Alan D. Gold

The applicant, sought for extradition to the United States on drug conspiracy charges, brought an application for an order requiring the Attorney General of Canada to obtain and disclose materials in the possession of U.S. authorities regarding their delay in seeking his extradition.

The applicant argued the ten-year delay amounted to an abuse of process violating section 7 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding it lacked jurisdiction to order disclosure from foreign authorities at the committal stage.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to establish an air of reality to the claim that the delay prejudiced the fairness of the extradition hearing itself, as opposed to the trial in the requesting state, which is a matter for the Minister at the surrender stage.

Five police officers appealed their convictions for attempting to obstruct justice and perjury arising from a warrantless search of a drug suspect's apartment and subsequent efforts to conceal it.

The officers argued various trial errors, including Charter violations regarding the use of their preliminary inquiry testimony, improper jury instructions, and abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors.

The Crown cross-appealed the 45-day conditional sentences.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, finding the sentences demonstrably unfit for police officers committing perjury and obstruction of justice, and substituted 3-year custodial sentences, but stayed their operation due to the passage of time.

The Crown sought a warrant to obtain bodily substances for forensic DNA analysis from the respondent pursuant to Section 487.05(1) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent was charged with break and enter of a dwelling house and mischief by wilful damage.

The Crown's evidence consisted of a DNA profile obtained from a half-consumed can of Fruitopia found at the crime scene, which had been matched to the respondent through the National DNA Data Bank.

The respondent argued that there was insufficient evidence that he was a party to the offence and that it was not in the best interests of justice to issue the warrant given the Crown already possessed the original DNA match.

The court granted the DNA warrant, finding reasonable grounds to believe the respondent was a party to the offence based on the inference that the beverage can was introduced to the secured property during the break-in period.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of sexual assault after forcing a masseuse to perform oral sex while he was on duty.

He appealed his conviction and 15-month custodial sentence, arguing that his police memo-book notes were unlawfully seized in violation of his Charter rights and that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in police notes, no violation of the right against self-incrimination, and no error in the trial judge's credibility findings or the sentence imposed.

Summary conviction appeal by a police officer convicted of assault with a weapon for baton strikes delivered during a G20 arrest.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge failed to consider mens rea, applied too strict a necessity standard under the excessive-force justification provisions, or erred in excluding case-specific police opinion evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed because the trial judge applied the correct legal principles and made fact findings entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was allowed because the sentencing judge erred in treating the appellant's lack of remorse, derived from his plea and testimony, as aggravating.

The custodial sentence was reduced to time served and replaced with 12 months' probation and community service.

This was a summary conviction appeal in which the appellant sought appellate relief from sentence.

In an addendum to reasons released the same day, the court clarified that the sentence appeal was allowed.

The disposition was varied to a suspended sentence with one year probation.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime after the trial judge discharged two jurors during deliberations.

The jury had reported a stalemate, with ten voting to convict and two to acquit.

Following complaints from other jurors, the trial judge conducted extensive inquiries into the two dissenting jurors' conduct and ultimately discharged them.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's inquiries improperly probed the content of the deliberations, undermining jury secrecy.

The discharge of the two holdout jurors created an appearance of unfairness, resulting in an unfair trial.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant pled guilty to eight offences related to a large-scale ephedrine exportation business, including money laundering and tax evasion, and was sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by imposing a custodial sentence instead of a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the custodial sentence was fit for a sophisticated, large-scale fraud enterprise.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of discreditable conduct, misdirected the jury on post-offence conduct, and misdirected the jury on the elements of first degree murder, specifically regarding unlawful confinement and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

Following the dismissal of two related civil actions, the successful defendants sought a costs order requiring the plaintiffs’ counsel personally to pay a portion of the trial costs associated with calling 22 witnesses.

The defendants argued that the evidence of those witnesses was inadmissible under the parol evidence rule and that counsel’s decision to call them wasted approximately ten days of trial time.

The court considered Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the court’s inherent jurisdiction to award costs against a solicitor.

The judge held that such orders should be made only in rare circumstances and typically require conduct approaching recklessness, abuse of process, or bad faith.

The court concluded that counsel’s decision to lead the evidence was not reckless or abusive and declined to order costs against counsel personally.

