Human Rights

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude breath sample evidence, alleging multiple breaches of his rights including: (1) arrest and approved instrument demand without reasonable grounds; (2) delayed notification of the right to counsel; (3) failure to facilitate access to counsel at the roadside and counsel of choice at the station; and (4) video recording of cell toilet use.

The court found one Charter breach—a nine-minute delay in informing the accused of his right to counsel—but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would harm the administration of justice more than admission.

The accused was found guilty.

The court granted summary judgment in two related libel actions brought by Rainbow Alliance Dryden, Caitlin Hartlen, Felicia Crichton, and John-Marcel Forget against Brian Webster.

The plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Webster published defamatory posts on Facebook, falsely associating them with grooming and sexual predation of children.

The court found the posts were defamatory, identified the plaintiffs, and were published to third parties.

The court rejected Mr. Webster’s defences, including fair comment, and found he acted with malice.

General and aggravated damages were awarded to each plaintiff.

The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was 26 months and 8 days (800 days).

The court analyzed periods of delay, attributing 161 days to defence delay due to failure to promptly set a trial date and incorrect availability advice.

An additional 193 days of delay were equally apportioned between the defence and the court due to defence counsel's unavailability and the court's inability to offer earlier dates.

After deductions, the net delay was 446 days (approximately 14.6 months), which is well below the Jordan ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed as the defence could not demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite proceedings, nor did the case take markedly longer than it should have.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood, contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant sought to exclude breath samples and test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter, including claims of racial profiling.

The court found no Charter breaches.

The officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol in the defendant's body based on improper parking at an LCBO, admission of prior alcohol consumption, and detection of alcohol odour.

The screening demand was lawful and made within the immediacy requirement.

No racial profiling occurred.

The defendant was properly arrested and advised of her rights.

A conviction was registered.

The accused was charged with an Over 80 offence following a RIDE program stop.

The accused alleged that the arresting officer steered him towards duty counsel after arrest, thereby breaching his constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel of choice.

The Crown conceded that steering occurred but argued it did not constitute a breach.

The court found that the officer's imprecise and careless communications misled the accused about the scope of his right to counsel of choice.

The officer failed to provide reasonable opportunities to contact alternative counsel and failed to adequately respond to the accused's expressed dissatisfaction with duty counsel.

The court found a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter and excluded the breath test evidence, resulting in an acquittal.

A tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order to the Divisional Court, claiming the Board failed to accommodate his disabilities by refusing to grant an adjournment when he called on the morning of the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as devoid of merit and for failure to perfect.

The tenant then appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the proper procedure was a motion to set aside or vary before a Divisional Court panel, but agreed to hear the matter as if such a motion had been properly brought.

The Court upheld the dismissal, finding the Board member reasonably exercised discretion in refusing the adjournment given the tenant's prior notice, failure to use available rescheduling procedures, pattern of requesting adjournments, and non-payment of rent.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, sought an order permitting the admission of evidence of extrinsic sexual abuse of the complainant.

The applicant challenged the constitutional validity of sections 278.93 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the statutory procedure for determining admissibility of extrinsic sexual history and private records compels disclosure of defence evidence and strategy in advance of trial, breaching sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The applicant also contended that granting the complainant standing on the admissibility voir dire creates an appearance of unfairness.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory provisions can be applied in a manner consistent with the principle against self-incrimination, the right to a fair trial, and the complainant's rights to privacy and equality, provided that applications under section 278.93 are brought during cross-examination of the complainant rather than as pre-trial motions.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for stunt driving and his sentence following a retrial.

The appellant was originally charged in September 2011 with driving 218 km/h in a 100 km/h zone on Highway 401, allegedly racing with another vehicle.

After a lengthy procedural history, the retrial commenced in March 2017.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal regarding jurisdiction, alleged non-disclosure of dispatch recordings, and Charter violations related to a second officer's attendance at the scene.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal against conviction, finding no evidentiary foundation for the appellant's assertions and noting the appellant's own failure to diligently pursue available remedies.

On the sentence appeal, the court found the trial judge made an error in principle by failing to consider that the appellant had already served 12 days incarceration and three months of a driving prohibition for the same offence.

The conviction was upheld but the sentence was varied.

The applicant was charged with public mischief following a private information sworn by her estranged husband.

The charge arose from her report to police of an alleged assault.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on delay in trial.

The net delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated trial date was approximately 14.5 months, below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court.

The court found that while the defence had taken meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, the case had markedly exceeded reasonable time requirements due to systemic failures and Crown complicity in unnecessary delays, particularly during the pre-enquette phase and service of process.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operation with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop on November 26, 2016.

The Crown called two police officers and filed an expert toxicologist report.

The defence raised multiple Charter violations relating to the roadside breath sample procedure and the right to counsel.

The court found two Charter violations under section 10(b) but admitted the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was convicted of the over 80 charge but acquitted of the impaired driving charge due to insufficient evidence of impairment.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop on Highway 401.

