Anthony Gibbs Bryant

This endorsement addresses two evidentiary issues during a first-degree murder trial: the admissibility of composite sketches and the proper conduct of examination-in-chief of a critical Crown witness.

The court ruled the composite sketches inadmissible due to low probative value, misleading potential, and prejudicial effect, and prohibited their use by both the Crown and co-accused.

Regarding the examination-in-chief, the court found the Crown's questions were not leading or a disguised impeachment, but cautioned against overly broad questions that merely ask if video evidence matches recollection.

This endorsement addresses the admissibility of identification evidence from a lay witness, Margaret Warner, during a first-degree murder trial.

The accused sought to prohibit the Crown from leading evidence where Ms. Warner identified individuals in surveillance video as the same individuals she observed at the scene of the shooting.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Ms. Warner's observations, even if considered opinion, were admissible as lay opinion evidence due to her unique position to assist the trier of fact through personal observation.

The court also rejected the argument that the evidence constituted an inadmissible 'in-dock identification', noting that Ms. Warner was not identifying the accused but rather comparing individuals in the video to those she observed at the scene.

Deficiencies in the evidence were deemed suitable for cross-examination and potential limiting instructions to the jury.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit a photograph of the deceased, Dwayne Thompson, taken at the coroner's office, through Sgt. Raymond Linton, who was not present at the autopsy.

The accused objected, arguing the Crown reneged on an agreement not to introduce autopsy photographs through Sgt. Linton and that the photograph was prejudicial.

The court ruled the photograph admissible, clarifying it was not an "autopsy photograph" in the agreed-upon sense, and that its probative value, particularly in authenticating paper bags placed on the deceased's hands at the scene, outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The court also issued directives for future disclosure of electronic evidence to prevent similar misunderstandings.

The Crown sought to admit a modified summary of cellphone records, replacing phone numbers with the names of the accused, to simplify evidence for the jury.

The accused objected, arguing identity and phone number association were disputed, making the summary prejudicial.

The court ruled that while summaries are generally admissible to clarify evidence, the proposed modified summary was inadmissible as evidence because replacing phone numbers with accused names on a disputed issue of identity would be unfairly prejudicial and amount to impermissible advocacy, potentially misleading the jury.

The Crown could use the summary as an aid in closing arguments but not as evidence.

This endorsement addresses several pre-trial procedural issues in a first-degree murder trial involving three accused.

The court provides directions on the order of peremptory challenges, the procedure for challenging jurors for cause, disclosure of electronic records and aids (Excel spreadsheets, PowerPoints, maps), and the examination of a key witness, Cassandra Hudson.

The court also sets out non-sitting dates and addresses miscellaneous requests regarding nourishment and clothing exchanges for the accused.

Key rulings include declining to prohibit Crown counsel from preparing a witness and denying a request to videotape witness testimony for discovery purposes.

This endorsement addresses numerous pre-trial motions in a first-degree murder trial involving three accused.

Key rulings include denying the Crown's application for prisoner restraints, dismissing defence applications for accused to sit at counsel table and for an immediate opening statement after the Crown.

The court granted internet access for counsel, denied a challenge to the jury array based on an erroneous questionnaire but outlined vetting procedures, permitted a race-based challenge for cause with specific questions, ordered a 14-member jury with two alternates, and granted the exclusion of unsworn jurors during selection.

Further, the court dismissed an application to exclude cell phone numbers provided to probation officers, granted the introduction of alternate suspect evidence, permitted eyewitness identification evidence regarding males on video, allowed evidence of post-offence conduct (haircut change, phone number changes), and dismissed an application to exclude evidence due to a lost police interview, offering alternative remedies.

An application to admit discreditable conduct evidence against one accused was dismissed, while the Crown was permitted to call a detective multiple times with prior notice.

The Superior Court of Justice delivered sentencing reasons for three defendants convicted of culpable homicide following a home invasion and robbery.

Tin Wai Hong was convicted of second-degree murder, receiving a life sentence with 13 years parole ineligibility, and a concurrent 4-year sentence for assault causing bodily harm.

