Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters

The City of Toronto appealed sentencing decisions by a Justice of the Peace who had imposed no victim surcharge on fines for provincial offences, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Boudreault.

The appellant sought a ruling that the Justice of the Peace erred in law in declaring that no surcharge would be imposed, arguing that the Provincial Offences Act surcharge operates differently from the Criminal Code surcharge addressed in Boudreault.

The court found that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by failing to provide adequate reasons and by failing to comply with notice requirements under the Courts of Justice Act before raising a constitutional challenge.

The defendant applied for a declaration that section 60.1 of the Provincial Offences Act (victim fine surcharge) was unconstitutional, alleging violations of sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant had been convicted of operating a motor vehicle without insurance, a second conviction within six months.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the surcharge is administratively imposed rather than court-imposed punishment, and therefore does not engage section 12.

The court further found that even if the surcharge constituted punishment, it would not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, and that there was no violation of section 7 security of the person interests.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and breach of recognizance for contact with the complainant contrary to section 145(3) of the Criminal Code.

The charges arose from an incident on July 9, 2017, involving an acrimonious interaction between the defendant and his ex-wife during a child custody exchange.

The defendant pleaded guilty to the breach of recognizance but not guilty to dangerous driving.

The court found the defendant's credibility unreliable due to his agitated state of mind and inconsistencies in his testimony.

However, the court determined that the Crown failed to prove the mens rea of dangerous driving beyond a reasonable doubt, as the evidence did not establish that the defendant operated his vehicle at a high rate of speed or deliberately swerved toward the complainant.

The court found the defendant guilty of breach of recognizance but acquitted him of dangerous driving.

The City of Oshawa prosecuted property owners for violations of the Building Code Act, 1992 and the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997.

The defendants were charged with failing to comply with Property Standards Orders for three properties and failing to install a smoke alarm in a dwelling unit.

The court found the defendants guilty of failing to comply with a Property Standards Order for 304 Simcoe Street South and guilty of failing to install a smoke alarm at 17 Quebec Street.

However, the court dismissed charges related to 9 Quebec Street and 17 Quebec Street Property Standards Orders due to insufficient proof of ownership beyond February 24, 2017.

The trial proceeded ex parte after the defendants failed to appear despite proper notice.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with care and control while blood alcohol exceeded 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

Police observed the accused in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle in a hotel parking lot at 2:18 a.m.

The accused was extremely intoxicated.

The court found that although the accused had rebutted the presumption under section 258 of the Criminal Code, he did not have actual care and control of the motor vehicle.

The accused had given his keys to a friend while sober, had called a taxi, and entered the vehicle only to retrieve personal items.

The momentary activation of the turn signal and brake lights did not create a realistic risk of danger.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered ex parte under section 9.1 of the Provincial Offences Act for failing to move into another lane for an emergency vehicle.

The Certificate of Offence cited an incorrect and repealed section of the Highway Traffic Act (section 159.1(2)) rather than the valid provision (section 159(3)).

The respondent conceded that the Certificate was not regular on its face due to the improper section citation.

The court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction, finding that the discrepancy between the section number and the description of the offence created ambiguity that rendered the Certificate incomplete and irregular for purposes of an ex parte conviction.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges under the Environmental Protection Act for operating a waste disposal site without a Certificate of Approval and disposing of waste contrary to their Waste Management System Approval.

The core issue was whether the respondent's approval for "collection, handling and transportation" implicitly included storage.

The court found that storage was not authorized and that the trial judge erred in her interpretation of the approval and the application of due diligence.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a stay of proceedings was ordered, as further proceedings were deemed not in the interests of justice.

The accused was charged with flight from police and dangerous driving following an incident on April 19-20, 2015, near Ignace, Ontario.

A police officer activated emergency lights to stop the accused's vehicle for speeding in poor weather conditions.

The accused's vehicle pulled over briefly, then accelerated rapidly and fled at excessive speed through a built-up commercial area.

The vehicle subsequently crashed in a ditch.

The court found the Crown proved both charges beyond a reasonable doubt, rejecting the accused's testimony as unbelievable and accepting the police officers' evidence regarding the accused's excessive speed and dangerous manner of driving in adverse conditions.

Two accused persons were jointly charged with dangerous driving while racing contrary to section 249.4(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged they were operating motor vehicles in a race on Forrest Lea Road.

The trial judge found that while both accused were driving at excessive speeds on an unfamiliar rural road without paying attention to traffic signs, they were not engaged in racing as contemplated by the statute.

The judge found the accused were driving one behind the other, not side by side in competitive fashion.

The judge convicted both accused of the lesser included offence of dangerous driving contrary to section 249(1) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 (impaired driving) following a random sobriety check-stop conducted by police in a shopping plaza parking lot.

The central issue was whether police had authority to conduct random check-stops in private parking lots.

The court held that while the Highway Traffic Act does not authorize such stops in parking lots, police possess common law authority to stop vehicles in parking lots for highway safety purposes, including random stops.

The court found no Charter violation and admitted the breath test results, finding the defendant guilty as charged.

Two defendants pleaded guilty to criminal offences arising from their conduct following the accidental death of a 16-year-old boy who was skateboarding on an unlit highway at night.

The defendants struck the victim with a pickup truck, discovered his body in the truck bed, and then transported the body to a skateboard park to stage a skateboarding accident before calling 911 with a false report.

The court imposed consecutive jail sentences emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as paramount sentencing objectives, while acknowledging the defendants' youth, remorse, and rehabilitation prospects.

The defendant was charged with disobeying a stop sign contrary to section 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution alleged that the defendant failed to bring his vehicle to a complete stop at a marked stop line at the intersection of Scott Boulevard and Pringle Avenue in Milton on September 11, 2012.

The defendant denied the allegation and testified that he did stop his vehicle before the stop line.

The court found that while the prosecution established the actus reus on a balance of probabilities, it failed to meet the higher standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant's testimony, when considered in the context of the totality of evidence, raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop at a stop sign contrary to section 136(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution presented evidence from a police officer who observed the defendant's vehicle pass through a stop sign at approximately 5-7 km/h without coming to a complete stop.

The defendant testified that he stopped his vehicle behind the marked stop line before proceeding through the intersection.

The court found that while the offence is one of absolute liability requiring only proof of the actus reus, the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to significant uncertainty regarding the officer's vantage point (possibly 50 metres or more from the intersection rather than the stated 10 metres) and the credible, consistent testimony of the defendant.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with "Follow Too Closely" contrary to section 158(1) of the Highway Traffic Act on December 5, 2011.

The defendant brought a Charter application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the overall delay of 14 months was excessive for a minor provincial offence.

The court found that the defendant's rights to trial within a reasonable time were infringed, with institutional delay and Crown actions accounting for 11.5 months of the total delay.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to yield to a pedestrian under section 140(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant argued that the offence should have been charged under section 144(7) of the Highway Traffic Act because the pedestrian was struck at a signalized intersection (crosswalk) rather than at a pedestrian crossover as defined in the regulations.

The court held that the substance of the offence—failing to yield to a pedestrian with the legal right of way—is the same under both sections, and that form does not trump substance.

The court found no prejudice to the appellant and upheld the conviction.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of impaired driving causing death.

While impaired by alcohol, the accused operated a motor vehicle on Fingal Line near St. Thomas with two passengers, both of whom were killed when the vehicle struck a telephone pole.

The accused fled the scene and was apprehended with the assistance of a police K-9 unit.

The sentencing court imposed a global sentence of four and one-half years imprisonment, with a ten-year driving prohibition, balancing the paramount principles of general deterrence and denunciation against mitigating factors including the accused's early guilty plea, lack of prior record, genuine remorse, and the time spent in pre-trial custody and strict bail conditions.

The defendant was charged with disobeying a stop sign by failing to stop at the intersection of Leighland Avenue and Kent Avenue in Oakville on February 9, 2011.

The prosecution relied on the testimony of Police Officer Ross Amore, who observed the defendant's vehicle entering the intersection at approximately 15 kilometres per hour without stopping.

The defendant testified that he stopped properly at the stop sign, and his passenger corroborated this account.

The court found that while the officer's testimony was genuine, it lacked significant reliability due to equivocal responses regarding other vehicles at the intersection and a lack of detail regarding the defendant's vehicle's approach to the marked stop line.

The court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant failed to stop at the marked stop line as required by the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was acquitted.