William M. LeMay

The accused was charged with multiple counts of assault, assault with a weapon, and sexual assault against his former stepchildren.

The allegations arose during a highly contentious parenting dispute between the accused and his former spouse over their shared child.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainants and their mother, concluding that the mother had a strong motive to fabricate the allegations to exclude the accused from their child's life.

The court acquitted the accused on all counts due to the lack of credible and reliable evidence.

Additionally, the court ordered the transcripts and decision to be forwarded to the Children's Aid Society due to evidence that the mother had physically abused the complainants.

The moving party sought to set aside an interlocutory decision of Papageorgiou J. that declined to schedule appeals of interlocutory decisions made by Associate Justices.

The Divisional Court treated the request as a motion for leave to appeal.

The court denied leave to appeal without costs, noting that the proposed appeals of the Associate Justices' decisions were within the jurisdiction of a single judge of the Superior Court of Justice and had already been disposed of, with no further appeal proceedings available.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 inclusive to the responding party.

The moving party, The Corporation of the City of Peterborough, brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $10,000 to the responding party.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The appellant sought judicial review of decisions from the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) and the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT).

On consent, the Divisional Court quashed the HRTO decisions and remitted the matter for further adjudication without specific directions.

The Court also quashed the LAT decisions and remitted the matter for a new hearing before a different adjudicator, with reasons to follow.

The applicant, the sole registered owner of a property in Kincardine, Ontario, sought an interlocutory injunction to remove the respondent from the property and obtain exclusive possession to facilitate its sale.

The respondent, who currently occupies the property, claimed he owns 51% of the property pursuant to an alleged oral agreement to operate a commercial marijuana cultivation operation.

The court applied the RJR MacDonald test and found the applicant established a strong prima facie case based on the tort of ejectment, irreparable harm from loss of control of the property and ongoing financial burden, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.

The court granted the injunction with conditions including a 30-day grace period for the respondent to vacate and a requirement that net proceeds of sale be paid into court.

The court addressed a motion to interpret an order made on September 9, 2025, regarding the preservation of funds in trust accounts.

The plaintiff sought clarification on whether the order required the defendants to deposit additional funds into trust or merely maintain funds already held in trust.

The court also addressed whether the order applied to all defendants or only the Mayfield defendants.

The court held that the order requires maintenance of funds already in trust, not the deposit of new funds, and that the order applies only to the Mayfield defendants, not the Gandhi defendants.

The accused was charged with nine counts arising from two discrete incidents in May and June 2019 involving his former partner.

The Crown conceded two counts.

The court found the accused guilty of uttering threats (two counts), sexual assault, arson, and break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The court acquitted on assault, break and enter with intent (May incident), uttering threats (June incident), and escape from lawful custody.

The defence of automatism based on substance abuse was rejected, as the court found the accused retained sufficient capacity to form the necessary intent for the offences.

The Crown sought to admit a statement given by the accused to police following his arrest for assault, uttering threats, and related offences.

The defence opposed admission, arguing the statement was involuntary and that various Charter breaches occurred, including violations of sections 10(a), 10(b), and 7.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the statement.

The court found that the statement was voluntary and that while two technical Charter violations occurred (failure to inform the accused of all charges at the initial arrest and providing an incorrect charge description at the second arrest), these breaches were remedied before the statement was taken through a "fresh start." The court admitted the statement.

The applicant purchased a property in 2018 with title held 99% in his name and 1% in the names of the respondents (the parents of his fiancée).

The applicant paid the entire down payment of $430,000 and deposit of $20,000.

The respondents co-signed the mortgage and paid the monthly mortgage payments, while the applicant paid property taxes, utilities, and insurance.

After the relationship between the applicant and the respondent's daughter ended in 2020, the property was sold in 2022.

The respondents claimed either an agreement existed for a 50/50 split of proceeds or that unjust enrichment applied.

The court found no agreement existed and that unjust enrichment did not apply, ordering the proceeds to be distributed according to title (99% to the applicant, 1% to the respondents).

The appellant was successful on an appeal to set aside a noting in default in a slip and fall action.

The court assessed costs for the appeal and the motion below.

