William M. LeMay

The Applicant, Lovedeep Kang, withdrew her action against the Third Party, Jagjit Kaur Bhullar.

Ms. Bhullar then sought full or substantial indemnity costs against the Applicant, alleging bad faith.

The Applicant argued for no costs, citing a bona fide claim and financial hardship.

The court found no bad faith, assessed costs on a partial indemnity basis, and considered the Applicant's financial circumstances but found insufficient evidence of hardship.

The court ultimately awarded Ms. Bhullar $6,000.00 in costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable at the conclusion of the main action, finding the claimed costs disproportionate to the stage of the action when it was abandoned.

The plaintiff sought pre-judgment interest under the Courts of Justice Act following a judgment and costs decision.

The defendants opposed, arguing that awarding pre-judgment interest would run counter to the purposes of insurance and that the plaintiff did not suffer a loss of money, only lost chattels.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments, finding no principled or legal basis to deny pre-judgment interest on contractual insurance payments.

The court reasoned that interest accounts for the time delay in payment, prevents insurers from benefiting from delayed payouts, and is consistent with the Insurance Act's payment timelines.

The plaintiff was awarded $2,531.72 in pre-judgment interest.

The Applicants sought a declaration that the Respondents held their 50% interest in a property in trust for the Applicants, alleging no significant financial contribution from the Respondents.

The Respondents countered that they contributed most of the down payment and that rental income covered the bulk of carrying costs, while the Applicants lived rent-free.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Respondents made significant contributions to the down payment and that the Applicants' carrying costs were largely offset by rental income and their rent-free occupancy.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay, pursuant to Rule 24 or Rule 48 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action, concerning roof repairs, was commenced in 2013 and had a history of delays, including cancelled discoveries and being struck from the trial list.

The court determined Rule 48 applied, placing the onus on the plaintiff to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay and demonstrate no non-compensable prejudice.

Despite the plaintiff's "barely acceptable" explanation for dilatory conduct, the court found the action was ready for trial and the defendants failed to prove actual non-compensable prejudice.

The motion to dismiss was denied, and the action was restored to the trial list with peremptory trial dates.

The defendant sought an urgent injunction to prevent the sale of a mortgaged property by the plaintiffs under a power of sale.

The defendant argued the property was unique, the notice of sale was deficient, and payments were not properly credited.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the property was not unique, the notice of sale was not void due to minor irregularities, and the balance of convenience favored the plaintiffs, who had a binding agreement of purchase and sale.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion for the return of her two young children from the respondent father, who had unilaterally retained them beyond an agreed-upon access period, citing COVID-19 concerns and an alleged agreement.

The court found the matter urgent, emphasizing the importance of enforcing existing court orders and discouraging unilateral "self-help" remedies.

It determined there was no agreement for the children to remain with the father and that returning them to the applicant's primary residence was in their best interests, given her reasonable pandemic precautions.

The Crown brought a motion to admit "recognition" evidence from the accused's former girlfriend, Dejaunte Blake, to identify the accused in surveillance video related to a first-degree murder charge.

The defence opposed, arguing the relationship was not significant enough and the video quality was poor.

The court, applying the principles from R. v. Leaney, found the witness was in a better position than the jury to identify the accused due to her intimate and regular contact with him.

The court admitted the evidence, ruling that concerns about video quality and prior inconsistent statements went to weight, not admissibility.

In a first-degree murder trial, the court ruled on the admissibility of three wiretap excerpts, balancing their probative value against their prejudicial effect.

Two excerpts were excluded: one lacked sufficient link to the killing and carried significant prejudice by associating the accused with incarcerated individuals, and the other lacked probative value regarding a potential getaway vehicle or the shooting itself.

The third excerpt, which involved the accused discussing a homicide and police inquiries with his girlfriend, was admitted as highly probative of post-incident conduct related to his involvement in the shooting.

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to determine the voluntariness of two statements made by the accused to police.

The first statement was made to patrol officers investigating a trespass complaint prior to the murder, and the second was a six-hour interview following the accused's arrest by a tactical unit.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found no evidence of inducements, oppression, lack of an operating mind, or police trickery.

Both statements were ruled voluntary, with the first admissible in the Crown's case in chief and the second admissible for cross-examination.

The offender was convicted by a jury of importing 203.5 grams of heroin, conspiracy to import, and possession for the purpose of trafficking, and pled guilty to using a forged document.

The court found the offender was a mere courier motivated by financial need to support his family, and that he knew the imported substance was heroin.

Weighing the significant mitigating factors, including his status as a first-time offender with strong community support, against the aggravating nature of heroin, the court sentenced the offender to 5 years' imprisonment.

