COURT FILE NO.: FS-09-65736-00
DATE: 2019 12 20
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ROSE FRATIANNI
J. Skapinker, Counsel for the Applicant
APPLICANT
- and -
PETER D’AMBROSIO
M. Giesinger and J. Bennett, Counsel for the Respondent
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
LEMAY J
[1] This matter proceeded to trial for four days before me in November of 2018. I released my reasons in May of this year (see 2019 ONSC 2190). In my decision, I directed the repayment of substantial amounts of spousal support that the Respondent had overpaid. I also directed the parties to provide me with submissions on the tax consequences of that issue.
[2] Subsequent to issuing my decision, I received a request from the Respondent to redact parts of the decision to protect the child of the marriage from identification. I also received a request from the Respondent to adjust the repayment of spousal support upwards. In addition, counsel for the Applicant wrote to advise me as to the fact that his client had filed for bankruptcy. Finally, there were the costs of the proceeding that had to be addressed. I will deal with each issue in turn. However, I will start with the issue relating to the bankruptcy to explain why I am content to assume jurisdiction to deal with the remaining issues.
The Effect of the Bankruptcy
[3] In June of this year, counsel for the Applicant wrote to advise that the Applicant had made an assignment in bankruptcy and that counsel for the Applicant was taking the position that the action was stayed on account of the bankruptcy proceeding. I expected that, at some point, an order of the bankruptcy court would follow from counsel. As a result, I held off on making a number of the decisions that are addressed in these reasons. However, I did not receive any order of the bankruptcy court.
[4] As a result, on December 5th, 2019, I provided the parties with an endorsement that outlined some missing documentation from the file, confirmed the fact that I had not received the bankruptcy order, and directed the parties to provide some information and submissions, particularly on my jurisdiction on the bankruptcy issue. In particular, I directed the “Respondent’s counsel” to provide any documentation to substantiate the assignment into bankruptcy and the staying of this action.
[5] Counsel for the Respondent asked, by e-mail, whether this order should have read “Applicant’s counsel”. My judicial assistant confirmed by e-mail the next day that I intended for Applicant’s counsel to provide the documentation to substantiate the bankruptcy.
[6] I received an e-mail from Mr. Skapinker, counsel for the Applicant, which reads as follows:
It is ms fratiannis position that whether the order made for the refund of support after the trial survives her bankruptcy is a matter for the bankruptcy court. It is inappropriate for mr. d’ambrosio to attempt an end run around the bankruptcy court. Ms fratianni does not object to the fixing of costs provided the affect of same is left to the bankruptcy court nor does ms fratianni object to the request to remove references to the child’s learning disability but I point out that the reasons have already been published.
[7] This e-mail came in response to the submissions of December 12th, 2019 from the Respondent. In addition, I received from Mr. Skapinker’s office a letter from a licensed insolvency trustee advising that the Applicant had filed an assignment in bankruptcy, as well as a notice from Industry Canada confirming a bankruptcy filing had been made by the Applicant. However, I have no Court Order or other directions actually staying the proceeding, and I have no update as to whether the Applicant remains an undischarged bankrupt.
[8] However, out of an abundance of caution, I will assume that there is an ongoing assignment into bankruptcy in this case, and that section 69.3(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act applies to the Applicant.
[9] In support of the proposition that I could continue with the proceedings before me, and particularly the costs issues, counsel for the Respondent directed my attention to three cases, Nouri v. Negravi (2015 ONSC 5695), Pasichnyk v. Pasichnyk (2005 CarswellOnt 7560 (S.C.J.) and Williams Estate v. Vogel of Canada Ltd. (2016 ONSC 2264).
[10] In Pasichnyk. Turnbull J. stated (at paragraphs 11 and 12):
[11] Counsel for the applicant wife argues that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act do not require an order lifting any stay under the Act prior to assessing costs. In the well respected text by Houlden and Morawetz, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada, 3rd ed., at page 3-143, the learned authors write that “sections 69, 69.1, 69.2 and 69.3 do not operate to prevent a court from delivering judgment in an action that has been fully tried before the defendant became bankrupt”. After citing authorities for that proposition, they then cite the case of Fairview Electronics Ltd. v. De Boer International Ltd. (1983), 48 C.B. R. (N.S.) 102 (Ont. S.C.) as authority for a creditor to tax costs of an action that had been brought by the bankrupt and dismissed prior to bankruptcy.
