Anthony Gibbs Bryant

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of a statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for drug trafficking and manslaughter.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary because police failed to record their interactions with the accused from the time of his arrest until the formal interview, relying on R. v. Moore-McFarlane.

The court distinguished Moore-McFarlane, finding the uncontradicted testimony of the police officers credible and reliable.

The court concluded there were no threats, promises, or oppressive circumstances, and the accused's minor injury during arrest did not affect his operating mind.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

The Crown sought to qualify an OPP officer as an expert witness to interpret coded text messages and provide context on the illicit drug trade in a trial for drug trafficking and manslaughter.

The defence did not contest the admissibility of the evidence but reserved the right to cross-examine on potential bias.

The court applied the Mohan and White Burgess frameworks, finding the proposed evidence logically relevant, necessary, and the officer properly qualified.

The officer was qualified to provide opinion evidence on the indicia of trafficking, street values of drugs, and the interpretation of coded language.

The accused, charged with manslaughter and trafficking following a fatal drug overdose, brought an O'Connor application seeking third-party records, including cell phone records and mental health treatment records of the deceased and a key Crown witness.

The court found that the mental health records did not meet the likely relevance threshold, as the request relied on stereotypical assumptions about drug users and mental illness rather than case-specific evidence.

The application for the cell phone records of the witness's mother was granted to proceed to the second stage of the O'Connor analysis, while the remaining requests were dismissed.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application following the offender's convictions for gang sexual assault, choking, forcible confinement, and uttering threats.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record involving extreme violence, often committed while intoxicated, and was diagnosed with likely schizophrenia, antisocial personality disorder, and substance use disorders.

The court found the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation under s. 753(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

Concluding that the offender's risk of violent recidivism was intractable and could not be adequately managed in the community on a long-term supervision order, the court imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder, pointing a firearm, and unauthorized possession of firearms after fatally shooting a man who had aggressively approached his home following a series of altercations.

The victim, who was highly intoxicated and angry, had repeatedly rammed the accused's vehicle with his truck and approached the accused's door brandishing a stick.

The accused, who was inside his home, fired a single shot through the door, killing the victim.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting in self-defence, resulting in an acquittal on the murder and pointing a firearm charges.

The accused was found guilty of unauthorized possession of firearms.

In a trial for second-degree murder, the Crown applied to admit statements made by the accused to police, while the accused sought to exclude them under the Charter.

The accused argued his statements were involuntary due to police inducements, his right to counsel was breached because his consulted lawyer had an unknown conflict of interest, and he was arbitrarily detained at the police station after a warrant of remand was signed.

The court found the statements were voluntary, the right to counsel was not breached as the state played no role in the conflict, and although the continued detention at the police station was arbitrary, the breach was not serious enough to warrant exclusion under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The statements were ruled admissible.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of Bill C-75 amendments to the Criminal Code that abolished peremptory challenges and altered the challenge for cause procedure.

The applicant argued the changes violated sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter and relied on a recent coordinate court decision that found the repeal of peremptory challenges unconstitutional.

The court dismissed the application, finding the coordinate decision was plainly wrong and therefore not binding.

The court held that the amendments are constitutional and operate retrospectively.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of sexual offences against a single complainant.

The appeal addresses multiple errors arising from jury management during deliberations and the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The jury reported deliberation impasses, requested materials and evidence playbacks, and one juror indicated unavailability beyond the third day.

The trial judge provided transcripts of portions of the appellant's police interview used in cross-examination rather than replaying the cross-examination itself, failed to replay the appellant's testimony after the jury withdrew their request, exhorted the jury twice without clarifying that no time limit existed on deliberations, and failed to adequately relate the evidence to the defence position in the charge.

The cumulative effect of these errors resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

During a first-degree murder trial, the accused brought an application requesting that the Court call two third-party suspects as witnesses, or alternatively, permit the defence to call and cross-examine them.

The court declined to call the witnesses itself, finding it unnecessary and potentially disruptive to the adversarial process.

However, the court exercised its common law discretion to permit the defence to cross-examine the witnesses on specific topics, noting that the provisions of section 9 of the Canada Evidence Act were inadequate for this situation.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit expert evidence from a Brazilian Jiu Jitsu practitioner regarding the mechanics and effects of blood chokeholds.

The Crown theorized that the accused used a rear naked choke to kill the victim, explaining the lack of structural damage to her neck.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and the Abbey two-step process to assess the admissibility of the evidence.

The court found that the evidence had low probative value because there was insufficient evidence connecting the accused to martial arts training, and high prejudicial effect.

Furthermore, the court held that evidence regarding the physiological effects of chokeholds should be introduced by medical experts, not a martial arts practitioner.

The application to admit the expert evidence was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to determine the admissibility of rebuttal evidence in response to the defence's allegations of inadequate police investigation in a murder trial.

The court provided general guidelines, ruling that the reviewing officer could not give opinion or hearsay evidence about the original investigation, but could testify about his own investigative steps.

