Adriana Doyle

This decision concerns a 13-count indictment against David Bukoski, including criminal harassment, distribution of intimate images, arson, conspiracy, and sexual assault.

The case centers on the aftermath of a breakup between S.M., a Canadian teenager, and Mr. Bukoski, an American, and the extensive harassment and criminal conduct that followed, much of it perpetrated online.

The court found Mr. Bukoski guilty of criminal harassment of S.M. and her mother, distribution of intimate images, and sexual assault, but acquitted him on the arson and conspiracy counts due to reasonable doubt regarding his involvement.

The judgment provides a detailed analysis of the evidence, credibility assessments, and the application of legal principles to complex facts involving internet-facilitated crime.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle collision and settled his claims for statutory accident benefits with the respondent insurer, providing a full and final release.

He later sought additional benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder, which the insurer denied based on the settlement.

The License Appeal Tribunal dismissed his claim because he had not returned the settlement funds as required by s. 9.1(8) of Regulation 664.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, confirming that repayment of settlement funds is a mandatory precondition to applying to the Tribunal, and there is no exemption for impecuniosity.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissing his complaint as abandoned after he failed to respond to a single email inquiring about the status of related WSIB proceedings.

The Tribunal had refused to reconsider the dismissal, focusing solely on whether the email was delivered rather than conducting a contextual analysis of abandonment.

The Divisional Court held that inferring abandonment from the failure to respond to one email, given the applicant's history of compliance and the ongoing nature of the WSIB proceedings, was unreasonable.

The application was granted, the dismissal order was quashed, and costs were awarded to the applicant.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Kimmel J. dated December 13, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs of $2,200 to the responding parties.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $2,200.

The moving party was successful on a motion to stay the discharge of its construction lien pending appeal and sought costs of $20,000.

The responding party argued costs should be reserved to the appeal panel or fixed at $5,000.

The Divisional Court fixed costs at $9,000 in favour of the moving party, finding its claimed costs disproportionate for a straightforward stay motion.

The payment of costs was stayed pending the determination of the appeal.

The moving party, 2B Developments, sought an order staying the trial judge's final order which dismissed its action, discharged its construction lien, and awarded damages to the respondent.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Divisional Court found that the appeal raised serious issues to be tried, including procedural fairness and the trial judge's finding of fraud.

The court held that 2B would suffer irreparable harm if the stay were refused because the discharge of a construction lien is irrevocable, resulting in the permanent loss of a statutory right.

Finding the balance of convenience favoured 2B, the court granted the motion to stay the discharge of the lien pending appeal.

The defendant brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP).

The parties had a brief relationship, after which the defendant made public allegations in the gaming community and on social media that the plaintiff had sexually assaulted her and was a sexual predator.

The court found that while the expressions related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff's defamation claim had substantial merit and there were grounds to defeat the defence of justification.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expressions.

The motion was dismissed, with no costs awarded.

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) applied for an order compelling Jason Snelgrove to reimburse funds allegedly misappropriated from his mother, Loreen Snelgrove, a vulnerable senior with dementia, while he acted as her attorney for property.

The court found that Jason Snelgrove breached his fiduciary duty by failing to account for expenditures and using funds contrary to his mother's interests.

Despite Jason's claims of ignorance regarding record-keeping and his mother's capacity to instruct him, the court ordered him to repay a significant portion of the funds.

N.G. was convicted by a jury of 13 sexual offences against his four biological daughters, committed over approximately two decades (2001-2019).

This decision addresses his sentencing.

The court considered the severe impact on the victims, the breach of trust by the offender, and the prolonged nature of the abuse as aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included N.G. being a first-time offender, his employment history, community involvement, and low risk of re-offending.

The court imposed a total sentence of 12 years imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives, and issued several ancillary orders including DNA sample, SOIRA registration, firearms prohibition, and non-contact orders.

The applicants challenged the capacity of Anastasia Helen Troy ("Ann") when she signed her 2022 will and powers of attorney (POAs), alleging incapacity and undue influence.

They sought a declaration that Ann is currently incapable, appointment as guardians, and an accounting.

The respondents moved to dismiss the application.

The court dismissed the challenge to the will, stating it cannot be challenged while the testator is alive.

