Human Rights

The defendant hospital brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' action under Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs sought damages for breach of contract, constructive dismissal, negligence, misfeasance in public office, defamation, and human rights violations arising from the suspension and revocation of the physician's hospital privileges following non-compliance with a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The court found that most claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board under the Public Hospitals Act and were struck.

The court allowed only the claim for lost wages from October 1, 2021 to the date privileges were suspended, and granted leave to amend regarding defamation and misfeasance in public office claims.

The accused, Sethuraman Sarvanantharajah, was charged with impaired operation and operation over the legal limit after striking a parked car.

The court addressed several issues, including the time of driving, proof of impairment, reasonable grounds for arrest, and alleged breaches of Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the Crown proved the time of driving and impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds.

Furthermore, the court determined there was no unreasonable delay in contacting counsel and that the police were not obligated to provide detailed grounds for arrest to counsel during the initial consultation, as such information could be obtained from the client or through disclosure.

The accused was found guilty of both charges, with a conditional stay on the impaired driving charge.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results on three grounds: (1) breach of section 10(b) Charter rights to counsel; (2) failure to comply with the "as soon as practicable" requirement under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code; and (3) loss of the presumption of accuracy under section 320.31(1).

The court found a breach of the right to counsel but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable despite a 14-minute delay at the police station.

The court found the breath test results admissible at common law and reliable, and convicted the defendant.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol.

The primary issue was whether the defendant's Charter rights under section 10(b) were breached when police conducted the investigation and breath demand in English without providing a Vietnamese interpreter.

The defendant argued that his limited English proficiency prevented him from fully understanding and exercising his rights to counsel.

The court examined the defendant's actual comprehension of his rights through video evidence and testimony, considering factors including his ability to communicate in English, his responsiveness to police directions, his ability to ask questions, and his demonstrated understanding of his rights to counsel.

The court found no breach of section 10(b) rights and convicted the defendant of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

James Grant brought an application under sections 7 and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of criminal charges, alleging numerous Charter violations by state agents following his arrest for importing a controlled substance.

The alleged violations included unlawful detention, search, denial of counsel, excessive force during fingerprinting and strip searches, and judicial bias stemming from his "sovereign citizen" beliefs.

The court dismissed the application, finding no Charter breaches in the initial border search, fingerprinting incidents, or the courthouse flagpole incident.

It also determined that prison officials were justified in using force for a mandatory strip search in a custodial setting and that there was no reasonable apprehension of judicial bias or discrimination based on the applicant's beliefs.

The appellant was arrested on a surety warrant that had been rescinded by an administrative judge over a month prior to the arrest, but the rescission was not recorded on CPIC.

A pat-down search incident to arrest and a subsequent strip search yielded cocaine and marijuana.

The trial judge found the arrest lawful and the searches reasonable.

On appeal, the court found the arrest was unlawful because: (1) the surety warrant had been validly rescinded by the administrative judge; (2) the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest; and (3) the police failed to make reasonable inquiries when the appellant informed them the warrant had been dealt with in court.

The court also found the strip search violated section 8 of the Charter.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and verdicts of acquittal were substituted.

The accused was tried on a single count of operating a motor vehicle with blood/alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown called two witnesses: a security guard and the arresting officer who was also a qualified breath technician.

The defence raised Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 9 and 10(b), seeking remedies under section 24(2).

The court found that the accused was psychologically detained at her residential door without being advised of her rights to counsel, and that she was arbitrarily detained in a locked cell for 89 minutes after being determined releasable.

The court excluded the breath evidence due to the serious Charter breaches and the accused was acquitted.

The appellant displayed a sign reading "Trump is right.

Fuck China.

Fuck Mexico" in Grand View Plaza within Niagara Parks.

The Niagara Parks Police issued a summons for violations of section 2(9)(a) of Ontario Regulation 829 under the Niagara Parks Act, which prohibits abusive or insulting language that interferes with the use and enjoyment of the parks.

The appellant was also issued an oral trespass notice.

The application judge dismissed the constitutional challenge.

On appeal, the court held that while section 2(9)(a) does limit freedom of expression under the Charter, the limitation is justified under section 1.

However, the court found that the trespass notice was unconstitutional as applied to the appellant's political expression.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of 80 mgs/100ml following a collision where she drove into a stopped vehicle at full speed.

The Crown proved reasonable grounds for arrest based on the dangerous driving, physical observations, and odour of alcohol.

The court found breaches of the accused's Charter rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) due to delayed notification of the change in investigation purpose and failure to advise of right to counsel.

However, the breaches were found to be minor with no real impact on the accused's interests, and the breath test evidence was admitted under section 24(2).

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation based on both the breath test readings and the pattern of dangerous driving, mental confusion, and impaired faculties demonstrated before and after the collision.

The accused was charged with over 80 (impaired driving) following a RIDE stop.

