Anthony Gibbs Bryant

The Crown applied under s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code for a pre-trial ruling from the first trial (which ended in a mistrial) to be binding on the second trial.

The prior ruling by Justice Taylor found the accused's statement to police voluntary and admissible, but did not address a Charter s. 7 issue.

The accused sought to raise a s. 7 Charter challenge regarding the statement at the second trial.

The court, applying factors from R. v. Victoria, found it would not be in the interests of justice to bind the second trial to the prior ruling, as new Charter arguments were being advanced, and the public interest in a serious criminal case warranted hearing constitutional concerns on their merits.

The accused was convicted of failing to comply with a probation order, breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit mischief, assault, and forcible seizure.

The Crown sought a declaration that the accused be designated a Long-Term Offender under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code and sought an eight-year long-term supervision order.

The defence challenged the application on Charter grounds, arguing unreasonable delay in sentencing proceedings.

The court dismissed the Charter application and declared the accused a Long-Term Offender, imposing a 60-day custodial sentence on top of pre-sentence detention credit, followed by a seven-year long-term supervision order.

The court found a substantial risk of reoffending, particularly in the context of intimate partner violence, and determined that community control was possible only through a long-term supervision order.

During a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit portions of a witness's prior police statement as past recollection recorded due to the witness's professed memory loss.

The defence initially agreed to admit certain excerpts but later objected to the Crown tendering subsequent portions of the statement.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that all relevant parts of the statement met the four essential conditions for admissibility as past recollection recorded and that fairness to the Crown required presenting a complete and non-misleading picture to the jury.

This endorsement addresses procedural issues during a joint criminal trial for murder, specifically concerning the illness of lead defence counsel for one of the accused.

The court considered whether to continue with a critical Crown witness in counsel's absence and the appropriate duration to delay proceedings.

The court deferred the critical witness's evidence and directed the Crown to call other witnesses, emphasizing the accused's right to full answer and defence and the importance of lead counsel's presence for cross-examination of critical witnesses.

The court deemed discussions of severance premature, pending further medical information on counsel's return.

During a murder trial, the defense requested a voir dire regarding an in-dock identification made by a witness, Margaret Warner, to Cst.

Melo, and a potential breach of a witness exclusion order.

The court declined to continue the inquiry into the in-dock identification, finding it lacked probative value and was highly prejudicial, thus excluding it from trial.

The court also found no breach of the witness exclusion order by Cst.

Melo but modified the order to remove Cst.

Melo's exemption due to concerns about witness contact regarding identification.

This endorsement addresses two evidentiary issues during a first-degree murder trial: the admissibility of composite sketches and the proper conduct of examination-in-chief of a critical Crown witness.

The court ruled the composite sketches inadmissible due to low probative value, misleading potential, and prejudicial effect, and prohibited their use by both the Crown and co-accused.

Regarding the examination-in-chief, the court found the Crown's questions were not leading or a disguised impeachment, but cautioned against overly broad questions that merely ask if video evidence matches recollection.

This endorsement addresses the admissibility of identification evidence from a lay witness, Margaret Warner, during a first-degree murder trial.

The accused sought to prohibit the Crown from leading evidence where Ms. Warner identified individuals in surveillance video as the same individuals she observed at the scene of the shooting.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Ms. Warner's observations, even if considered opinion, were admissible as lay opinion evidence due to her unique position to assist the trier of fact through personal observation.

The court also rejected the argument that the evidence constituted an inadmissible 'in-dock identification', noting that Ms. Warner was not identifying the accused but rather comparing individuals in the video to those she observed at the scene.

Deficiencies in the evidence were deemed suitable for cross-examination and potential limiting instructions to the jury.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit a photograph of the deceased, Dwayne Thompson, taken at the coroner's office, through Sgt. Raymond Linton, who was not present at the autopsy.

The accused objected, arguing the Crown reneged on an agreement not to introduce autopsy photographs through Sgt. Linton and that the photograph was prejudicial.

The court ruled the photograph admissible, clarifying it was not an "autopsy photograph" in the agreed-upon sense, and that its probative value, particularly in authenticating paper bags placed on the deceased's hands at the scene, outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The court also issued directives for future disclosure of electronic evidence to prevent similar misunderstandings.

The Crown sought to admit a modified summary of cellphone records, replacing phone numbers with the names of the accused, to simplify evidence for the jury.

The accused objected, arguing identity and phone number association were disputed, making the summary prejudicial.

The court ruled that while summaries are generally admissible to clarify evidence, the proposed modified summary was inadmissible as evidence because replacing phone numbers with accused names on a disputed issue of identity would be unfairly prejudicial and amount to impermissible advocacy, potentially misleading the jury.

The Crown could use the summary as an aid in closing arguments but not as evidence.

This endorsement addresses several pre-trial procedural issues in a first-degree murder trial involving three accused.

The court provides directions on the order of peremptory challenges, the procedure for challenging jurors for cause, disclosure of electronic records and aids (Excel spreadsheets, PowerPoints, maps), and the examination of a key witness, Cassandra Hudson.

The court also sets out non-sitting dates and addresses miscellaneous requests regarding nourishment and clothing exchanges for the accused.

Key rulings include declining to prohibit Crown counsel from preparing a witness and denying a request to videotape witness testimony for discovery purposes.

This endorsement addresses numerous pre-trial motions in a first-degree murder trial involving three accused.

Key rulings include denying the Crown's application for prisoner restraints, dismissing defence applications for accused to sit at counsel table and for an immediate opening statement after the Crown.

The court granted internet access for counsel, denied a challenge to the jury array based on an erroneous questionnaire but outlined vetting procedures, permitted a race-based challenge for cause with specific questions, ordered a 14-member jury with two alternates, and granted the exclusion of unsworn jurors during selection.

Further, the court dismissed an application to exclude cell phone numbers provided to probation officers, granted the introduction of alternate suspect evidence, permitted eyewitness identification evidence regarding males on video, allowed evidence of post-offence conduct (haircut change, phone number changes), and dismissed an application to exclude evidence due to a lost police interview, offering alternative remedies.

An application to admit discreditable conduct evidence against one accused was dismissed, while the Crown was permitted to call a detective multiple times with prior notice.

The Superior Court of Justice delivered sentencing reasons for three defendants convicted of culpable homicide following a home invasion and robbery.

Tin Wai Hong was convicted of second-degree murder, receiving a life sentence with 13 years parole ineligibility, and a concurrent 4-year sentence for assault causing bodily harm.

Mason Gillard-Gatza and Nathaniel Cain were convicted of manslaughter, each receiving an 11-year sentence (net 4 years 3 months after pre-trial custody credit) and a concurrent 2-year sentence for assault causing bodily harm.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the violent, drug-related home invasion, gratuitous violence, and prior criminal records, alongside mitigating factors including youth, lack of prior record, family support, expressions of remorse, and, for one defendant, reduced life expectancy.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA sample, and no-contact orders with victims.