However, the court found sufficient "suspicious circumstances" to allow the challenge to the 2022 POAs to proceed, noting concerns about Ann's cognitive decline and the respondents' conduct.

The court denied the request for an accounting at this stage due to no direct evidence of mismanagement but granted directions for medical record disclosure and ordered parties to conduct themselves respectfully around Ann.

The applicant, David Bukoski, sought a stay of criminal proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The prosecution, involving 13 charges including criminal harassment, sexual assault, arson, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit murder, had taken 71 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The court calculated the net delay by subtracting defence-waived delay (5.5 months), defence delay due to applicant's illness (14 months), Crown/complainant circumstances (3 months), and pandemic impact (4 months), and defence's underestimation of trial time (10 months), resulting in a net delay of 34.5 months.

The court found the case to be "particularly complex" due to the nature of the evidence, including extensive internet communications, pseudonyms, international coordination, and the unique circumstances of witnesses.

The Crown was found to have taken reasonable steps to mitigate delay.

Consequently, the court dismissed the application for a stay of proceedings, finding the remaining delay justified by the case's complexity.

The applicant father sought the return of the parties' four-year-old child to the United Kingdom under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, alleging wrongful retention by the respondent mother in Canada.

The court applied the hybrid approach to determine habitual residence, finding it to be the UK.

However, the court found that the father, through his actions, had consented and acquiesced to the child's retention in Canada, thereby triggering an exception under Article 13(a) of the Convention.

Consequently, the application for the child's return was dismissed, and the court assumed jurisdiction over the matter.

The accused, Dominic Mignac, was charged with seven counts, including aggravated assault, assault causing bodily harm, attempted murder, and resisting arrest, following a stabbing incident at a Burger King.

The court found the accused guilty of assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest.

However, the charges of attempted murder, uttering a death threat, and carrying a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace were dismissed due to reasonable doubt regarding the specific intent to kill and the purpose of carrying the knife.

The defence of self-defence was rejected as the accused's actions were not deemed a reasonable or proportional response to any perceived threat, particularly after the victim had disengaged.

An offender was found guilty of second-degree murder of an Indigenous victim.

The Crown sought a 13-year parole ineligibility period, citing the offender's extensive criminal record, history of violence, and non-compliance with court orders.

The defence requested the minimum 10-year parole ineligibility, emphasizing the impact of colonialism and intergenerational trauma on the offender, as detailed in a Gladue report, and his struggles with substance abuse and mental health.

The court considered the sentencing principles, including denunciation and deterrence, balanced against the Gladue factors, and the jury's recommendation.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for 10 years, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition, DNA order, and a communication prohibition.

The applicant sought judicial review of a joint decision by the Ontario and British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioners rejecting claims of solicitor-client and litigation privilege over documents related to a 2019 cyberattack.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the standard of review for privilege claims is correctness.

The Court found the Commissioners correctly determined that facts existing independently of privileged communications must be disclosed pursuant to statutory duties under the Personal Health Information Protection Act.

The Court also rejected the applicant's argument that the joint investigation breached procedural fairness, finding it was statutorily authorized and the applicant had acquiesced to the process.

The respondents brought a motion to strike two expert reports and related affidavit paragraphs filed by the applicant in a right-of-way dispute.

The court found that one expert's impartiality was compromised by reviewing settlement communications, and the other expert failed to comply with Rule 53.03 requirements for expert reports and refused cross-examination.

The court granted the motion, striking both expert reports and the referring affidavit paragraphs, and awarded costs to the respondents.

The applicant municipality sought declarations and advisory opinions from the Superior Court of Justice regarding a perceived conflict between its statutory duty to maintain highways under the Municipal Act, 2001, and its obligations to protect endangered species and their habitats under the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

The municipality faced charges under the ESA for road maintenance activities that allegedly harmed the mottled Duskywing butterfly and its habitat, arguing it was impossible to comply with both statutes simultaneously.

The court dismissed the application, finding the issues were not ripe for declaratory relief because the municipality had not availed itself of the permit process provided under the ESA, nor had it fully tested its defenses in the ongoing provincial prosecution.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Penny J. dated January 8, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As no costs outline was filed, the court ordered no costs.