Administrative Law

The Toronto Revolver Club sought declarations that the Chief Firearms Officer of Ontario lacks authority to conduct warrantless inspections of shooting ranges and to impose conditions on shooting range approvals.

The court found that while the first issue presented no live controversy, the CFO has no authority to attach conditions to shooting range approvals under the Firearms Act.

The court applied statutory interpretation principles, finding that the Act and Regulations do not expressly grant such power and that the power is not practically necessary to achieve Parliament's public safety objectives, as the CFO retains broad revocation authority.

Nahom Mussie pleaded guilty to human trafficking, possession of fentanyl for trafficking, and obstruct justice.

The human trafficking involved the exploitation of a vulnerable, drug-addicted young woman (S.M.) over several months, with the accused controlling her activities and providing her with fentanyl.

S.M. later died of a fentanyl overdose.

The obstruction of justice charge stemmed from Mussie providing a fraudulent employment letter for a bail variation, obtained by exploiting another drug user.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission for a six-year global sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's extreme vulnerability and the accused's misconduct while on bail, and mitigating factors such as the guilty plea and lack of prior criminal record.

The court imposed the jointly recommended six-year global sentence, granting credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The appellant, a novice driver, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while holding a cellular phone, arguing his guilty plea (made by paying the fine) was uninformed because he was unaware of the automatic 30-day licence suspension that followed.

The court dismissed the appeal, distinguishing the licence suspension as a direct consequence of the Highway Traffic Act (HTA) regulatory scheme, rather than a collateral consequence that would invalidate the plea.

The court emphasized that drivers are expected to be aware of the consequences within the highly regulated driving regime and that the simplified plea process under the Provincial Offences Act (POA) is intended for efficiency, making it rare to set aside a plea on "fundamental fairness" grounds for readily discernable penalties.

The appellant, Andrew Liverance, appealed a s. 810 peace bond imposed by a Justice of the Peace.

The appeal focused on whether the original hearing adhered to principles of natural justice and whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace failed to provide the unrepresented appellant with a fair hearing by denying him the opportunity to make submissions, curtailing cross-examination, providing incorrect procedural guidance, and refusing an adjournment to call witnesses and present evidence.

The court also found a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the Justice of the Peace appeared to have decided the case before all evidence and submissions were complete.

The peace bond was quashed, and no new hearing was ordered.

The appellant municipality appealed the dismissal of charges against the respondents for unlawfully operating a public storage facility on four properties zoned Highway Commercial C3.

The trial justice found the by-law unclear regarding public storage and dismissed the charges.

On appeal, the court held that the by-law contained an overall prohibition on land uses not specifically permitted, and public storage was not enumerated as a permitted use in the C3 zone.

The court found the use was unlawful both at the time of purchase in 1988 and at present, therefore the defence of legal non-conforming use failed.

The appeal was allowed and convictions were registered.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition regarding a detention order for the appellant.

The appellant challenged two aspects of the Board's decision: (1) whether the Board erred in making a detention order rather than granting some form of discharge, and (2) whether the Board erred in not including a term allowing the appellant to live in community accommodation approved by the hospital.

The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order but found the Board had misapprehended the hospital's evidence regarding a community living provision and failed to consider that evidence.

The appeal was allowed to the extent of inserting a clause permitting community living in hospital-approved accommodation into the detention order.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Review Board order detaining her in the General Forensic Unit at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for charges of possession of a weapon for dangerous purposes, assault with a weapon, and aggravated assault.

She sought an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order, finding that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety based on her active psychiatric symptoms, stated intention to cease medication if released, vulnerability to opiate-based medications, and history of medication non-adherence.

The court found the Board's reasoning sound and the disposition reasonable and necessary.

The appellant appealed a probation order imposed by the sentencing judge that prohibited him from contacting his parents.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge had changed position from what was indicated during the joint pre-trial meeting, thereby prejudicing him by denying him the opportunity to make submissions on this condition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness and noting that probation had not been decided during sentencing submissions.

The court also noted that the parents could consent to contact if they wished.

The plaintiff, William Rallis, brought an action against various judicial officials and court staff.

The court considered a request to dismiss the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that claims against judicial officials were barred by absolute judicial immunity, and claims against court staff were barred by section 5(6) of the Proceedings against the Crown Act.

Consequently, all claims against the named judicial officials and court staff defendants were dismissed without costs.

Motion for summary judgment in a child protection proceeding under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The applicant Society sought preliminary findings regarding the child's First Nations status, protection findings under section 74(2)(b)(i), and an order for extended care with no access.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding insufficient evidence and procedural deficiencies.

The court emphasized the Society's failure to make timely inquiries regarding the child's First Nations status and native community identification, contrary to section 90(2) of the CYFSA.