The Crown sought to admit "recognition evidence" from a hotel customer service representative to identify the accused in surveillance video related to a first-degree murder charge.

The defence opposed, arguing the witness lacked sufficient exposure to the accused.

The court dismissed the Crown's motion, finding that the witness's limited prior interactions with the accused, reliance on a short, obscured video clip, and identification based on clothing and gait (rather than facial features or consistent observation of gait on stairs) did not place her in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the accused.

Following a trial regarding an insurance claim for a fire loss, the court determined the costs of the action.

The plaintiff was awarded $25,468.64 at trial, which was less than the defendants' Rule 49 offer of $50,000 made prior to trial.

The court held that a subsequent, higher offer made by the defendants on the first day of trial did not revoke the earlier Rule 49 offer.

Consequently, the plaintiff was entitled to costs up to the date of the offer, and the defendants were entitled to costs thereafter.

Setting off the amounts, the plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendants a net sum of $15,000 in costs.

The offender was convicted of two counts of trafficking in persons, two counts of procuring, and one count of receiving a material benefit related to two young women.

The court determined a proportionate sentence, addressed the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for trafficking in persons under section 279.01(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and considered enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The mandatory minimum was found not grossly disproportionate for the offender but was for a reasonable hypothetical offender, thus violating section 12 of the Charter and not saved by section 1.

The court imposed a global sentence of eight years, with credit for pre-sentence custody.

This decision addresses the costs of a previous motion where Economical Insurance successfully moved to strike portions of the plaintiffs' claims.

The court found Economical to be the successful party on the underlying motion.

While the plaintiffs' counsel's conduct in noting Economical in default was improper and lengthened the proceeding, it was not serious enough to warrant substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to Economical in the amount of $7,500.00, inclusive of HST and disbursements, finding the claimed amount proportional with a minor deduction for duplicate time.

The appellant, Daniel Palmer, appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor (J.P.), who was his youth advisor.

The trial judge found Palmer guilty, disbelieving his testimony and concluding that the elements of sexual exploitation, including sexual purpose, were met.

Palmer argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in assessing mens rea by not considering J.P.'s testimony about punitive intent, and improperly considered a defence concession.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding sexual purpose, which does not require the accused's sexual gratification, and properly assessed the evidence and mens rea.

Following a trial decision ordering the applicant to repay overpaid spousal support, the court addressed several post-trial issues.

The court assumed jurisdiction to finalize the judgment despite the applicant's assignment in bankruptcy.

The respondent's request to redact the trial decision to anonymize the child was dismissed.

The court declined to adjust the spousal support repayment amount to account for tax consequences, finding the applicant paid no tax on the support and the respondent's tax liability was a matter for the CRA.

The respondent was awarded partial indemnity costs of $52,500 for the trial.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought a psychological assessment, which the insurer denied on the basis that the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) applied.

At arbitration, the Arbitrator found the MIG unconstitutional under s. 15 of the Charter without making any factual findings about the applicant's condition or whether the MIG actually precluded his benefits.

The Director's Delegate overturned this decision, holding that constitutional issues cannot be decided in a factual vacuum.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applicant's judicial review, affirming that the Arbitrator erred by deciding the Charter issue without a proper factual foundation.

This was a costs decision following the dismissal of a family law motion for interim disbursements.

The court held that the respondent's offer to settle did not trigger Rule 18(14) because it was withdrawn before the hearing started, but it remained a relevant factor supporting a costs award.

The court rejected both parties' allegations of bad faith, while noting that the respondent's aggressive language warranted a modest reduction.

Applying the Rule 24(11) factors, the court awarded the successful respondent $3,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements on a partial indemnity basis, payable at the conclusion of the action.

The plaintiffs sued their insurer and an auto body shop over defective repairs to their vehicle following an accident, claiming damages for the repair costs, fraud, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, negligence, and mental distress, along with 22% interest.

The insurer brought a motion to set aside a noting in default, strike all non-contractual claims, and transfer the action to Small Claims Court.

The court set aside the noting in default and struck the claims for fraud, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, negligence, mental distress, and 22% interest, finding the plaintiffs failed to plead the necessary material facts to support these causes of action.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings on strict terms but declined to transfer the action to Small Claims Court to avoid the risk of inconsistent findings with the ongoing Superior Court action against the auto body shop.

The court fixed the costs of a motion where the defendant successfully opposed the registration of a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on its property.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $51,051.67, arguing it made a Rule 49 offer and the motion was complex.

The court found the Rule 49 offer invalid because it required unanimous acceptance by all moving parties and third-party consent.

The court also found the costs claimed completely unreasonable and excessive for a CPL motion, noting that counsel spent 222 hours on the matter.

The court fixed costs at $6,000, payable 75% by one group of plaintiffs and 25% by another.