Alison Wheeler

The appellant appealed his conviction on counts of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittal on sexual assault.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his sentence of four years on the invitation to sexual touching count.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury verdicts were not inconsistent because the trial judge's instructions created a reasonable basis for the jury to understand that sexual assault required force applied by the appellant to the complainant, whereas sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching required only touching or an invitation to touch.

The court dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

This addendum addresses the appellant Ronald Cyr's request for clarification regarding the court's refusal to allow him to advance a new Charter argument on appeal.

The appellant sought to argue that sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required that clause 6 of section 3(1) of the Juries Act be expanded to exclude former auxiliary police officers from jury service.

The court declined to permit this new argument, finding no air of reality to the suggestion of bias and noting that sections 670 and 671 of the Criminal Code provided a complete answer to this ground of appeal.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against the two daughters of his former girlfriend, with offences alleged between 2002 and 2004.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's denials and accepted the complainants' evidence.

The appellant was sentenced to two years less one day imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, finding that counsel failed to review a police statement with the appellant, failed to prepare him for cross-examination on that statement, and failed to intervene during cross-examination.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

Three accused were convicted of first-degree murder following a trial involving an undercover police operation.

The appellants challenged the conviction on multiple grounds including: (1) the trial judge's refusal to sever the trial; (2) the admissibility of statements made to an undercover officer; (3) jury management issues during sequestration; and (4) various trial procedure matters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that joint trial was appropriate despite cutthroat defences, the undercover operation did not violate Charter rights, and jury management issues did not constitute a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants brought a motion to raise new issues on appeal regarding the eligibility of a juror who was a former auxiliary police officer.

They sought to argue that the juror was ineligible under the Juries Act and, alternatively, under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal permitted the appellants to advance the statutory interpretation argument but denied permission to advance the Charter argument, with full reasons to follow in the appeal judgment.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that ordered his continued detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health with permission to live in the community restricted to supervised accommodation.

The appellant argued the Board erred by failing to consider a conditional discharge and by requiring supervised accommodation.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the appellant was not yet ready for a conditional discharge, as recent attempts at community living had failed.

The Court also found the Board's requirement for supervised accommodation was reasonable and supported by expert opinion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder in the killing of a taxicab driver.

He argued that the trial judge erred in her instructions on the use of his police statements and post-offence conduct, and that the Crown's cross-examination was improper.

He also alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to lead evidence of a 'family conspiracy' by his co-accuseds' family to frame him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or the Crown's cross-examination, and concluding that trial counsel's tactical decisions were sound and did not constitute ineffective assistance.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for killing his mother.

He raised a defence of not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR), which the jury rejected.

On appeal, he argued the jury's verdict was unreasonable because it rejected uncontradicted expert psychiatric evidence, and he sought to introduce a new psychiatric report as fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury had a rational basis to reject the expert opinion due to flaws in its factual foundation.

The court also denied the admission of fresh evidence, concluding it lacked cogency and could not reasonably be expected to have affected the verdict.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court order quashing their discharge at a preliminary inquiry regarding a tractor trailer robbery.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and testimony from former co-accused implicating the appellants in other robberies.

The appellants argued the motion judge improperly treated evidence from other counts as similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly identified a jurisdictional error by the preliminary inquiry judge in failing to consider the evidence as a whole, and that the similarities between the robberies supported an inference that the same group committed them.

The appellant was convicted of kidnapping and sexually assaulting a 12-year-old girl, designated a dangerous offender, and given an indeterminate sentence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended eyewitness identification, cell tower, and DNA evidence, and erred in rejecting a determinate sentence with long-term supervision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and noting the overwhelming case against the appellant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant's risk could not be managed in the community.

The Crown appealed a suspended sentence and three years' probation imposed on a 20-year-old offender who pleaded guilty to intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to a dwelling house.

The offender set fire to a carport over a drug debt, which spread to an attached home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly inferred a causal link between the offender's mental health issues and the offence, and correctly weighed mitigating factors including his youth, guilty plea, and rehabilitation prospects.

The appellant appealed convictions relating to child pornography and voyeurism, arguing principally that the trial judge improperly admitted and relied on similar fact and disposition evidence without a voir dire.

The court held that the impugned extrinsic evidence concerning the hidden webcam, neighbourhood children, and other voyeuristic recordings was admissible because its probative value on identity and situation-specific propensity outweighed any prejudicial effect.

Count-to-count evidence was also properly used as circumstantial evidence of identity and context.

The court found no prejudice from the absence of a formal admissibility ruling and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of two young persons charged with first degree murder.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by excluding evidence of a prior altercation and association between the respondents and the deceased while incarcerated, which the Crown alleged was relevant to motive and could confirm the testimony of an unsavoury witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the evidence lacked sufficient probative value to overcome its highly prejudicial effect, particularly after the key witness's trial testimony failed to connect the deceased to the alleged prior 'bad blood'.

In a pending conviction appeal involving child pornography offences, the Crown sought directions limiting full compliance with the Court of Appeal’s ineffective assistance protocol, and the self-represented appellant sought an order under s. 683(3) to examine or cross-examine former trial counsel.

The court held that the protocol is flexible and may be varied on a case-by-case basis, and it was unnecessary and inappropriate to make a preliminary merits determination of the ineffective assistance ground.

Given the existing record, the court permitted the Crown to decline the full fresh evidence process contemplated by the protocol, subject to any further order of the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellant’s request to examine or cross-examine former trial counsel was dismissed because the proposed questioning would not materially advance the claim.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after participating in the beating death of a drug dealer.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting a witness's videotaped out-of-court statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule after the witness claimed no memory of the conversation at trial.

The appellant also challenged the jury instructions regarding the use of the hearsay statement, the effect of intoxication on the intent for murder, and the use of post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the admission of the hearsay evidence or the jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury charge by using the word 'some' regarding s. 21(2) and the phrase 'ought to have known' regarding possession under s. 4(3).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first phrase would not have misled the jury given the instructions on reasonable doubt.

While acknowledging the second phrase was an error, the Court applied the curative proviso because the photographic evidence against the appellant was overwhelming.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The young person appealed a Superior Court judgment granting the Crown's application for certiorari and mandamus, which quashed a preliminary inquiry discharge on first degree murder and directed committal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences regarding the knowledge of the likelihood of death.

The Court affirmed that mandamus was appropriate because committal for the full offence was legally inevitable given the evidence.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual offences against a child, arguing that the trial judge improperly assessed credibility, gave insufficient weight to inconsistencies, overemphasized demeanour, misapprehended the appellant's evidence, and allowed interpreter errors to undermine trial fairness.

The court held that appellate intervention in credibility findings is rare and found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's treatment of the complainant's evidence or the appellant's testimony.

The court also held that interpreter mistakes were minor, were addressed as they arose, and did not establish trial unfairness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The self-represented appellant applied under section 683 of the Criminal Code for an order to examine witnesses to adduce fresh evidence on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence was irrelevant, redundant, or mere speculation given the undisputed fact at trial that child pornography was found on the appellant's computer.

The proposed examinations did not meet the reasonable possibility test for fresh evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider defence evidence that could have raised a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was alive to the issue and properly accepted the appellant's admissions to the police, which formed the core of the Crown's case.

The Court held that the trial judge's treatment of the evidence was adequate and there was no need to explicitly subject a minor part of the testimony to a separate W.(D.) analysis.