The court also found the Society's evidence regarding the parents' ability to care for the medically fragile child to be inadequate, lacking sufficient detail and failing to demonstrate that the Society had provided individually appropriate services to address protection concerns.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his application for orders in lieu of prohibition, procedendo, and certiorari with respect to a trial judge's ruling on territorial jurisdiction.

The appellant had been arrested by York Regional Police in Mississauga on drug trafficking charges alleged to have occurred in Peel Region, but was transported to York Region where the information was laid and trial proceedings commenced.

On the first day of trial, the appellant challenged the court's territorial jurisdiction.

The trial judge dismissed the application, and the appellant sought extraordinary remedies from the Superior Court, which were also dismissed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that extraordinary remedies are available only for jurisdictional errors, not for errors of law in the exercise of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a certiorari decision that refused to quash an Ontario Court of Justice decision denying the return of marijuana seized from the appellant after charges of possession and possession for the purpose of trafficking were withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the appellant failed to establish he was lawfully entitled to possession of the cannabis and did not have a licence authorizing possession at the time of seizure.

The certiorari judge did not err in concluding that no error or excess of jurisdiction occurred.

An appeal from the Ontario Review Board's November 14, 2016 disposition continuing the appellant's detention at a General Forensic Unit and refusing a transfer to another institution.

The appellant raised two issues: (1) whether the Board erred in refusing a second adjournment and dismissing a document disclosure motion, and (2) whether the Board erred in failing to find that the hospital's March 2016 reduction of privileges and implementation of a behaviour intervention plan infringed Charter rights under sections 7 and 9.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the Board's decisions.

The appellant, an NCR accused with schizoaffective disorder and polysubstance use disorder in remission, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to order a conditional discharge rather than an absolute discharge.

The Board had imposed a requirement that the appellant demonstrate a 12-month drug-free period before obtaining absolute discharge, citing substance abuse as the critical risk factor.

The Court of Appeal found the Board had misdirected itself by shifting the burden of proof to the appellant and by relying on speculative evidence of risk rather than evidence demonstrating a significant threat to public safety.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered an absolute discharge.

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a habeas corpus application challenging the appellant's reclassification from medium to maximum security and subsequent transfer to a penitentiary outside Ontario.

The appeal was rendered moot when the appellant was reclassified back to medium security and subsequently released on parole while the appeal was pending.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, noting that the issues sought to be raised were not properly raised before the application judge and that attempting to expand upon the legal principles established in Mission Institution v. Khela without a proper factual foundation would provide limited assistance.

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid, seeking to compel a preliminary inquiry judge to commit the accused, Terrence Barrett, for first-degree murder.

The preliminary inquiry judge had committed Barrett for second-degree murder and aggravated assault, but declined to commit for first-degree murder, finding insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Superior Court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's limited weighing of circumstantial evidence, concluding that she had properly instructed herself on the law and did not commit any jurisdictional error by finding the evidence insufficient to support planning and deliberation.

The Crown's application was dismissed.

The appellant, Duca Financial Services Credit Union Ltd., appealed a Master's order declining to recuse himself from hearing a motion to set aside an administrative dismissal of an action.

Duca Financial alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the Master's case management actions and comments during the recusal motion.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias was established, and affirmed the Master's decision to continue hearing the motion.

Gurdeep Virk, an unregistered individual, and his wife Mokshi Virk, a registered real estate salesperson, were charged with trading in real estate without registration and furnishing false buyer's representation agreements.

The prosecution alleged that Gurdeep actively participated in open houses, contract negotiations, and provided client advice to three families (the Vandras, Kohlis, and Bardoliwalas) without being licensed.

Mokshi was charged as a party to Gurdeep's offence and separately for preparing fraudulent buyer's representation agreements.

The court found that Gurdeep engaged in conduct constituting trading in real estate without registration, and that Mokshi abetted this conduct.

However, the court acquitted Mokshi on the charges relating to fraudulent documents, finding insufficient evidence that the buyer's representation agreements were false documents.

The George Defendants brought a motion for the judge to recuse himself due to his past association and friendship with the Plaintiffs' senior counsel.

The judge, while finding no reasonable apprehension of bias based on his past involvement with a non-profit organization, ultimately decided to recuse himself.

This decision was made out of an abundance of caution, given his personal friendship with counsel and the possibility that counsel's credibility might become an issue in the motions, despite the administrative nature of counsel's affidavit.

The matter was sent back to civil practice court for a new judge.

This is a child protection matter involving two children, L and C, and a status review application.

The Highland Shores Children's Aid Society sought Crown Wardship with no access for L and a Supervision Order for C. The court found that while Society intervention was necessary to protect the children from an abusive partner, the apprehension of L was not justified and the Society's subsequent handling of the case was unreasonable.

The court found the Society failed to conduct thorough investigations, failed to consider kinship care options, and abused its discretion by using access as a punitive tool rather than focusing on the children's best interests.

The court ordered L returned to his mother's care subject to a six-month supervision order and C placed in joint care of both parents subject to supervision.