The defence challenged whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and whether the evidence established impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that the officer possessed reasonable and probable grounds based on the accused's erratic driving behaviour, odour of alcohol, admission of consumption, and physical signs of impairment.

The court convicted the accused of impaired operation and stayed the over 80 charge pursuant to the Keinapple principle.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol content over 80 mg/100 ml on April 6, 2015.

A McDonald's employee reported observing an impaired driver, providing a license plate.

Police located the vehicle and observed erratic driving before stopping it at the accused's residence.

The Crown relied on breath test evidence and expert toxicology opinion.

The defence challenged the arrest under section 8 of the Charter and argued the expert report's assumptions were not established.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds for arrest but excluded the expert report due to evidence of bolus drinking (consumption of alcohol shortly before testing).

The court acquitted on both charges, finding the evidence of impairment insufficient to meet the beyond reasonable doubt standard.

The defendant was stopped, detained, and searched by Durham Regional Police while walking near the courthouse.

Police claimed they believed he resembled a wanted person (Tyrone Hylton) and that he attempted to flee and destroy evidence.

The defendant was found in possession of 7 grams of crack cocaine.

The defendant challenged the detention and search as arbitrary and unreasonable.

The court found that police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for either the detention or search, as the resemblance between the defendant and the wanted person was superficial and based primarily on race.

The court also rejected the police evidence that the defendant attempted to flee or swallow drugs.

Finding violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the court applied the section 24(2) analysis and excluded the evidence, resulting in acquittal.

The applicant brought a Charter motion under sections 10(b) and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that she was not afforded contact with counsel of her choice and did not receive adequate legal advice.

The applicant was arrested for impaired driving and given her right to counsel.

She selected three lawyers from a provided list.

The police attempted to contact her first two choices without success and successfully connected her with her third choice, with whom she spoke for approximately eight minutes.

The applicant subsequently complained to police that the lawyer was rude and hung up on her, and that she received no advice.

The court found that the police took reasonable steps to facilitate contact with counsel of choice and that the applicant did not diligently and reasonably indicate that the advice received was inadequate.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a roadside stop.

A police officer received a report that the accused appeared intoxicated at a drive-through window, stopped the vehicle, and requested a roadside screening device (ASD) test.

The ASD arrived approximately 15 minutes later, and the test was administered 18 minutes after the initial stop.

The accused was not advised of his right to counsel until after failing the ASD test.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test evidence showing a blood-alcohol concentration of 160 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the evidence on multiple grounds, including that the ASD demand and test were not made "forthwith" as required by statute, and that the breath tests were not taken "as soon as practicable" as required to trigger the evidentiary presumption of identity.

The offender pleaded guilty to one count of gross indecency and one count of indecent assault involving two young male victims in the early 1980s.

The offences involved sexual exploitation of children aged 10 and 13 years old, including oral sex, anal intercourse, coercion, blackmail, and the provision of alcohol.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months' imprisonment concurrent on both counts, rejecting the defence submission for a conditional sentence despite the offender's exemplary life over the intervening 30 years.

The court found that denunciation and general deterrence required incarceration in a traditional setting.

A DNA order, SOIRA compliance order, and 5-year weapons prohibition were imposed.

A section 161 order was refused on Charter grounds.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in connection with a search warrant executed on an apartment.

The Crown conceded violations of sections 8 and 10(b).

The court found violations of all three sections.

The applicant was charged with unlawful production of marijuana, possession of marijuana for trafficking, and possession of MDMA for trafficking.

The court conducted a section 24(2) analysis and excluded evidence consisting of keys and a lease seized during the search, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The trial proceeded with a blended Charter application challenging the validity of the breath sample evidence.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: (1) the demand under s. 254(2) Criminal Code was not made "forthwith" as required, with a 22-minute delay from formation of suspicion to commencement of testing; (2) the accused's s. 10(a)(b) Charter rights were not provided immediately after the roadside test failure.

Under s. 24(2) Charter analysis, the court excluded the Certificate of Analysis evidence as the breaches were multiple, protracted, and contrary to the officer's training, warranting disassociation by the justice system.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, driving with excess alcohol, and possession of marijuana following a traffic stop in Brampton.

The marijuana charge was dismissed on consent.

The central issue was whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, thereby justifying a breath demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the breath demand and sought exclusion of the evidence.

The court found the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of circumstances, including observations of driving conduct and physical signs of intoxication.

The court rejected the defence argument that the officer's observations were exaggerated or careless.

Convictions were entered on both driving-related counts.

The defendant was charged with speeding (111 km/h in a 70 km/h zone) under the Highway Traffic Act, prosecuted under Part I of the Provincial Offences Act.

The defendant brought an application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The trial commenced on November 17, 2010, but was adjourned due to lack of court time.

The trial was subsequently rescheduled multiple times, with the defendant explicitly waiving his Charter rights for one period.

The court found that 15 months and 16 days of the total 23 months and 20 days of delay was attributable to unacceptable institutional delay.

The court concluded that the defendant's right to a fair trial had been prejudiced and that a stay of proceedings was the appropriate remedy.