The Crown sought to introduce breath sample evidence.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the accused's Charter rights were breached in three respects: (1) the manner of detention in the police cruiser for the roadside screening test was not reasonably necessary; (2) the accused was not adequately facilitated in her right to consult with counsel of her choice, as the police policy effectively channeled her toward duty counsel; and (3) the accused was subjected to an unjustified strip search.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence based on the cumulative effect of these breaches and the serious impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a legally excessive blood alcohol concentration following a minor motor vehicle collision in Toronto.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples taken at roadside via an approved screening device and subsequent Intoxilyzer readings at the police station, supported by toxicology evidence.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of all BAC evidence on Charter grounds, arguing that the officer failed to comply with the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code by delaying approximately 10 minutes between forming reasonable suspicion and making the formal ASD demand.

The court found a breach of the "forthwith" requirement and, applying the three-part test under section 24(2) of the Charter, excluded the BAC evidence as the admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg%.

Following a traffic stop, the accused requested to speak with counsel of choice.

Police made two attempts to contact the named lawyer over approximately 21 minutes but received no response.

The accused subsequently declined offers to contact duty counsel or pursue alternative means to reach counsel of choice.

The trial judge found a breach of s. 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the breath test evidence under s. 24(2), finding the violation to be at the less serious end of the scale.

The accused was convicted.

The defendant was stopped for impaired driving and arrested for driving with excess alcohol.

The defendant challenged the arrest on Charter grounds, including lack of grounds for arrest, breach of rights to counsel, and failure to conduct breath tests as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer had reasonable grounds to arrest based on observations of erratic driving, smell of alcohol, and admission of drinking, followed by a failed roadside screening device test.

The court rejected the Charter challenges, finding no breach of rights to counsel and that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable despite cumulative delays.

The defendant was found guilty of driving with excess alcohol.

The accused was arrested on impaired driving charges on November 28, 2014, but no Information was sworn until February 4, 2015—over two months later.

The trial commenced almost 22 months after arrest.

The accused challenged the delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing it exceeded the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued delay should be calculated from the swearing of the Information, not arrest.

The court held that delay must be calculated from arrest, as the accused was subject to court process through the Promise to Appear.

After subtracting defence delay, the net delay exceeded 18 months, and the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances.

The charges were stayed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial addressed two key issues: (1) whether a discrepancy in dates between the Certificate of a Qualified Technician and the Intoxilyzer Test Record Card undermined the reliability of the Certificate; and (2) whether the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds to believe that the approved screening device used for the roadside test was in proper working order, thereby justifying the warrantless seizure of breath samples under section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the date discrepancy was a typographical error and did not affect the Certificate's reliability.

The court also found that the officer had objectively reasonable grounds to believe the device was properly calibrated and functioning correctly based on recent accuracy checks, calibration records, and a self-test.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon (switchblade knife) and possession of cannabis marihuana for the purpose of trafficking following a vehicle stop.

The Crown alleged the accused was in care or control of a vehicle with an odour of alcohol emanating from it.

The trial judge found that the initial detention was arbitrary, the search of the vehicle was unreasonable, and the accused's rights to counsel were breached.

The judge determined that the police officer's stated concerns about officer safety were pretextual and that the officer was motivated by a hunch rather than reasonable grounds.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and all charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle while exceeding the legal blood alcohol content under section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath analysis evidence, alleging violations of her Charter rights under sections 7, 8, and 9.

The court found that the investigating officers had reasonable suspicion and reasonable and probable grounds to demand breath samples, that the detention was not arbitrary, and that no Charter violations occurred.

The court convicted the accused based on toxicological evidence and the totality of circumstances demonstrating impairment.

The accused was charged with four counts of sexual assault and four counts of sexual interference involving his grandchildren between 2010 and 2011, and with historical charges of gross indecency and indecent assault between 1975 and 1979.

Following a lengthy trial with evidence heard over multiple days, the court dismissed all charges.

The court found the two younger complainants not credible, as they admitted to fabricating stories and lies to get people in trouble.

The court also found that the conduct involving the third grandchild did not constitute sexual assault, as it involved appropriate parental instruction and medical care.

Regarding the historical charges, the court granted a stay of proceedings due to the loss of critical investigative evidence, and alternatively found the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit and possession of marijuana.

The defendant conceded guilt to the marijuana charge and did not challenge evidence supporting the impaired driving charge.

However, he sought a stay of proceedings, alleging he was subjected to an unlawful strip search incident to his arrest.

The Crown argued either that no strip search occurred or that a reduction in sentence was the appropriate remedy.

The court found that a strip search did occur without justification and granted a stay of proceedings on the impaired driving charge, citing a pattern of unlawful strip searches by the police service and the need to defend constitutional protections.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with blood-alcohol content exceeding eighty milligrams per one hundred millilitres of blood, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused admitted guilt to both charges.

However, the court found that the police violated the accused's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) by arbitrarily detaining him solely based on his residence in the Northwest Territories, conducting an unreasonable strip search, and failing to inform him of the reason for his continued detention or his right to counsel.

The court granted a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy, finding that the cumulative effect of the Charter breaches warranted this exceptional remedy despite the seriousness of the offence and the strength of the Crown's case.