The court also made specific rulings on several areas of challenge, deferring a decision on the admissibility of the accused's bad character evidence regarding firearms until later in the trial.

The offenders, Theo Cleland and Hussein Karshe, were convicted of aggravated assault following a jury trial.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the serious group attack and injuries to the victim, and mitigating factors, such as their lack of criminal records, youth, and rehabilitative efforts.

The primary sentencing objectives were denunciation and deterrence, balanced with rehabilitation and restraint.

The court imposed intermittent sentences of 90 days incarceration, followed by three years of probation with conditions including community service, counselling, and restitution for uninsured expenses.

This decision addresses the judge's proposed opening comments and jury selection procedures for a first-degree murder trial.

The judge adopted several suggestions from counsel, including referring to the accused as "defendant" and strongly emphasizing that jurors must not conduct external research.

The judge also accepted defence counsel's request to defer their opening statement and for potential jurors with knowledge of the case to submit written notes.

The judge declined to remove all references to the elements of the offence from the opening comments, affirming their general inclusion.

The defendant pleaded guilty to assaulting a peace officer causing bodily harm contrary to section 270.01(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The assault occurred at the Oshawa Courthouse when the defendant, extremely intoxicated and angry, caused a disturbance and bit a court constable on the forearm, breaking the skin and causing a permanent scar.

The Crown sought a six-month custodial sentence emphasizing deterrence and denunciation.

The defence sought an intermittent sentence or conditional sentence, highlighting the defendant's serious alcohol addiction, childhood trauma, and post-arrest rehabilitation efforts.

The court imposed a six-month conditional sentence with house arrest on the Electronic Supervision Program and community service, followed by two years of probation, finding that the principles of restraint, rehabilitation, and the defendant's status as a single mother supporting a teenage son favored a community-based sentence over incarceration.

The accused, Michael Ball, brought a pre-trial application seeking evidentiary rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence concerning third-party involvement in the death or disposal of the body of Erin Howlett, and the adequacy of the police investigation.

The court found that evidence suggesting third parties were present at Howlett's death or assisted in disposing of her body was admissible, as it could raise reasonable doubt about the accused's guilt, even if not directly alleging they caused the death.

The court also affirmed the defence's right to challenge the police investigation's adequacy, including specific failures to investigate third parties or conduct certain tests.

The accused, Michael Ball, is charged with first-degree murder.

In this pre-trial application, the Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of ante mortem statements made by the deceased, Erin Howlett.

The defence also sought a ruling on the admissibility of certain statements, some for the truth of their contents (hearsay) and others for non-hearsay purposes (original evidence).

The court ruled on the admissibility of various statements, excluding double hearsay, statements about the deceased's job loss due to "money gone missing" due to high prejudice and low probative value, and limiting the use of false statements about studying to be a financial planner to assessing credibility and corroborating the accused's police statement, not as evidence of other plans.

The accused, Michael Ball, charged with first-degree murder, challenged the admissibility of a statement made to police.

Police staged a break-in at Ball's residence, removed firearms, and left a threatening note linking him to the murder.

Ball reported the break-in and the note, leading to an interview where he was cautioned but felt compelled to speak due to statutory obligations (reporting stolen firearms) and perceived threats.

The court found that police tactics, including creating an aura of violence and using statutory compulsion, breached Ball's s.7 Charter rights (right to silence, principle against self-incrimination).

The court concluded that admitting the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s.24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown applied under s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code for a pre-trial ruling from the first trial (which ended in a mistrial) to be binding on the second trial.

The prior ruling by Justice Taylor found the accused's statement to police voluntary and admissible, but did not address a Charter s. 7 issue.

The accused sought to raise a s. 7 Charter challenge regarding the statement at the second trial.

The court, applying factors from R. v. Victoria, found it would not be in the interests of justice to bind the second trial to the prior ruling, as new Charter arguments were being advanced, and the public interest in a serious criminal case warranted hearing constitutional concerns on their merits.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial application for the production of third-party medical records belonging to a key Crown witness.

The court found that the witness's credibility was central to the case and that there was an evidentiary link between the witness's mental health history and his reliability.

Balancing the witness's reasonable expectation of privacy against the accused's right to make full answer and defence, the court ordered the production of specific hospital records relating to the witness's psychiatric and substance abuse complaints.

The accused was convicted of failing to comply with a probation order, breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit mischief, assault, and forcible seizure.

The Crown sought a declaration that the accused be designated a Long-Term Offender under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code and sought an eight-year long-term supervision order.

The defence challenged the application on Charter grounds, arguing unreasonable delay in sentencing proceedings.

The court dismissed the Charter application and declared the accused a Long-Term Offender, imposing a 60-day custodial sentence on top of pre-sentence detention credit, followed by a seven-year long-term supervision order.

The court found a substantial risk of reoffending, particularly in the context of intimate partner violence, and determined that community control was possible only through a long-term supervision order.