William C. McDowell

The respondent, a Canadian businessman, brought a libel action in Ontario against an Israeli newspaper regarding an article published online and in print.

The appellants moved to stay the action, arguing Ontario lacked jurisdiction, Israel was a more appropriate forum, and the action was an abuse of process.

The motion judge dismissed the stay motion, finding Ontario had jurisdiction based on the tort being committed in Ontario, and that Israel was not clearly a more appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings on jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.

The plaintiff university brought an action against its former Assistant Vice-President and Director of Maintenance, alleging they orchestrated multiple fraudulent schemes, including false invoicing, kickbacks, and using university resources for personal residence improvements.

The court found the defendants liable for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, ordering them to pay damages.

The court also voided the transfer of the primary defendant's properties to his family members as fraudulent conveyances and rescinded his severance agreement due to material non-disclosure of his fraudulent activities.

The respondent acted as an agent to assist a client in collecting insurance proceeds, agreeing to a percentage fee.

To resolve issues with clearing cheques, the appellant solicitor agreed to have the insurance cheques made payable to his firm in trust and provided an undertaking to protect the respondent's fee.

The appellants argued the undertaking applied only to a single payment and was given on behalf of the client, not personally.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the undertaking extended to future payments and was a personal promise of the solicitor, dismissing the appeal.

Following a successful appeal setting aside a series of ex parte 'investigative receivership' orders, the successful appellants sought costs against both the original applicant and the court-appointed receiver.

The Court of Appeal held that both were liable for costs.

The applicant was liable on a partial indemnity scale because he initiated and supported the proceedings.

The receiver was held personally liable for costs on a substantial indemnity scale because it acted as a 'real litigator' and pursued an impermissibly overreaching roving receivership, losing its objectivity as an officer of the court.

The Court also clarified that substantial indemnity costs are calculated as 1.5 times partial indemnity costs under Rule 1.03, rather than as a percentage of full indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed the summary dismissal of his defamation action against the author and publisher of a book about a street gang.

The appellant claimed a passage comparing him to a movie character carried defamatory meanings, including that he was a murderer and a psychopath.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the words were not capable of bearing those defamatory meanings and that true innuendo had not been properly pleaded.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to reduce the motion judge's costs award from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, finding that Rule 49 did not automatically warrant substantial indemnity costs for a successful defendant.

The plaintiff moved to strike a statement of defence and abuse of process counterclaim arising from a solicitor's negligence action against former criminal counsel concerning advice to enter a U.S. plea agreement.

The court held that the defence pleading was replete with evidence, argument, quotations, and scandalous character attacks contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and struck it in its entirety with leave to amend.

The court declined to strike the abuse of process counterclaim under rule 21.01(1)(b), holding it was not plain and obvious the claim could not succeed where the plaintiff had arguably made his innocence and reputational vindication an unnecessary material issue in the negligence action.

Costs were ordered in the cause.

The defendants moved to set aside service ex juris and stay a defamation action brought by an Ontario resident against an Israeli newspaper and journalists regarding an article published online.

The court held that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter because the alleged defamatory article was read by individuals in Ontario, establishing a presumptive connecting factor through the commission of the tort in the province.

The defendants failed to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction and did not demonstrate that Israel was a clearly more appropriate forum under the forum non conveniens analysis.

The plaintiff’s undertaking to limit damages to reputational harm suffered within Canada, the availability of jury trials in Ontario, and fairness considerations supported Ontario as the proper forum.

The court also rejected the argument that the action constituted an abuse of process due to minimal publication in Ontario.

The respondent franchisor brought a motion to stay an application commenced by franchisees and a related property owner, arguing that disputes concerning a licence agreement and a right of first purchase should be determined by arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause.

The court considered the competence‑competence principle and whether the dispute fell within the scope of the arbitration clause.

Because the property owner was not a party to the licence agreement or arbitration clause, the issue of whether the right of first purchase extended to the property could not be arbitrated.

The court also noted that another dispute regarding licence fees was expressly excluded from arbitration and that bifurcating the issues would be inefficient given a pending transaction deadline.

The motion to stay the proceeding in favour of arbitration was dismissed.

The appellants moved to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal that dismissed their motion to set aside a Registrar's Order dismissing their appeal for delay.

The panel admitted fresh evidence showing that the delay was due to the inadvertence of former counsel, who failed to provide the full explanation for the delay or evidence of the appellants' intention to pursue the appeal.

Finding that the appeal raised serious issues regarding the scope of a receiver's authority, the court set aside the dismissal orders, extended the time to perfect the appeal, and awarded costs to the appellants.

Following a successful trial, the plaintiff sought costs and disbursements against the defendant.

The defendant largely agreed with the plaintiff’s bill of costs but raised objections concerning certain travel expenses and the calculation of prejudgment interest.

The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to airfare to attend the trial but not travel costs for the pre‑trial hearing because participation could have occurred by teleconference.

The court also required proper receipts corresponding with trial dates and adjusted prejudgment interest to reflect a 16‑month period rather than the 19 months claimed.

