William C. McDowell

The applicant municipality successfully obtained an interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondents from blockading various development sites and successfully defended a motion to quash its by-laws.

The applicant subsequently sought its costs of the proceedings.

The respondents argued they were public interest litigants and that costs should be in the cause or paid by the province.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the respondents' unlawful conduct necessitated the litigation and they were not acting in the public interest.

The court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $350,000, significantly reducing the $887,000 claimed due to duplication, excessive time, and the exclusion of costs for a court-ordered consultation process.

In an appeal from Ontario, the appellants sought a stay of a defamation action on the basis of lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.

The Court held that Ontario had a real and substantial connection because the alleged tort was published in Ontario and the plaintiff pleaded publication and reputational harm in that forum.

The Court also held that the appellants failed to show Quebec was clearly more appropriate, giving deference to the motion judge’s discretionary forum analysis.

The Court discussed concerns about forum shopping and noted, without deciding, that choice-of-law rules in multijurisdictional defamation may warrant future refinement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

On a motion for directions in an application concerning settlement agreements related to the Ambassador Bridge between Windsor and Detroit, the moving parties sought broad documentary production from the federal government.

The court addressed disputes over the scope of relevance and proportionality in documentary disclosure within an application proceeding.

The court held that production must be limited to documents relevant and probative to interpreting the settlement agreements and their alleged ongoing obligations, rejecting requests for expansive historical government policy and legislative background materials.

The court provided guidance on specific document categories, directed the parties to exchange lists of litigation records from prior Canadian and U.S. proceedings, and required further review of settlement negotiation materials.

Directions were also given to narrow issues, schedule cross-examinations, and coordinate related proceedings.

The applicant, a resident and taxpayer of Mississauga, sought judicial review of the Report of the City of Mississauga Judicial Inquiry.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the application on the basis that the applicant lacked standing.

The court found that the applicant had no direct, personal interest in the inquiry's findings and therefore lacked private standing.

Furthermore, the court held that the applicant did not meet the test for public interest standing, as he was not directly affected and there were other individuals with a greater interest who could have challenged the inquiry.

The motion was granted and the application for judicial review was quashed.

The plaintiffs, former federal public servants, sued the Attorney General of Canada (AGC) for negligent misrepresentation after resigning to join a private company, Loba, and transferring their pensions to the Loba Plan, which was later revoked by the CRA.

The trial judge found the AGC liable for failing to disclose known risks about the Loba Plan and apportioned liability 80% to the AGC and 20% to the Loba Parties (third parties).

The AGC appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of duty of care, misrepresentation, and causation against the AGC.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding apportionment, finding the trial judge erred in her fiduciary analysis of the Loba Parties.

The Court adjusted the apportionment of liability to 60% for the AGC and 40% for the Loba Parties.

A separate appeal by one plaintiff regarding the calculation of his damages was dismissed.

The applicants sought an order quashing and permanently prohibiting a disciplinary proceeding against them before the Discipline Committee of the Professional Engineers of Ontario, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court found that the tribunal's administrative staff had inappropriately interfered in the scheduling process, demanded evidence for adjournments, and usurped the role of the Chair.

The Chair was found complicit in this conduct and interfered with the independence of a panel member who had ruled against the staff's request to be added as a party.

The court concluded that a reasonable apprehension of bias was established and permanently stayed the disciplinary proceedings.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to decline jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was a real and substantial connection between the Ontario court and the claim, satisfying the test for jurisdiction simpliciter under both Muscutt and Van Breda.

The Court also found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion regarding the forum non conveniens analysis, noting that even if recent Supreme Court jurisprudence attenuated the juridical advantage point, there were sufficient other bases to support the decision.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $12,000.

The appellant sued multiple defendants for malicious prosecution, defamation, and other claims arising from a child sexual abuse investigation that resulted in criminal charges which were later stayed.

After his civil action was dismissed at trial, he appealed, primarily arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the ineffective assistance claim was an abuse of process because the appellant had already sued his trial counsel for negligence and settled that action.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge should have ordered a mistrial and that the trial judge erred in dismissing the defamation claim against the child's grandmother.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its application to declare invalid and set aside two building permits issued for a nine-storey transitional housing and shelter building.

The appellant argued the Chief Building Official erred in classifying the proposed use as a 'hostel' rather than a 'crisis care facility' under the zoning by-law, and that the pending Municipal Shelter By-law appeal should have prevented the permits' issuance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's acceptance of the CBO's zoning compliance determination or the finding that the pending by-law appeal did not constitute 'applicable law' preventing the permits' issuance.

Cross-appeals arose from a sixth municipal prosecution alleging campground zoning violations involving camp lots located too close to a residential zone boundary.

The defendants sought reinstatement of a stay for abuse of process based on repeated prosecutions and prejudice, while the prosecutor sought restoration of convictions entered after the justice of the peace had already stayed the charges.

The court held the defendants had not met the stringent "clearest of cases" standard for a stay under s. 7 of the Charter, particularly in the context of ongoing regulatory land-use offences.

It further held that the convictions could not be restored because the justice of the peace required the defence of legal non-conforming use to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt instead of on a balance of probabilities.

Both appeals were dismissed and the order for a new trial was affirmed.

Cross-appeals arose from a sixth municipal prosecution alleging campground zoning violations involving camp lots located too close to a residential zone boundary.

The defendants sought reinstatement of a stay for abuse of process based on repeated prosecutions and prejudice, while the prosecutor sought restoration of convictions entered after the justice of the peace had already stayed the charges.

The court held the defendants had not met the stringent "clearest of cases" standard for a stay under s. 7 of the Charter, particularly in the context of ongoing regulatory land-use offences.

It further held that the convictions could not be restored because the justice of the peace required the defence of legal non-conforming use to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt instead of on a balance of probabilities.

Both appeals were dismissed and the order for a new trial was affirmed.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for libel.

The defendants pleaded alternative defamatory meanings and sought to justify them.

The motions judge struck out the defendants' particulars on the basis that they were oppressive to the plaintiffs, relying on the Polly Peck approach adopted in Pizza Pizza.

The defendants appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the court cannot strike a pleading or particulars in a libel action that are relevant, necessary, and of reasonable probative value solely on the ground of oppression.

The court must balance the probative value against the prejudicial effect under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant challenged a decision arising from a preliminary hearing in a prosecution involving alleged sexual touching during a medical examination.

The Court of Appeal held there was some evidence on which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that the appellant squeezed the complainant's breasts and placed his hand underneath her pants for a sexual, rather than medical, purpose.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The applicant ballet company sought a stay of an interim arbitral award that suspended the non-renewal of the respondent dancer's employment contract and ordered her reinstatement pending a final decision.

The applicant argued the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to order reinstatement under the Labour Relations Act.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that while there was a serious question to be tried regarding jurisdiction, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience strongly favoured the respondent, as a further hiatus in dancing would likely end her career, whereas the applicant would not suffer a fatal blow if she were reinstated.