[12] I concur with the principle that the Applicant does not have to seek an order lifting any deemed stay under the Bankruptcy Act to have this assessment of costs proceed. It would not make sense that the rights of the parties should not be crystallized as soon as possible so that the claims, if any, which the applicant may wish to prove in the bankruptcy can be considered by the trustee and the other creditors.
[11] This passage succinctly summarizes the law in this area. As a result, I have the jurisdiction to deal with not only the costs issues, but the other issues as well even if there is an assignment into bankruptcy. All of the other issues flow from the reasons that I already rendered in this case and are part of the “Court delivering judgment in this case.” In particular, I note that none of these submissions require any additional facts to be found. They just require clarification, explanation or expansion of the rulings I made after the case was fully tried.
[12] Given the lack of supporting documentation, the contents of Mr. Skapinker’s e-mail and the case law I have cited, I am of the view that I have jurisdiction to address the remaining outstanding issues even if there is a bankruptcy proceeding. If there is, in fact, a bankruptcy proceeding, then the bankruptcy court can deal with the effect of my orders as appropriate.
[13] That being said, I note that there is a claim by the Respondent that I should order the repayment of the spousal support amounts, including costs, through the Family Responsibility Office. Counsel also argues that the spousal support payments would survive a bankruptcy pursuant to section 178(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. No case law was cited to support this request.
[14] I decline to make any Orders in terms of the enforcement of repayment obligations through the Family Responsibility Office or the survival of the amounts in a bankruptcy proceeding for three reasons:
a) The issues in the bankruptcy proceeding are not before me. As a result, it is doubtful as to whether I have jurisdiction to make an order that these payments survive the bankruptcy proceeding.
b) The parties were not invited to make submissions on this issue in my December 5th, 2019 endorsement, and I view addressing this issue at this stage as an unfairness to the Applicant.
c) The case-law does not necessarily favour the position taken by the Respondent. In that regard, I would direct the parties attention to the decisions in M.P.A.N. v. J.N. (2018 ONCJ 769 at paras. 290 to 292) and the discussion in M.B. v. S.B.B. (2019 ONSC 3960) and the cases cited therein. In light of this case law, I am not prepared to make the Orders sought by the Respondent.
[15] For these reasons, I have the jurisdiction to address the outstanding issues, but I decline to make any orders relating to the treatment in bankruptcy of the amounts payable by the Applicant to the Respondent. That is a matter that can be pursued in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Anonymizing of the Decision
[16] The Respondent has requested that I redact portions of the decision, specifically the concluding sentence of paragraph 54 of the decision. This request is based on the Respondent’s desire to protect his son from the consequences of someone else seeing the decision and coming to know about the Respondent’s son’s personal information.
[17] There are two problems with this request. First, it requires me to change the reasons after I released them. It is doubtful that a judge has jurisdiction to change his reasons after they have been released and the order has been taken out, even on consent. Second, and more importantly, the facts set out in that paragraph were part of the grounds for making my decision. Redacting them would leave the reasons without part of their factual foundation. In this regard, I would direct the parties to paragraph 69 of my reasons.
[18] I also note that the request was framed in the alternative that I provide an updated version of the decision with the name of the child redacted. At this point, I note that the decision had been public for some weeks before the request was even made. I also note that changing the decision would require reference to the unredacted version and might bring more attention to the decision than it currently receives. As a result, I am not prepared to provide an amended decision.
[19] For these reasons, the request is rejected and there will be no changes to the reasons I released.
Adjusting The Amount of Spousal Support
[20] In my reasons of May 7th, 2019, I stated the following at paragraph 268:
[268] If there are any arithmetical issues in either Schedule “A” or Schedule “B”, the parties are entitled to make written submissions of no more than two (2) pages in length within fourteen (14) calendar days of the release of these reasons. To be clear, these submissions are not an opportunity to challenge my methodology for arriving at the calculation of NFP or support. They are only for the purpose of identifying any arithmetical errors. I will then review those submissions and determine whether any reply submissions are required. No reply submissions are required or permitted until requested by me.
[21] The deadline for any requests for arithmetical adjustments to my support calculations was May 21st, 2019. I received nothing from any party at that point and, therefore, assumed that the calculations were correct.
