumstance.

After deducting the COVID-19 related delay, the net delay was well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

Regarding the abuse of process claim, the court found no firm resolution agreement was reached between the parties, and thus the Crown did not "resile" from a deal.

The court also found no prejudice to the defendant and no bad faith or improper motive by the Crown.

Both applications were dismissed, and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.

The defendant pleaded guilty to owning and driving a motor vehicle without automobile insurance contrary to the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The Crown sought the minimum fine of $5,000, while the defence argued for $500 based on Gladue principles and financial hardship.

The court found that Gladue principles apply to sentencing under s. 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act, and that the defendant's circumstances as a grandchild of residential school survivors, single mother of two children, and participant in the Indigenous Mother's Gateway Program constituted exceptional circumstances warranting relief from the minimum fine.

The court imposed a fine of $1,500 payable over 15 months and placed the defendant on probation for 15 months.

The defendant applied for a declaration that section 60.1 of the Provincial Offences Act (victim fine surcharge) was unconstitutional, alleging violations of sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant had been convicted of operating a motor vehicle without insurance, a second conviction within six months.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the surcharge is administratively imposed rather than court-imposed punishment, and therefore does not engage section 12.

The court further found that even if the surcharge constituted punishment, it would not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, and that there was no violation of section 7 security of the person interests.

The defendant was charged with speeding 104 km/h in a posted 90 kph zone contrary to s. 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The incident occurred on March 7, 2013.

The defendant brought an application under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of proceedings due to a violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Crown took no position on the application.

The court found that the total delay of 12 months and 14 days from the date of the offence to the trial date was unreasonable, consisting of an excessive 6-month intake period to schedule the trial and a further 5-month delay from the Notice of Trial to the actual trial date.

The court determined that a reasonable neutral intake period for a Part 1 proceeding should be 30 to 45 days.

The defendant also demonstrated actual prejudice due to the delay.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was ordered.

The defendant brought an application for a stay of proceedings for a violation of s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay.

The charge arose from an alleged breach of a municipal bylaw regarding driving a motor vehicle on a beach.

The proceedings were initiated by private information by the plaintiff.

The court found that while institutional delay of 6.7 months fell below guideline thresholds, the total delay attributable to prosecution and other factors amounted to approximately 12 months of unreasonable delay when the appellate period was excluded.

The defendant demonstrated actual prejudice from the extended proceedings.

The court granted the application and stayed the charge.

The defendant was charged under s. 18(1) of the Dog Owner's Liability Act for an incident on March 22, 2012, in which a dog named Mac killed a cat named Barn Mother on a farm in the Municipality of West Elgin.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging a violation of her right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding no unreasonable delay.

On the merits, the court found that the defendant was an "owner" of the dog under the Act, that the cat was a "domestic animal," and that the defendant failed to establish a due diligence defence.

The defendant was found guilty of the offence.

The defendant was charged with being an attendant at an adult live entertainment parlour and having physical contact with another person while providing services, contrary to the Business Licensing City of London By-Law #L-6, s. 3.8.

The court examined two issues: identity and whether the establishment constituted an adult entertainment parlour.

The court found the defendant guilty after determining that the performance involved nudity designed to appeal to erotic or sexual appetites, constituting a live performance under the by-law, and that physical contact occurred between the defendant and a patron.