Ontario Court of Justice - Summary Conviction Offences - SCJ

The appellant appealed a common law peace bond order, arguing that it could only be made on consent, that the Crown failed to prove the complainant feared for their life, and that the peace bond hearing breached natural justice.

The court dismissed the appeal, clarifying that common law peace bonds do not require consent, the threshold is a "reasonably apprehended breach of the peace" and natural justice was observed as the appellant had notice, made submissions, and gave evidence, with the trial judge relying on evidence adduced at the prior criminal harassment trial.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of impaired care or control and over 80.

The respondent was involved in a single motor vehicle accident and was later arrested after registering a fail on an approved screening device.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that he had successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control for the period between a tow truck's arrival and police arrival.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code to the entire relevant time period, specifically the period of driving leading up to the collision.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Peter Bothwell, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol, arguing a violation of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel due to insufficient privacy during his calls.

At trial, the judge found no breach, concluding that Bothwell's concerns about privacy were remedied by him lowering his voice and that officers did not overhear his conversations.

The Superior Court, on appeal, upheld the trial judge's finding, determining that it was open to the trial judge to conclude that Bothwell had not met the burden of proving a Charter breach on a balance of probabilities, and that the finding was not a palpable and overriding error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving while operating an e-bike.

He argued that the trial judge erred in law by concluding that the undisputed facts—including erratic driving, swaying, red eyes, and an odour of alcohol—amounted to impairment.

He also argued the trial judge misapplied the circumstantial evidence test and improperly discounted the lack of impairment indicia at the police station.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the legal test for impairment and reasonably concluded that the totality of the evidence proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed convictions for harassment in a domestic context and breach of a peace bond, following a trial where he was acquitted of uttering threats.

The appeal raised issues concerning the trial judge's interpretation of facts, witness influence, the reasonableness of the verdict, rejection of defence evidence, and incomplete disclosure.

The Superior Court, sitting as a summary conviction appeal court, dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's thorough examination of evidence, detailed reasons for credibility findings, and proper handling of the disclosure issue, which the appellant had consciously waived at trial.

The court emphasized the limited scope of appellate review for factual findings and credibility.

The appellant, Ramanpreet Sran, appealed his conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) contrary to s. 235 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on three grounds: alleged unlawful and arbitrary detention (s. 9 Charter), lack of reasonable suspicion for an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand (s. 9 Charter), and failure to provide an interpreter for Panjabi (s. 10 Charter).

The appellate court, applying a standard of review of palpable and overriding error for factual findings and correctness for legal standards, dismissed the appeal.

The court found no Charter breaches, affirmed the lawfulness of the ASD demand based on the officer's reasonable suspicion, and concluded there was no language barrier requiring an interpreter.

The appellant, Marti Mayrhofer-Lima, appealed his conviction and sentence for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The appeal focused on alleged Charter breaches (sections 7, 10(a), 10(b), 8, and 9) and the trial judge's failure to provide sufficient reasons.

The Crown had conceded breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b), but the trial judge rejected these concessions without notifying counsel or allowing submissions on the pivotal case of R. v. Bush.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred in not accepting the Crown's concession regarding the section 10(b) breach and in failing to provide counsel an opportunity to make submissions on R. v. Bush, which was central to the rejection of the section 9 concession.

These errors were deemed reversible, as they impacted the appellant's strategic decisions at trial.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a 20-year driving prohibition imposed in 2009 following guilty pleas to care and control over 80mg and breach of probation.

The appellant had an extensive record of drinking and driving offences spanning over 40 years.

The appeal was brought over five years after sentencing.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no palpable or overriding error by the sentencing judge, noting the appellant's record and the fact that he had been convicted of another impaired driving offence in 2014 while the appeal was pending.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was found asleep in the driver's seat of her vehicle and subsequently blew over the legal limit.

At trial, she was convicted of having care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired, failing to rebut the presumption under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and improperly assessed her credibility against a reasonable person standard.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were entitled to deference and no material error was made.