[22] On June 4th, 2019, almost two weeks late, I received correspondence from the Respondent’s counsel advising that there was an arithmetical error of approximately $8,000.00 in my calculations. Having reviewed the correspondence, there probably is an error in the calculations.
[23] However, I have two concerns about the Respondent’s conduct in the manner that submissions after trial are being made. First, these submissions were obviously late, and I received no explanation as to why they were late. Second, the Respondent has provided uninvited submissions on the issue of redacting the decision and done so directly to me rather than by bringing a motion. As a result, there are issues as to whether I should receive and review these submissions. I understand that counsel for the Applicant is opposed to these late submissions.
[24] However, to ensure that I provide everyone with an opportunity to be heard, I am ordering as follows:
a) The Applicant’s counsel is permitted (but not required) to provide submissions on the issue of whether I should consider these late submissions and, if so, whether they are accurate. Those submissions are due by January 6th, 2020.
b) The Respondent’s counsel shall have until January 13th, 2020 to provide any responding submissions to the Applicant’s submissions.
c) No further reply submissions will be permitted.
Tax Consequences
[25] In my decision, I directed that Ms. Fratianni repay the sum of $67,800 on account of overpayments of spousal support between January 1, 2014 and November 1, 2018. I also directed that this amount could be reduced on account of the tax consequences. The reason for this direction was that the spousal support payments were taxable in Ms. Fratianni’s hands and tax deductible from Mr. D’Ambrosio’s hands. I invited submissions from the parties on this issue.
[26] Resolving the issue of the tax consequences of the repayment of spousal support requires an understanding of two key facts. First, the Respondent actually received tax deduction on his tax returns for the payment of spousal support. The repayment may create tax issues for him. Second, although the amounts were taxable in the Applicant’s hands, she did not actually pay any tax on the spousal support that she received, as her declared income was too low for the entire period.
[27] The Applicant argues that the Respondent should be required to re-file his tax returns with the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) without the deduction for spousal support and that the information from these tax returns should be used to calculate the actual amount of spousal support that he is entitled to receive as a result of my decision. The basis for this claim is that the Respondent received a benefit from paying spousal support.
[28] The Respondent argues that there should be no deduction for spousal support for a whole series of reasons. These reasons can be summarized as follows:
a) The tax consequences of the Respondent receiving a repayment of spousal support that has already been paid are a matter between him and the CRA, and should not be addressed in this proceeding.
b) Allowing a deduction of amounts owing from the Applicant and requiring the Respondent to refile his taxes with the CRA would result in double-dipping.
c) The Applicant also has tax liabilities in relation to my findings about her hiding income and should be required to address those issues with the CRA.
d) The Respondent suffered the loss of opportunities to invest in the stock market or otherwise earn income from the money he overpaid to the Applicant.
[29] Both parties cited the decision in Dhala v. Dhala (2008 ABCA 259) to me. The Respondent seeks to rely on this decision. The Applicant points out that this decision was on an interim motion and does not actually resolve the question. Indeed, at paragraph 17, Watson J.A. states that it is both unnecessary and probably unwise to resolve the question of the tax consequences of a repayment of spousal support on the motion for leave to appeal.
[30] However, I also note that, at paragraphs 15 and 16 of the decision, Watson J.A. states:
[15] The Applicant claims that the trial judge, and I, neglected to consider, or wrongly considered, the effect upon the Applicant of the trial judge’s finding that there was an overpayment of spousal support in the amount of $54,000.00, which the trial judge deducted from the matrimonial property division. The unchallenged evidence before me is that the Respondent has been deemed to be repaid the spousal support overpayment as a result of the trial judge’s decision, and that accordingly the Respondent has been required to pay income tax on that return. The Applicant claims that it is not fair that she should pay all of the overpayment back, as she received the spousal support net of tax in the first instance. She proposes that she should only have to repay a portion of the overpayment, keeping back a notional percentage of the overpayment to make up for the taxes she paid on receiving it in the first place.
[16] This argument has no merit. The Respondent asserts that the Applicant would be entitled to re-file her income tax returns for the relevant time period, and then seek reimbursement from the Canada Revenue Agency for any overpayment of taxes. The Respondent suggests that in light of her bankruptcy, the Applicant may not feel motivated to re-file such returns as any money re-paid to her would go into her bankruptcy estate and might therefore benefit creditors. On the face of it, the Respondent’s position seems to have some force.