The respondent argued against costs, citing partial success, unreasonableness of the amount, and his impecuniosity as a recipient of social assistance.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the appellant was the successful party and the claimed costs were reasonable.

The court declined to consider impecuniosity due to insufficient evidence of the respondent's financial circumstances.

The appellant was awarded $5,764.38 in partial indemnity costs for the appeal, but no costs for the motion below.

This decision resolves the final outstanding issue of costs in a long-running civil action involving the Estate of Sulochana Shanthakumar and the Royal Bank of Canada, among other parties.

The court reviews the history of the litigation, the conduct of the parties, and the principles governing costs, ultimately awarding $25,000 in costs to RBC for steps taken after December 31, 2024.

The court declines to award substantial indemnity costs, finding that while the conduct of the applicant was problematic, it did not rise to the level required for such an award after the relevant date.

The court fixes costs in a dispute over the administration and interpretation of the John Szewczyk Testamentary Trust, specifically regarding the calculation of indexed payments to a beneficiary.

The court reviews the parties' positions, the applicable legal principles for costs in estate litigation, and the proportionality of the legal fees claimed.

Ultimately, the court orders that all parties' reasonable costs be paid from the trust, but reduces the amounts claimed by the applicant and one respondent due to concerns about excessiveness and proportionality.

This decision resolves the financial issues arising from the separation of Jamilla Jaha and Mabruck Mengele, including the imputation of income, calculation of child and spousal support, and equalization of property.

The court found that the applicant, Ms. Jaha, was intentionally underemployed and imputed income to her accordingly.

The court dismissed her motion for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and declined to revisit settled parenting and equalization issues.

The court also set out detailed calculations for support arrears and provided for a review of spousal support in three years, in anticipation of the respondent’s retirement.

The appellant landlord appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his motion to set aside a noting in default in a slip and fall action brought by the respondent tenant.

The Deputy Judge had refused to set aside the noting in default, citing prejudice to the respondent who had already collected the default judgment funds by withholding rent.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Deputy Judge erred in law by failing to apply the three-part test under Rule 11.06 of the Small Claims Court Rules, improperly ignoring a prior order that had set aside an earlier default judgment due to improper service, and considering irrelevant factors such as the respondent's premature garnishment and potential claims against third parties.

The noting in default was set aside and the appellant was granted leave to file a statement of defence.

The court considered the proper interpretation of annuity and indexing provisions in the John Szewczyk Testamentary Trust, specifically whether the annuity should be indexed annually or only once at inception, and whether overpayments should be repaid.

The court held that the will’s language and surrounding circumstances supported a one-time indexing at the date of death, with subsequent increases limited to $5,000 every five years.

Overpayments made prior to January 1, 2024, are not recoverable due to a prior settlement, but overpayments after that date are to be recouped by postponing the next scheduled increase.

The court fixes costs following a motion and cross-motion regarding parenting time and counseling for the parties' child, D.C. The Applicant (father) was successful in most of his requested relief, and the Respondent (mother) was found to have acted in bad faith by withholding information, flouting court orders, and seeking to reduce the Applicant's parenting time.

The court orders the Respondent to pay $30,000 in costs to the Applicant, to be paid within twelve months, and rejects arguments for reduction based on the Respondent's financial or personal circumstances.

The court fixes costs following an undefended trial in a family law matter where the respondent repeatedly ignored court orders and failed to participate in the proceedings.

The applicant sought full recovery of costs due to the respondent's bad faith conduct.

The court found that the respondent's actions—deliberately ignoring orders and withholding parenting time to leverage financial issues—constituted bad faith.

Costs were fixed at $45,000, to be paid from the respondent’s share of the matrimonial home.

The court granted a motion to strike a third-party claim brought by Roy D’Mello against the plaintiff’s lawyers, Neil Colville-Reeves and Reeves Richarz LLP, in a complex mortgage and property litigation.

The third-party claim sought contribution and indemnity, as well as damages for alleged champerty and maintenance.

The court found that claims against a plaintiff’s lawyer, acting as agent, cannot be sustained where the alleged conduct is attributable to the plaintiff.

The court also held that the facts pleaded did not support a claim for champerty or maintenance.

Leave to amend was denied.