Subject to those adjustments, the plaintiff was awarded the costs and disbursements set out in the bill of costs.

Requests for directions were brought regarding the disposition of documents generated in the Independent Assessment Process established under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement.

The moving parties sought guidance on whether the documents, which contained highly sensitive narratives of abuse and personal information, should be archived or destroyed.

The court held that the documents were confidential, subject to the implied undertaking and the law of breach of confidence, and were created for a private adjudicative process.

Interpreting the settlement agreement and exercising supervisory jurisdiction over the class action settlement, the court concluded the documents must ultimately be destroyed after a retention period.

During the retention period, claimants must be notified of their option to consent to the transfer of redacted records to the National Research Centre for Truth and Reconciliation.

A former employee sought enforcement of a severance settlement reached following termination without cause after the employer refused payment upon later discovering a shortfall in funds related to an employee social committee activity.

The employer conducted an internal investigation and asserted after-acquired cause, alleging theft and material nondisclosure during settlement negotiations.

The court found the investigation inaccurate and unreliable, noting the employee had not admitted theft and the criminal charge had been withdrawn without admission.

The conduct occurred in relation to an informal arrangement unrelated to the employee’s job duties and was accompanied by an intention to repay the funds.

The employer failed to establish just cause or grounds to rescind the settlement.

In a receivership-related motion arising from alleged fraudulent investment activities, the receiver sought authorization to utilize frozen funds held by entities subject to prior court orders to pay ongoing investigation costs.

The court held that the circumstances differed from typical insolvency proceedings because many affected entities were not parties and no specific allegations had been pleaded against them.

Exercising discretion under the prior freezing order, the court declined to allow prepayment of the receiver’s investigative expenses from the frozen funds.

The court also rejected a request for a sealing order due to the strong presumption of open courts but granted a confidentiality order restricting the receiver from voluntarily providing information to tax or criminal authorities.

Costs were not awarded due to divided success.

The appellant appealed an order discharging a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) and a limited proprietary injunction, which allowed the respondent to sell or encumber a property to fund legal defence costs for herself and her parents.

The appellant argued the motions judge erred in assessing its fraudulent conveyance and resulting trust claims, and in allowing the property's equity to fund the father's legal fees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the motions judge's assessment of the claims and no palpable or overriding error in his exercise of discretion to ensure the defendants had access to legal representation.

The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant from selling an independent medical examinations business to a competitor.

The plaintiffs argued the defendant breached a contractual duty of good faith by failing to negotiate a sale with them and by not offering a right to match the competitor's offer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried as the defendant had fulfilled its limited obligation to offer a first right of negotiation and was not required to provide a right to match.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured the defendants.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that an agreement of purchase and sale was void because it was entered into while the respondent corporation was dissolved.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the revival of a corporation under s. 241(5) of the Business Corporations Act is retroactive in effect.

The court reaffirmed its previous decision in Zangelo Investments Ltd. and explicitly rejected lower court jurisprudence that held otherwise, concluding that the revived corporation is deemed never to have been dissolved.

The applicant, a municipal deputy fire chief, brought a motion seeking an order that the municipality pay his advanced legal costs relating to a whistleblower complaint and a public interest application alleging municipal conflict of interest by the mayor.

The court considered whether the municipality’s whistleblower policy contained an implied term requiring reimbursement of legal fees and whether advanced costs should be awarded under the test from British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band.

The court held there was no basis to imply a contractual term requiring the municipality to fund legal counsel for whistleblowers where the policy was silent on such payments.

Applying the Okanagan test, the court found the applicant was not impecunious and had the ability to fund the litigation himself.

Although the allegations involved public officials, the issues did not reach the level of broad public importance required for an advanced costs order.

The plaintiff, York University, sought leave to appeal an order discharging a certificate of pending litigation on a property and authorizing its sale or mortgage to fund the defendants' legal representation.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's assessment of the equities, particularly the consideration of the personal circumstances of a non-owner defendant in a fraudulent conveyance claim.

The court also noted the importance of clarifying the legal principles for discharging such certificates to guide future cases.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding an agreement reached by the parties, reflected in a special case, concerning the review of a decision by the majority executors of an estate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to interfere with the agreement.

The court noted that the agreement entitled the appellant to a review of the majority executors' decision, meaning the court's jurisdiction was not ousted, and left the determination of the appropriate standard of review to the judge hearing the review application.

In a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal of two bar owners for manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision.

The deceased driver, who had consumed alcohol at the defendants' licensed establishment, was found to have a blood alcohol level exceeding 200 milligrams percent at the time of the collision.

The Crown alleged violations of the Ontario Liquor Licence Act constituted unlawful acts supporting manslaughter charges, or alternatively, that the defendants' conduct amounted to criminal negligence.

The court discharged both accused, finding that violations of liquor licensing regulations, while potentially constituting unlawful acts, were not objectively dangerous as required by law, and that the evidence did not establish the marked departure from the standard of care necessary for criminal negligence.