Sidney N. Lederman

The applicant, a 76-year-old family physician, sought judicial review of an order by the College of Physicians and Surgeons' Quality Assurance Committee requiring him to practice under clinical supervision.

The order followed peer assessments that identified critical deficiencies in his practice posing an immediate risk to patient safety.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because he did not receive a copy of the final review before the Committee's initial letter, and that the Committee failed to consider his responses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness when the process was viewed as a whole, and concluding that the Committee had properly considered the applicant's submissions.

The appellant, a listing real estate broker, appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding he was unjustly enriched and ordering him to share a commission with the respondent, a co-operating brokerage.

The respondent's agent had introduced the buyers to the property but failed to obtain a signed Buyer Representation Agreement.

The buyers subsequently approached the appellant directly, stated they were unrepresented, and signed a Buyer Representation Agreement with him.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the appellant performed the work of a co-operating broker and had a valid juristic reason to retain the full commission.

The trial judgment was set aside and the action dismissed.

The appellant moved for a stay pending appeal of a Small Claims Court order that refused to set aside a judgment made after she failed to attend trial.

The appellant also sought to stay the enforcement of a writ of seizure and sale.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the appellant failed to meet the first branch of the RJR-MacDonald test because there was no serious issue to be decided.

The appellant had not complied with Rule 17(5) of the Small Claims Court Rules, which requires a motion to set aside a judgment to be brought within 30 days of becoming aware of it.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for damages for breach of contract regarding a water filtration system rental.

The trial judge had found that the five-year term was not explained to the respondent, the system was defective, and the appellant breached the payment terms.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors by ignoring evidence that the term was in the contract and explained, ignoring evidence that the defect was fixed, and mischaracterizing an accounting error as a fundamental breach.

Judgment was entered for the appellant.

The appellant tenant appealed a Review Order of the Landlord and Tenant Board to the Divisional Court.

The tenant argued that she was inappropriately charged for utilities as part of her rent geared-to-income.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law.

The court held that under section 203 of the Residential Tenancies Act, the Board lacks jurisdiction to determine eligibility for or the amount of rent geared-to-income assistance, which must be addressed through the review process under the Housing Services Act, 2011.

The court declined to award costs.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to stay the respondents' application in favour of arbitration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants failed to request arbitration before submitting their first statement on the substance of the dispute, as required by Article 8(1) of the Model Law.

The court also noted that referring the matter to arbitration would result in a multiplicity of proceedings, as only one issue involving a dormant appellant would be subject to arbitration, while the remaining issues involving non-parties would require a court application.

The respondent school board sought $60,000 in partial indemnity costs following the dismissal of the applicants' application for judicial review regarding a school closure.

The applicants argued they should be shielded from costs as public interest litigants, or alternatively that costs should be fixed at $15,000.

The Divisional Court rejected the public interest immunity argument, noting the applicants acted partly in self-interest and adopted a 'no holds barred' approach that increased costs.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court fixed costs payable to the respondent at $35,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The court determined the costs of an appeal regarding the passing of accounts where success was divided.

The respondent was substantially successful on the compensation appeal, while the appellant was successful on the costs appeal, avoiding approximately $45,000 in personal costs.

As a result, no costs of the appeal were awarded.

However, because the appellant had made an offer to settle the costs issue on the same basis as the court's finding, the appellant was awarded $1,500 for the expense of making written costs submissions.

The applicants sought judicial review of a school board's decision to close two secondary schools and build a new one, alleging procedural unfairness, lack of statutory authority, and unreasonableness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the board substantially complied with the Ministry's school closure guidelines and its own policies.

The court held that the public consultation process was meaningful and that the failure to disclose certain confidential student survey data did not breach the duty of procedural fairness, as it did not prejudice the applicants' ability to participate.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment of a $400,000 loan advanced for the production of a film.

The borrower and guarantor argued that a separate agreement governing distribution of film revenues subordinated repayment of the loan until other liabilities were satisfied and effectively transformed the loan into a risk investment.

The court held that the loan agreement and promissory note clearly provided that the loan was payable on demand and were not modified by the revenue-sharing agreement.

The defendants’ interpretation would contradict the express contractual language and render the loan agreement meaningless.

Summary judgment was granted for the full loan amount plus interest.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding they breached a custom home construction contract and dismissing their counterclaim.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's dismissal of its claim for future lost profits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellants caused the delay, that the Consumer Protection Act did not apply because the real substance of the transaction was the purchase of real property, and that the respondent did not commit trespass.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in failing to award the 20% markup as pure profit on the uncompleted portion of the cost-plus contract, and awarded the respondent $162,008.71 in damages.