Mason Gillard-Gatza and Nathaniel Cain were convicted of manslaughter, each receiving an 11-year sentence (net 4 years 3 months after pre-trial custody credit) and a concurrent 2-year sentence for assault causing bodily harm.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the violent, drug-related home invasion, gratuitous violence, and prior criminal records, alongside mitigating factors including youth, lack of prior record, family support, expressions of remorse, and, for one defendant, reduced life expectancy.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA sample, and no-contact orders with victims.

Following a lengthy jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the court addressed post‑charge objections raised by the Crown and several defence counsel regarding the jury instructions.

The objections concerned the adequacy of instructions on forcible confinement, party liability, the mental state required for planned and deliberate murder, and the temporal‑causal connection required for constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the charge, when read as a whole, correctly conveyed the applicable legal principles and adequately reflected the parties’ positions.

With one limited exception, the court declined to give additional corrective instructions, finding the charge clear and legally sufficient.

The defendants, on trial for first-degree murder arising from a home invasion and robbery, raised numerous objections to the Crown's closing address to the jury.

The defence argued that the Crown misstated evidence, improperly referenced out-of-court statements, and undermined the presumption of innocence, seeking a mistrial or the right to make reply submissions.

The court reviewed the objections and found that while some of the Crown's comments required corrective instructions in the final jury charge, the conduct did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.

The applications for a mistrial and for reply submissions were dismissed.

During a lengthy jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the court ruled on several pre‑charge issues affecting the jury instructions and evidentiary materials.

The court addressed whether transcripts of recorded police statements should accompany the jury, whether certain medical records required redaction, and whether instructions on wilful blindness and alternative routes to first‑degree murder should be given.

The court allowed transcripts of most recorded statements to go to the jury but excluded the transcript of one accused’s statement due to lack of probative value.

Medical records referring to “severe hypoxia” were admitted without redaction.

The court declined to instruct the jury on wilful blindness for the driver accused, finding insufficient specificity of suspicion to impute knowledge.

During a multi-accused jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the Crown sought to revisit a pre‑trial editing ruling that had excluded a portion of one accused’s police statement referencing a conversation with a co‑accused driver.

The Crown argued that subsequent cross‑examination created a material change in circumstances because the witness acknowledged misleading the driver about the purpose of the trip, making the excluded statement relevant as a prior inconsistent statement and to credibility.

The court held that the threshold for revisiting the ruling was met but declined to change the original decision.

Although the probative value of the statement had increased, its prejudicial effect against the co‑accused—against whom it remained inadmissible—continued to outweigh its value, particularly given the stage of the trial and fairness concerns.

The Crown’s application was therefore dismissed.

During a jury trial for murder arising from a home invasion, the accused sought to call a cardiologist to testify that a congenital heart condition could have caused hypoxia leading to confusion and impaired cognition during the incident.

The Crown opposed the evidence, arguing it lacked relevance, necessity, and proper qualification and risked misleading the jury.

Applying the Mohan framework as refined in White Burgess and Abbey, the court held the proposed expert testimony was logically relevant, necessary to explain the accused’s serious medical condition, and within the expert’s qualifications.

The court further concluded that any limitations in the opinion affected weight rather than admissibility and that the probative value of the defence-led evidence was not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

The expert evidence was therefore admitted for consideration by the jury.

During a jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the accused sought to call a cardiologist to provide expert evidence regarding congenital heart disease and its potential impact on mental functioning.

The Crown challenged the admissibility of the expert testimony, arguing issues of relevance, qualification, and reliability under the Mohan framework.

The court determined that a focused Mohan voir dire was required to clarify the precise opinion and assess the expert’s qualifications.

The judge held that the expert could testify on the voir dire only to identify the proposed opinion and establish qualifications, and that broader cross-examination was unnecessary for the admissibility determination.

During a jury trial for offences arising from a home invasion and robbery, the Crown sought to revisit a prior evidentiary ruling that had ordered references to the accused’s consultation with duty counsel removed from a police statement.