[31] Neither party quoted any Ontario cases to me. In my review of the case law, the case that I was able to find that was most directly on point was Strangway v. Howard (2017 ONSC 2676). In that case, Broad J. stated (at para. 16):
[16] In my view, it is not necessary to undertake a calculation of a gross up of the overpayment of child support to account for the tax deduction. It is more appropriate to order that the overpayment be characterized as spousal support for the relevant period to permit the parties to file amended tax returns in order to achieve the appropriate tax treatment for the 2015 and 2016 taxation years. Counsel for the Respondent submits that the tax impact on the respondent would be reduced by taking this approach, with no prejudice to the applicant. In my view this is appropriate as it replicates the tax treatment that would have applied had the amount of the overpayment been treated as spousal support in the first place.
[32] This brings me to the facts of this case. I am not prepared to make any adjustment in the amount owing from the Applicant to the Respondent for three reasons, all of which have at least some of their roots in the reasoning in Strangway, supra, which I adopt.
[33] First, the Applicant will suffer no loss by being required to repay the entire overpayment. On my review of her tax returns, the Applicant has not paid any tax on any of the spousal support amounts that she was paid as her claimed income was not high enough. Therefore, giving her a discount on the amounts owing would result in her retaining money that she was not entitled to.
[34] Second, and a related point, deducting monies from the amounts that are repayable to the Respondent could result in him being out of pocket. He would have to pay tax on the support that he overpaid, but would not get the full refund. In other words, there is a risk that the Respondent would suffer a loss if I made any adjustment for the tax consequences of the repayment of spousal support in this case.
[35] Finally, even if there was a loss to the Applicant from having to repay the spousal support, I accept the Respondent’s submission that the money owing by him to the CRA as a result of the repayment of spousal support is a matter between him and the CRA. I also note that the issue of the Applicant’s actual income for the relevant years is an issue between her and the CRA.
[36] For the foregoing reasons, there will be no adjustment to the spousal support amounts on account of any tax liability.
[37] Finally, I will briefly comment on the submission that the Respondent made about lost investment opportunities. I reject this argument on the facts of this case, as I have already determined this question. In this regard, I direct the parties to paragraph 255 of my reasons. Compensation for investment income, or other losses, is the same type of remedy as interest and is not available on these facts.
Costs
The Position of the Parties
[38] The Respondent seeks costs in this case of $123,112.47. These costs are on a partial indemnity basis until August 27th, 2018 and on a full indemnity basis thereafter. These costs are sought on the following grounds:
a) The Respondent was successful on the bulk of the issues in this case.
b) The Applicant was largely responsible for the delays in this case, and that I found that both she and her counsel deliberately failed to comply with Court ordered disclosure in this case.
c) The Respondent made offers to settle that should entitle him to substantial indemnity costs, at least from the date the offers were made.
[39] The Respondent also argues that the costs submissions made by the Applicant should be reply submissions only because they were late. I reject that argument for two reasons. First, and most importantly, the Respondent is also seeking an indulgence from the Court. His submissions on the calculation errors were also late. However, the Respondent did not even ask for an indulgence to file his submissions late. As I have noted above, I am prepared to consider the Respondent’s calculations issues rather than dismissing them out of hand because they are late. The same courtesy should be extended to the Applicant in respect of her costs submissions.
[40] Second, regardless of whether the Applicant’s costs submissions are treated as reply submissions or not, they are still going to be before the Court, and I will still have to address the issues raised in those submissions. This is because the Applicant is arguing that there be no costs of these proceedings. This is a position that arises as a result of the Respondent’s claim for costs and will have to be considered irrespective of whether it is made in reply or not.
Analysis
[41] In conducting my analysis, I am mindful of the principles in Serra v. Serra (2009 ONCA 395), as well as the principles set out in Rule 24(11) for the assessment of those costs. I have considered these principles in reaching my conclusion on the costs issues.
[42] I start with the question of who was more successful in this trial. I disagree with counsel for the Applicant that this is a case where success was evenly divided. Instead, I am of the view that the Respondent was substantially more successful than the Applicant. I reach that conclusion for the following reasons:
a) The access and custody issues were the only significant issues where the Applicant was successful. These issues were argued at trial, but they did not consume a significant amount of time in the proceeding.
b) The outcome on the financial issues, including the imputation of income to the Applicant, favoured the Respondent. These issues were both more complex and more time consuming at trial than the custody and access issues.
c) As detailed between paragraphs 86 and 105 of my reasons, I concluded that the Applicant deliberately failed to comply with her disclosure obligations. This is the sort of conduct that, even if success was evenly divided, would attract an award of costs against the Applicant.
