Rhonda Vanderlinde

The City of Oshawa prosecuted property owners for violations of the Building Code Act, 1992 and the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997.

The defendants were charged with failing to comply with Property Standards Orders for three properties and failing to install a smoke alarm in a dwelling unit.

The court found the defendants guilty of failing to comply with a Property Standards Order for 304 Simcoe Street South and guilty of failing to install a smoke alarm at 17 Quebec Street.

However, the court dismissed charges related to 9 Quebec Street and 17 Quebec Street Property Standards Orders due to insufficient proof of ownership beyond February 24, 2017.

The trial proceeded ex parte after the defendants failed to appear despite proper notice.

The City of Oshawa appealed a trial justice's decision quashing an Information charging a corporation with failing to obtain a building permit for renovations to an aircraft hangar at the Oshawa Airport.

The trial justice found that the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity applied, immunizing the respondent from provincial building code enforcement because the property was integral to federal jurisdiction over aeronautics.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding the trial justice correctly applied the doctrine.

However, the court set aside a costs award of $111,000 plus HST against the prosecution, finding insufficient evidentiary foundation for such an award and palpable and overriding error in the trial justice's reasoning regarding the conduct of the prosecutors and the City of Oshawa.

This is a costs decision following the quashing of a provincial offence charge against the defendant for failing to obtain a building permit for construction to its hangar at the Oshawa Airport complex.

The court found that the constitutional doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity applied, rendering the charge void ab initio.

The court subsequently determined that the City of Oshawa, as prosecutor, had displayed marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable prosecution standards, warranting a costs award.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis, finding the prosecutor had acted in self-serving interests rather than the public interest, had failed to disclose relevant materials, had breached prosecutorial responsibilities by using settlement discussions against the defendant, and had proceeded despite clear jurisprudence establishing federal exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautics.

The defendant corporation was charged with failing to obtain a building permit for modifications to a hangar at Oshawa Airport, contrary to the Building Code Act, 1992.

The defendant raised a constitutional challenge based on federal exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautics under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.

The court found the Building Code Act provisions invalid as applied to the defendant's hangar and dismissed the charge.

Subsequently, the court awarded costs against the City of Oshawa as prosecutor, finding the prosecution exhibited flagrant departure from reasonable standards, including tunnel vision, witness bias, failure to disclose relevant documents, and refusal to accept established jurisprudence on federal aeronautics jurisdiction.

Crown appeal from an acquittal of a defendant charged with driving a heavy vehicle on a prohibited highway contrary to the City of Oshawa Traffic By-law 79-99.

The trial judge acquitted the defendant by finding that the prosecution bore the burden of proving the defendant knew of or intended to violate the bylaw.

The appellate court found the trial judge erred by imposing a mens rea requirement on a strict liability offence and by improperly relying on section 134(3) of the Highway Traffic Act, which did not apply to municipal bylaws.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that once the actus reus was proven, the burden shifted to the defendant to establish a due diligence defence under the strict liability framework.

A corporation charged with failing to obtain a building permit under the Ontario Building Code Act, 1992 for modifications to an aircraft hangar at the Oshawa Airport successfully defended the charge on constitutional grounds.

The court found that the hangar, located within the airport complex and used for aviation purposes, falls within the exclusive federal jurisdiction over aeronautics.

The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity applied, rendering the provincial building code requirement inapplicable to the federally regulated facility.

The court also dismissed a section 11(b) Charter application regarding trial delay, finding the delay, though significant, was within acceptable bounds given the complexity of the constitutional issues and societal interest in the matter.

The defendants were charged with applying excessive protective elements to their residential property in violation of the City of Oshawa's Fortification By-law.

The defendants had installed eleven video surveillance cameras on their property that captured views well beyond the perimeter of their land, including neighbours' yards, side yards, front yards, and adjacent streets.

The defendants claimed the cameras were necessary for protection against break-ins, vandalism, and harassment from neighbours, and argued the by-law was unconstitutional and did not apply to private property.

The court found the defendants guilty, holding that the by-law validly applies to private property, the municipal entry and search warrant were lawful, and the surveillance system exceeded reasonable protection by intruding into neighbours' reasonable expectation of privacy.

The appellant, a commercial property owner, was convicted of infractions under the Ontario Fire Code for permitting a private school to operate on the premises without compliance with fire safety regulations.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the private school was regulated by the Education Act and therefore exempt from the Ontario Fire Code under section 9.2.1.2 of Regulation 213/07.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the private school was not governed by the Education Act because no notice of intention to operate had been filed as required by section 16(1) of the Education Act.

The court found that the burden of proof rested on the appellant to establish the exemption and that a factual finding at trial could not substitute for the express statutory requirement of filing a notice of intention.