The accused brought a section 24(2) application to exclude breath testing evidence following a finding that the police violated his Charter right to counsel of choice.

The police followed standard institutional procedures that systematically channeled the accused to consult with on-call duty counsel rather than facilitating access to private counsel of choice as requested.

The court applied the Grant framework, balancing the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct, the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court found that the systemic nature of the violation, the importance of the right to counsel of choice, and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice outweighed society's interest in prosecuting the drinking and driving charge.

The breath test evidence was excluded and the charge dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for extortion, attempted extortion, and criminal harassment against three of his employees, as well as his three-year custodial sentence.

The appellant had falsely accused the employees of theft and threatened to call the police or immigration authorities unless they paid him large sums of money, obtaining almost $50,000 in total.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the relation of evidence to issues, similar fact evidence, or the law of extortion and harassment.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the three-year sentence fit given the serious nature of the threats, which included leveraging alleged associations with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Convictions Appeal Court dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal did not meet either branch of the test for leave to appeal under R. v. R.(R.).

The publication ban on the complainant's identity was continued.

The accused applied to exclude intercepted communications between them from use in a search warrant information, wiretap authorization affidavit, and at trial, arguing the communications were protected by marital privilege under s.4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court held that marital communications privilege is testimonial in nature and does not prevent the interception of communications or their use in investigative affidavits, though they generally cannot be compelled in court testimony without the recipient spouse’s consent.

The accused further argued that limiting the privilege to legally married spouses violated s.15 of the Charter by excluding common-law partners.

The court found the accused had not established that their relationship was analogous to marriage and therefore they could not benefit from the privilege in any event.

The application to excise the communications was dismissed and the intercepted communications were held admissible.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 mg/100 mL of blood alcohol.

During a RIDE spot-check, the accused was directed to a secondary investigation area without explanation, and subsequently arrested after failing a screening test.

The accused sought to contact his counsel of choice but was ultimately directed to duty counsel instead.

The court found two Charter breaches: (1) a violation of section 10(a) for failure to inform the accused of the reason for detention when directed to the secondary area, and (2) a violation of section 10(b) for failure to adequately facilitate access to counsel of choice.

The court found that the Toronto Police Service's institutional practice of controlling access to counsel and channeling accused persons to duty counsel, combined with inadequate resources and efforts to locate private counsel, resulted in the accused being denied a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice from counsel of his choice.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by mischaracterizing the appellant's role and failing to give weight to his rehabilitation, despite a positive presentence report.

Considering all circumstances, including fresh evidence, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 18 months, recommending consideration for the temporary absence program.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the trial judge excluded evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave thoughtful reasons for excluding the evidence and the Crown's appeal did not raise a question of law alone.

In a criminal appeal motion, the applicant sought an order compelling a trial witness to attend and provide a voice sample for use by a defence expert in support of an anticipated fresh evidence application.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code authorizes production of existing material connected with the proceedings, not the creation of new material.

It further held that s. 683(1)(b) permits compelling a compellable witness to attend and be examined as a witness, but not to assist in creating material for expert analysis.

The motion was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The accused applied under ss. 462.34 and 462.341 of the Criminal Code for the release of $500,000 from seized currency subject to restraint and management orders to fund his legal defence in pending drug trafficking and murder proceedings.

The Crown and an intervening execution creditor opposed the application.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish that he had no other assets or means available and failed to demonstrate that no other person had a lawful ownership or possessory interest in the seized funds.

In particular, the intervenor held a registered restitution and civil judgment enforceable under the Execution Act, and another person potentially claimed an interest in the currency.

The statutory prerequisites for release of seized property were therefore not met.

The Crown appealed a provincial court ruling granting a judicial stay of impaired driving charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay.

The trial judge had attributed portions of delay to the Crown and institutional causes and concluded the appropriate time to trial was eight months, resulting in a stay after approximately 372 days from charge to trial.

On appeal, the Superior Court held that the trial judge erred in assessing inherent intake time, improperly characterized certain periods as Crown delay, and overstated prejudice to the accused arising from disclosure-related attendances.

The court also found insufficient consideration of the strong societal interest in prosecuting impaired driving offences.

Rebalancing the Morin factors, the court concluded that systemic delay was within acceptable administrative guidelines and that the stay was unwarranted.