[43] As a result, I conclude that the Respondent is entitled to at least some costs from the Applicant for this proceeding. The question is how much?
[44] This brings me to the Respondent’s Offers to Settle. There were six offers that were served on the Applicant between August 14th, 2018 and October 4th, 2018. Counsel argues that the Respondent did better than all of these offers at trial. I disagree.
[45] It is not necessary to analyze each offer in detail, as none of the offers dealt with the imputation of income in a way that would trigger the costs consequences of Rule 18 of the Family Law Rules. All of the Respondent’s offers have his income imputed at a level lower than I found it, and the Applicant’s income imputed at a level higher than I found it. The imputation of income drove the outcome of the child and spousal support issues, which were both significant issues at trial. Having failed to achieve a result that was the same or better than his offer on a significant issue at trial, the Respondent is not entitled to the application of the enhanced costs provisions in Rule 18.
[46] I would also note that the Respondent included a sliding scale of spousal support repayments contained in a number of the offers. These sliding scales substantially increased the retroactive amount of spousal support payable by the Applicant for even a short delay in accepting the offer, with a delay of less than a month in accepting the offer resulting in an increase in the retroactivity payable by the Applicant of more than $30,000.00. The inclusion of this type of provision is of concern in deciding whether the offers meet the requirements of Rule 18, but that is not a question I have to decide, as I have determined that Rule 18 does not apply in this case in any event.
[47] However, the offers to settle that were made by the Respondent were not unreasonable attempts to resolve this litigation and they should have merited close consideration by the Applicant. I also note that the Applicant also made offers to settle. However, her offers were not reasonable, as they made no provision for the very significant overpayment of spousal support and did not address the issue of the imputation of income to the Applicant.
[48] Therefore, none of the offers trigger the consequences of Rule 18. However, the Respondent’s offers were reasonable attempts to resolve the issues in this case, and are a factor that favours an award of partial indemnity costs to the Respondent.
[49] Having established that the costs in this matter should be on a partial indemnity basis, the question is what should the quantum of those costs be?
[50] First, I note that claims have been made for the work done by previous counsel. Those claims amount to approximately $55,000.00 in partial indemnity costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements. I am of the view that some, but not all, of these amounts should be recoverable by the Applicant. There was obviously work done in the period before Mr. Bennet and Mr. Giesinger were retained. However, there were also 11 different lawyers that the Respondent saw before coming to his trial counsel. There is clearly going to be some duplication in the work performed by the previous counsel. In addition, the costs of various motions would have been considered by the Court at the time that the motions were heard.
[51] It is difficult to know how much duplication there is in these accounts. For example, in previous accounts, the charging lawyer states on more than one occasion “provide guidance and or opinion on subject matters”. Given this lack of detail, I cannot precisely identify the amount of time spent on various activities. However, based on my review of the dockets and accounts that were included as well as the file itself, I conclude that half of these costs can be claimed for the costs of the trial. This is subject to my comments about success set out below.
[52] This adjustment would leave a total of approximately $74,000.00 on account of partial indemnity fees and disbursements for this action. This is not an unreasonable amount to pay in this case, given the following points:
a) As noted above, the Applicant deliberately failed to comply with the disclosure that had been ordered in this case. This conduct was unreasonable (within the meaning of Rule 24(11)) and also made this matter more complicated.
b) The imputation of income comes with its difficulties and complexities, especially in a case where substantial documentation was missing.
c) The action lasted for a period of ten (10) years.
[53] However, this amount should be reduced to take into account two further factors. First, both Mr. Giesinger and Mr. Bennett attended at trial. The Court recognizes that this was likely Mr. Bennett’s first trial (as he was called in 2018), and that the best traditions of the bar require the sort of mentoring that was available through this experience, but this is not a cost that the Applicant should be called upon to bear. As a result, I am reducing the costs by the amounts claimed for Mr. Bennett’s attendance at trial. This does not apply to the work he did out of court on days when the trial was heard. This produces a deduction of $4,000.00.