The Crown argued that subsequent testimony placing the reliability of the statement in issue increased the probative value of the fact that the accused had received legal advice before speaking to police.

The court reconsidered the issue under the residual discretion to exclude evidence where prejudicial effect outweighs probative value.

The judge held that the probative value of the consultation with counsel remained slight and that admitting the evidence would invite improper speculation about privileged communications.

The earlier ruling requiring redaction was therefore maintained.

The accused, along with three co-accused, was charged with first degree murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion.

The accused brought a Corbett application to restrict cross-examination on his criminal record, which included five prior convictions for assault.

The Crown and a co-accused brought cross-applications to adduce evidence of the underlying facts of those assaults and other violent conduct as propensity evidence.

The court granted the accused's application, limiting cross-examination to his non-violent convictions, and dismissed the cross-applications.

The court found that the prejudicial effect of admitting the prior violent conduct substantially outweighed its probative value, particularly given the risk of propensity reasoning in a trial involving blunt force trauma.

In a jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a violent home invasion, the Crown challenged the sufficiency of a defence expert report disclosed under s. 657.3(3) of the Criminal Code.

The defence intended to call a cardiologist to testify about the accused’s congenital heart disease and the possible cognitive effects of exertion‑induced hypoxia, which could raise a reasonable doubt about the specific intent required for murder.

The court held that the report provided sufficient disclosure of the expert’s anticipated areas of evidence and the grounds underlying them, though it did not disclose the expert’s ultimate opinion regarding the accused’s symptoms at the time of the offences.

Considering the advanced stage and logistical constraints of the lengthy jury trial, the court declined to order further particulars or other remedial measures.

The issue of the expert’s qualifications to testify about hypoxia‑related cognitive effects was left to a focused Mohan voir dire.

In a jury trial for first degree murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the accused brought applications for directed verdicts at the close of the Crown’s case.

They argued the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support inferences of planning and deliberation or the requisite intent for murder and attempted murder, and that the rule in Hodge’s Case required exclusion of those theories.

The court held that the governing test on a directed verdict motion is whether there is any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict, and that the rule in Hodge’s Case does not apply at this stage.

The court found there was evidence capable of supporting inferences that the killing was planned and deliberate and that the accused participated with the necessary intent.

However, the Crown was barred from advancing second degree murder liability against the driver under the common unlawful purpose doctrine due to insufficient evidence of subjective foresight of death.

During a murder trial involving a home invasion, defence counsel for one of the co-accused sought to create a summary chart of a key Crown witness's testimony on an easel pad during cross-examination.

The Crown and counsel for another co-accused objected, arguing the chart was unnecessary, cumulative, and potentially misleading.

The court allowed the use of the demonstrative aid, finding that it was a useful organizational tool, met threshold reliability, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any trial management or trial fairness prejudice.

During a multi‑accused murder trial, the jury sent a note expressing concerns about safety after observing three men enter the courtroom whom they believed might be connected to the accused.

Defence counsel argued the note suggested potential racial bias or juror fear that could compromise impartiality and requested a jury inquiry.

The court conducted a focused inquiry questioning each juror individually about what they observed, whether they had concerns, whether race influenced their reaction, and whether they could remain impartial.

All jurors confirmed they had no concerns and could continue to decide the case solely on the evidence and legal instructions.

The court concluded the presumption of juror impartiality had not been rebutted and refused defence requests for a further inquiry.

In a jury murder trial arising from a planned robbery, the court ruled on the admissibility of text messages extracted from two accused persons' cell phones.

Applying the principles governing relevance, bad character evidence, and the balance between probative value and prejudicial effect, the court excluded one partial text exchange as too context-deficient and speculative to support the inference urged by the Crown.

Two other exchanges, accepted for the purpose of the ruling as drug-related communications, were admitted because their prejudice was minimal in the trial context and they provided relevant contextual evidence about the relationship between two accused.

The court directed that limiting instructions would address any propensity risk.