The tenants appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating their residential tenancy and ordering eviction for non-payment of rent.

The tenants argued they were denied procedural fairness when the Board Member made an interim order requiring rent payments into trust and subsequently refused to hear their applications against the landlord when they failed to comply.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Member had the statutory authority to control the hearing procedure and that her actions were a model of procedural fairness.

The plaintiffs brought an action alleging solicitor negligence arising from a share purchase transaction involving a property previously used as a gas station.

The solicitor defendants admitted a breach of duty for failing to disclose the property's prior use but sought summary dismissal on the basis that the claim was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act.

The court held that reasonable discoverability arose when a prospective purchaser abandoned a resale transaction due to contamination concerns, triggering the two‑year limitation period.

Because the action was commenced after the limitation period expired, the claim against those defendants was dismissed.

Claims against other lawyer defendants raised genuine issues of fact regarding the scope of retainer and limitation warnings and were permitted to proceed to trial.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to strike the respondents' claim for intentional interference with economic relations.

The appellants argued the claim lacked sufficient particulars regarding unlawful conduct, actionable conduct against third parties, and damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the statement of claim and amended particulars provided sufficient material facts to allow the appellants to respond, and that the pleading adequately disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

Family members of a deceased victim brought a claim under s. 61 of the Family Law Act alleging that police breached a duty of care by failing to arrest an intoxicated offender with a known history of violence who later killed the victim.

The defendant moved under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the statement of claim on the basis that police owed no private law duty of care to the deceased or his relatives.

The court held that plaintiffs bringing derivative claims under s. 61 need only establish that a duty of care was owed to the deceased, not directly to the relatives.

Applying the Cooper-Anns framework, the court concluded it was not plain and obvious that foreseeability and proximity could not be established based on the pleaded facts, including the police's alleged knowledge of the offender’s past violence against the victim and their shared residence.

Residual policy considerations did not clearly negate a prima facie duty of care at the pleadings stage.

The defendant insurer brought a motion to dismiss an indemnification action brought by another insurer arising from a motor vehicle accident involving insured property.

The plaintiff insurer had denied coverage to its insured and was later found liable in separate litigation, after which it sought statutory indemnity from the other insurer whose insured driver was allegedly at fault.

The court considered whether the claim for contribution and indemnity was barred under s. 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the plaintiff insurer was an alleged wrongdoer in the underlying action and that its indemnity claim fell within the contribution and indemnity regime governed by s. 18.

Because the plaintiff did not bring a third-party claim or otherwise commence its indemnity claim within two years of being served with the original statement of claim, the action was statute-barred.

An insurer appealed an arbitrator’s refusal to dismiss a statutory loss transfer application brought approximately 11 years after a motor vehicle accident.

The court held that the application was not barred by the two‑year limitation period under s. 5(1)(b) of the Limitations Act, 2002 because the limitation period runs from the day after a first‑party insurer requests indemnity from the second‑party insurer.

However, the court found that the equitable doctrine of laches can apply to delayed statutory loss transfer claims where the scheme possesses an equitable character.

The court further held that acquiescence constitutes a stand‑alone branch of laches and does not require proof of prejudice.

The first‑party insurer’s lengthy and unexplained delay, combined with knowledge of its claim, amounted to acquiescence and barred the loss transfer claim.

The plaintiffs appealed an order of a Master dismissing their action for delay at a status hearing.

The plaintiffs argued the Master failed to apply the correct test and failed to undertake a contextual assessment of the delay, which they attributed to corporate bankruptcies, the death of a plaintiff, and a threatened motion for security for costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master correctly applied the conjunctive test from Faris v. Eftimovski and made no palpable and overriding errors in concluding the plaintiffs failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay.

The Attorney General moved under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside a motion judge's order refusing to consolidate a pharmacist's constitutional challenge in the Superior Court with his professional misconduct appeal in the Divisional Court.

The Attorney General sought to have the consolidated proceeding stayed and the constitutional issue remitted to the College's Discipline Committee.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law and no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that exceptional circumstances justified allowing the constitutional challenge to proceed in the Superior Court, particularly given the Discipline Committee's inability to grant a general declaration of invalidity.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee dismissing a motion to reconsider its order suspending the mandatory revocation of the respondent pharmacist's certificate of registration for sexual abuse.

The appellant argued the Committee lacked jurisdiction to suspend a mandatory revocation under the Health Professions Procedural Code.

Applying a reasonableness standard of review, the Divisional Court held that the Committee's interpretation of its home statute was reasonable.

The Court found that the mandatory revocation provision did not preclude the Committee from exercising its general power to suspend penalty orders.

The appeal was dismissed.