[54] Second, there should be a deduction for the time that was spent on the issues where the Applicant was successful, being custody and access. I am of the view that a deduction of 25% to account for these issues is appropriate.
[55] When these factors are taken into account, the Applicant is required to pay the Respondent the sum of $52,500.00 in costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements.
Additional Costs Submissions
[56] There have been significant submissions from the parties, particularly Mr. D’Ambrosio, since the costs submissions were received at the end of May. In particular, there were the uninvited submissions on the issues of anonymizing the decision and the late submission on the recalculation of spousal support. There were also submissions on the bankruptcy issues and other matters.
[57] It is possible that there could be a claim for costs flowing from the submissions of the parties that were made after the costs submissions were made. At this point, I am of the preliminary view that no costs should be ordered for the post-costs submissions.
[58] I have two reasons for my preliminary view. First, the costs that have been ordered appear to be sufficient for the issues that are in dispute in this case. Second, Mr. D’Ambrosio was more successful on the issues in dispute on this endorsement, as he succeeded on both the costs and on the question of the tax consequences of the spousal support. However, that success must be counterbalanced against the fact that Mr. D’Ambrosio provided submissions on issues where he was either out of time, or where the Court did not invite those submissions. These two factors balance each other out to suggest that an award of costs may not be appropriate.
[59] However, in the event that either party is seeking costs for the post-costs submissions, they are to provide their submissions by no later than January 6th, 2020. Those submissions are not to be more than two (2) double-spaced pages, there are to be no more than three cases attached to those submissions, and the bill of costs is to be no more than fifteen pages.
[60] Responding submissions to any request for costs are due by January 13th, 2020. Those submissions are not to be more than two (2) double-spaced pages, there are to be no more than three cases attached to those submissions, and the bill of costs (if one has not already been provided) is to be no more than fifteen pages. I am aware that these timelines are tight, and that they may require work over the winter break. However, this matter has been going on for ten (10) years and needs to be finalized. The timelines may not be extended, even on consent, without my leave. There are to be no reply submissions without my leave.
Conclusion
[61] For the foregoing reasons, I am ordering as follows:
a) In the absence of any orders from the bankruptcy proceedings, the Court has jurisdiction to address the issues before it. However, the effect of this Court’s order on any bankruptcy proceeding are to be left to the court considering the bankruptcy issues.
b) The Respondent’s request to have portions of the decision redacted is dismissed.
c) The Respondent’s request for an adjustment in the calculation of spousal support is to be addressed by submissions between the parties, as set out in paragraph 24 of my reasons.
d) There will be no adjustment to the amount of spousal support overpayment repayable to the Respondent by the Applicant on account of any potential tax liabilities.
e) The Applicant will pay the Respondent’s costs in the sum of $52,500.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements.
f) Any party claiming costs of the post-costs submissions proceedings must provide their submissions by no later than January 6th, 2020. Those submissions are not to be more than two (2) double-spaced pages, there are to be no more than three cases attached to those submissions, and the bill of costs is to be no more than fifteen pages.
g) Any party wishing to respond to the post-costs costs submissions has until January 13th 2020 to provide their reply submissions. The limitations on those submissions will be the same as set out in paragraph (f) above.
[62] In terms of the submissions that I have invited, I would note two points. First, those submissions are to be strictly limited to the issues that I have invited the parties to address. The parties are not to go beyond what has been requested. I am making this order explicit because the submissions of the Respondent dated December 12th, 2019 went beyond the requests that I had made in my endorsement of December 5th, 2019 and because there has been a tendency to make additional submissions to me where I have not invited them.
[63] Second, there are to be no further submissions to me on any of the other issues in this case. Other than the two points I have to address, I have completed my work with this case. There are other routes by which parties can address the issues raised in this decision.
[64] As a final matter, I note that there have been some missing e-mails and submissions that my office has had to track down. Part of the problem came as a result of my office misplacing an e-mail or two that was not sent in hard copy. In order to ensure that everything is received by the Court, the parties are required to provide their submissions by e-mail and to file a copy with the Court office.
___________________________
LEMAY J
Released: December 20, 2019
COURT FILE NO.: FS-09-65736-00
DATE: 2019 12 20
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ROSE FRATIANNI
Applicant
- and -
PETER D’AMBROSIO
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LEMAY J
Released: December 20, 2019