The appellant, Andrew Kirk, appealed his conviction for impaired driving, raising two issues: (1) whether the trial judge erred in finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, and (2) whether the trial judge erred in finding that the identity of the accused had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal court found that despite uncertainty regarding which specific officer made the arrest, each officer present had sufficient subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

On the issue of identity, the court upheld the trial judge's finding that there was overwhelming evidence from multiple witnesses, including in-dock identification, to prove the accused's identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown applied for a bail review of a Justice of the Peace's decision to release the defendant, Christopher John Clymer.

The defendant faced serious charges including two counts of aggravated assault and had a criminal record with violent offences.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace erred by failing to adequately analyze the secondary grounds and by not considering the tertiary grounds for detention, as required by R. v. St. Cloud.

The court vacated the original bail order and ordered the defendant's detention, finding that both secondary and tertiary grounds for detention were met, particularly given the serious nature of the alleged offences, the defendant's violent criminal history, and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant, previously convicted of sexual assault, appealed the conviction arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the complainant and the appellant, and misapplied the principles from R. v. W. (D).

The appeal court reviewed the stringent standard for appellate intervention based on misapprehension of evidence.

It found that the trial judge's assessment of credibility, including addressing inconsistencies and finding corroboration, was supported by the evidence and within the appropriate range.

The court concluded that the trial judge properly applied legal principles and did not misapprehend material evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction and sentence were confirmed.

The appellant, Mohamed El Boury, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood/alcohol level in excess of 80mg.

The primary ground of appeal was the admissibility of the certificate of a qualified technician, specifically whether a copy had been properly served on the appellant as required by s. 258(7) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the certificate had been served on a balance of probabilities, a finding upheld on appeal.

The appeal court agreed with the Alberta Court of Appeal's reasoning in R. v. Redford that physical retention of the certificate is not required for valid service.

Additionally, the court found that even if the certificate was inadmissible, the Crown had proven the offence through viva voce evidence from the breath technician.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay an "over 80" charge against the respondent, Hany Ibrahim, due to a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge's calculation of institutional delay, finding errors in the characterization of neutral time and inherent preparation time.

After recalculating, the institutional delay was determined to be 10 months, at the upper limit of the Morin guidelines.

The court upheld the stay of proceedings, emphasizing the straightforward nature of the case, the respondent's expeditious conduct, the institutional nature of the delay, and the significant prejudice suffered by the respondent.

The appellant, self-represented, appealed his conviction for uttering a death threat contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The grounds of appeal were the trial judge's alleged failure to provide adequate assistance to the self-represented appellant, an unreasonable verdict, and the trial judge's failure to consider the evidence of a defence witness.

The court found no merit to any of the grounds, noting the trial judge's careful assistance to the appellant, the verdict's reliance on credibility findings, and that the unreferenced defence evidence was irrelevant to the verdict.

The appeal was dismissed.

Mohammed Karimullah appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The appeal raised several grounds, including alleged factual errors by the trial judge, the rejection of expert evidence regarding alcohol impairment, and the failure to adequately address good character evidence.

The court found that the alleged factual errors were either insignificant or not palpable and overriding.

The trial judge was entitled to reject expert opinion, even if uncontradicted, and to use common sense in evaluating the evidence, particularly regarding the appellant's changed driving behavior.

The court also determined that the trial judge's brief reference to good character evidence was sufficient, as a judge is presumed to know the law, and counsel did not emphasize it in closing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, Keon Chisholm, sought a bail review under Section 520 of the Criminal Code to vary his house arrest conditions.

He requested permission to have contact with his co-accused brother and to attend school or pursue employment opportunities.

The court found no material and relevant change in circumstances since the initial bail hearing to warrant a variation of the order, dismissing the application.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the test for impairment and failed to consider evidence consistent with non-impairment.

The appellant had been pulled over for driving 138 km/h in a 90 km/h zone, had bloodshot eyes, and smelled of alcohol.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors in assessing the evidence and that any degree of impairment is sufficient for a conviction.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal regarding the impaired driving conviction, finding the trial judge applied the correct legal test and the verdict was reasonable based on the evidence.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the refusal conviction because the trial judge failed to address the defence argument that the breath demand became invalid due to police delay in conducting the test 'as soon as practicable'.

A new trial was ordered for the refusal charge.

The self-represented appellant appealed his summary conviction for simple assault against his former spouse.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) test and subjected his evidence to a more stringent standard of scrutiny than the complainant's.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding the verdict was not unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence.