Adriana Doyle

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a prior order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As no costs outline was submitted, the court made no order as to costs.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Vermette J. dated December 15, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion.

As no costs outline was submitted, the court made no order as to costs.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of a municipal council decision reprimanding him and suspending his pay for 30 days due to his participation in the Freedom Convoy protest.

The applicant argued the council failed to consider his section 2 Charter rights when imposing the penalty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the council was bound by the Integrity Commissioner's finding of misconduct, and any Charter arguments were relevant only to the Commissioner's finding, not the council's subsequent discretionary penalty decision.

The appellant, who acted as an agent and landlord but was not the property owner, appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding him jointly liable for a bad faith eviction under s. 57 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The appellant argued the LTB erred in law by failing to apportion liability between the multiple landlords based on their respective roles, as he lacked the legal authority to sell the property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the RTA is consumer protection legislation designed to balance rights between landlords and tenants, and does not require the LTB to adjudicate or apportion liability between multiple landlords.

The appellant father appealed a final restraining order granted by a motion judge during a motion for temporary relief.

The respondent mother had sought a temporary restraining order after being violently attacked by the appellant's father.

Neither party requested a final restraining order, and both were content with the temporary order in place.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by granting a final order on an interim motion without giving the parties an opportunity to make submissions.

The temporary restraining order was reinstated.

The landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board declining to evict the tenants under s. 83(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

At the hearing, the landlord abandoned his original grounds of appeal and sought leave to argue a new ground, claiming the Board failed to consider unfairness to the landlord.

The Divisional Court denied leave to raise the new ground, noting the Board was deprived of the opportunity to address it.

In any event, the court found the new ground lacked merit, as the record demonstrated the Board had properly considered the circumstances of both the landlord and the tenants.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering him to pay $22,853.53 for building materials.

He argued the Deputy Judge failed to provide sufficient reasons regarding his complaint that the materials supplied were of the wrong type, nature, or colour.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the oral reasons were sufficient given the informal context of the Small Claims Court, as the Deputy Judge clearly rejected the appellant's credibility and noted he had installed and continued to use the materials.

The appellant father appealed a trial decision awarding primary care and residence of the child to the respondent mother.

The father argued the trial judge erred in law by failing to give appropriate weight to the child's Indigenous cultural, linguistic, and spiritual upbringing and heritage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly identified the legal principles and thoroughly examined the evidence.

The trial judge reasonably concluded that both parents were committed to and capable of fostering the child's Indigenous heritage, making it a non-decisive issue in this case.

No order as to costs was made.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion where the applicant father's motion for the return of a child was dismissed, and the respondent mother's cross-motion, asserting the child's habitual residence in Ghana and declining Ontario's jurisdiction, was granted.

The court awarded the respondent mother $7,000.00 in costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable by the applicant father within 90 days.

The court considered the Family Law Rules and the parties' submissions, finding no bad faith on either side but emphasizing that surreptitious child removal is not condoned.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to produce unredacted notes from her treating psychologist.

The plaintiff cross-moved for a limited sealing order and anonymization of the parties' names, arguing the notes contained highly personal information touching on her "biographical core." The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding the redacted portions irrelevant to the LTD claim and potentially embarrassing/prejudicial.

The court granted the plaintiff's cross-motion, emphasizing the strong public interest in protecting confidential therapist-patient relationships and ensuring individuals with mental health issues can seek help without fear of public disclosure of their deepest personal information.

The applicant father brought a motion requesting the return of the child, alleging the respondent mother wrongfully removed the child from Ottawa to Ghana.

The mother requested an order declaring the child's habitual residence as Ghana and that the Ontario court decline jurisdiction.

The court applied the hybrid approach to determine habitual residence under section 22 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

Finding that the child had lived in Ghana for almost her entire life and only spent 35 days in Ottawa, the court concluded the child's habitual residence was Ghana.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the habitual residence was Ontario, it would decline jurisdiction under section 25 of the Act, as Ghana was the more appropriate forum.

The appellant dentist appealed a discipline committee decision finding he engaged in sexual abuse of a patient and committed professional misconduct by co-signing a mortgage with another patient.

The committee revoked his certificate of registration and ordered him to pay costs and therapy expenses.

On appeal, the appellant argued the patient was his spouse under the statutory exception, relying on an alleged foreign divorce and religious marriage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the committee's finding that the sexual relationship commenced before the alleged marriage, rendering the spousal exception inapplicable.

The mandatory penalty of revocation and the costs awards were also upheld.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision that dismissed one of her two allegations of breach of a settlement agreement for being untimely.

The HRTO found that the two alleged breaches did not constitute a 'series of contraventions' under s. 45.9(3) of the Human Rights Code, meaning the first breach was filed outside the six-month limitation period.

The Divisional Court held that the HRTO's interpretation was reasonable and consistent with its established jurisprudence.

The court also dismissed the applicant's claims of procedural unfairness and bias, finding no evidentiary basis for them.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The applicant, a member of the Ontario College of Teachers, sought judicial review of a decision by the College's Discipline and Fitness to Practise Committees to amend their rule regarding third-party record production to align with R. v. Mills.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant lacked both private and public interest standing as he was not currently subject to any proceedings where the rule would apply.

Furthermore, the Court held that even if standing were established, the Committees' decision to update the rule was reasonable and within their statutory authority.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his application alleging age discrimination in credit card travel insurance.

The HRTO had dismissed the application at a preliminary hearing, finding that s. 22 of the Human Rights Code applied.

The Divisional Court granted the judicial review, finding that the adjudicator made a fundamental error by placing the onus on the applicant to prove that s. 22 did not apply, rather than on the respondents seeking to benefit from the exception.

The HRTO decisions were quashed and the matter was remitted for a new preliminary hearing before a different adjudicator.

The appellant pharmacist appealed the decisions of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Pharmacists finding professional misconduct, imposing a penalty, and awarding costs of $190,000.

The misconduct involved billing for medications not prescribed or received, and falsifying records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error or palpable and overriding error of fact in the Committee's decisions regarding misconduct, penalty, or costs.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a prior order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs and vacated the partial interim stay order that had been previously granted.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing, awarding costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Mirza J. dated June 6, 2023.

The Divisional Court allowed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were fixed at $5,000, with the ultimate determination of costs left to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal three orders of Morgan J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $35,500.