Health Law - SCJ

The plaintiff sued the defendant surgeon for medical malpractice following a brachial plexus injury sustained during shoulder replacement surgery.

The sole issue was whether the plaintiff proved surgical negligence.

The court concluded that the injury was more likely than not the result of surgical negligence, specifically due to excessive force or prolonged stretch applied to the arm during the glenoid exposure phase of the surgery.

The court found for the plaintiff, dismissing the defendant's arguments regarding non-negligent causes and emphasizing that while a bad outcome alone does not prove negligence, the extreme rarity and nature of the injury provided strong circumstantial evidence of a breach of the standard of care.

This is a motion for court approval of a settlement in a complex medical malpractice case involving a person under disability, Nathaniel Hughes.

The plaintiffs sought approval of a $4.5 million settlement, including a structured annuity, for injuries sustained by Nathaniel as an infant at Peterborough Regional Health Centre.

The court reviewed the settlement under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering the risks of litigation and the best interests of the person under disability.

The court found the settlement, including legal fees and disbursements, to be fair and reasonable given the complexities and risks, and approved it.

The applicants sought a declaration that their deceased son's written consent for his cryopreserved sperm complied with the Assisted Human Reproduction Act and its regulations, and an order for its release to create an embryo.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Act prohibits the use of human reproductive material for embryo creation without specific written consent for third-party use, and that posthumous donation is limited to a spouse or common-law partner.

The court also found that distributing the sperm in Canada for use outside Canada would still breach the Act due to distribution prohibitions and lack of required testing.

The defendants, Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences and Dr. Omar Ghaffar, brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss a medical malpractice action.

The plaintiff, Donald Jameson Whitehead, failed to file any expert evidence or affidavit evidence in response, despite being self-represented and advised of the requirements.

The court found that the defendants had discharged their evidentiary burden by providing expert opinions that their care met the standard of care and that consent was properly obtained.

Given the plaintiff's failure to adduce expert evidence, which is generally fatal in medical malpractice cases except in the clearest of circumstances, the court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The motions for summary judgment were granted, and the action was dismissed.

Randy Hillier, a former Member of Provincial Parliament, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's COVID-19 Gathering Restrictions (O. Reg. 82/20 and O. Reg 265/21), arguing they violated his Charter right to peaceful assembly under s. 2(c).

He faced charges for attending political protest rallies during the spring 2021 lockdown.

While Ontario conceded the s. 2(c) infringement, it argued the restrictions were justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court, applying the Oakes test and relying on the precedent set by Ontario (Attorney General) v. Trinity Bible Chapel, found that the restrictions served a pressing and substantial objective (reducing COVID-19 transmission and protecting the healthcare system), were rationally connected to that objective, minimally impaired Charter rights given the urgent and uncertain circumstances, and were proportionate.

The court emphasized the application of the precautionary principle in public health emergencies.

The application was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found the appellant incapable of making treatment decisions regarding antipsychotic medications and a Community Treatment Plan.

The appellant challenged the Board's findings on three grounds: error in appreciating foreseeable consequences of treatment decisions, misapprehension of evidence, and error in finding likelihood of substantial mental deterioration without treatment.

The court upheld the Board's decision, finding that the appellant's inability to recognize the severe psychotic symptoms of her condition prevented her from appreciating the consequences of treatment or lack thereof.

The court also found no misapprehension of evidence and confirmed the Board's assessment of the likelihood of deterioration based on the Mental Health Act criteria, dismissing the appeal on all grounds.

In a class action seeking certification against the Crown and two psychiatrists (Defendant Doctors) regarding treatment in a psychiatric hospital program, the plaintiffs moved for a partial discontinuance of the action against the Defendant Doctors.

The court granted the discontinuance, finding it to be in the best interests of the putative Class Members.

The decision was based on the lack of additional recovery from the doctors, the streamlining of the claim, the doctors' later involvement in the program, and their agreement to provide de bene esse examinations to preserve evidence.

The court confirmed that the discontinuance was not for an improper purpose and did not prejudice the class members or the co-defendant Crown, as the doctors' evidence remained available.

This appeal concerned a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) affirming a finding that the appellant was incapable of consenting to antipsychotic and mood-stabilizing medications.

The appellant, who was self-represented, did not appear at the appeal hearing, but amicus curiae provided submissions.

The court admitted fresh evidence regarding mootness but ultimately found the appeal was not moot due to the appellant's ongoing interactions with the mental health system and the potential relevance of a prior capable wish.

The court reviewed the CCB's application of the capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and its consideration of the appellant's religious beliefs.

The court found no reviewable errors by the CCB, concluding that the CCB's finding on the appellant's inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of treatment was sufficient, and that the appellant's religious beliefs were a manifestation of his mental condition, not a genuine religious objection.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant, Dr. Simon Lin, brought a motion for summary judgment in a dental malpractice action.

The plaintiff, Sharon Shyn Ang, alleged negligence in administering excessive local anesthetic and causing dental damage.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to provide admissible and persuasive expert evidence to establish a breach of the standard of care or causation.

The plaintiff's expert report was inadmissible as it was not in affidavit form and the expert was not qualified to opine on the standard of care in Ontario.

The plaintiffs in two medical negligence actions appealed a decision dismissing their motions to compel production of documents and answers to discovery questions related to hospital quality of care reviews.

The Associate Justice had found the information irrelevant and protected by common law quality assurance privilege.

On appeal, the court found the documents and questions to be relevant but upheld the Associate Justice's conclusion that a common law evidentiary privilege (Wigmore test) applied to the quality assurance communications, and that the Quality of Care Information Protection Act, 2016 (QCIPA) did not abrogate this common law privilege.

The appeals were dismissed.

This decision provides supplementary reasons to a prior motion to strike pleadings in a medical malpractice case.

The court ruled on previously unaddressed paragraphs and clarified others in the Statement of Claim and Proposed Amended Statement of Claim.

It addressed allegations related to a doctor's deficient skills, failure to disclose, and the hospital's knowledge of complaints.

The court struck certain pleadings that improperly referenced unidentified prior conduct without sufficient material facts, while upholding others related to breach of fiduciary duty and punitive damages where sufficient material facts were pleaded.

The appellant, MAK, appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board that found him incapable of making treatment decisions for his bipolar condition and confirmed a Community Treatment Order.

MAK argued that the Board erred in law and fact by misapprehending evidence, failing to assess his capacity at the time of the hearing, and incorrectly concluding he met the requirements for a Community Treatment Order.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Board correctly applied the legal tests for capacity and Community Treatment Orders, and that its factual findings, including MAK's inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of non-treatment, were entitled to deference.

The appellant, C.B., appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board: one confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) and its Community Treatment Plan (CTP), and another confirming his incapacity regarding treatment with antipsychotic medications.

The court upheld the Board's finding of incapacity for antipsychotic medication, applying the correct legal test and finding no palpable and overriding error.

The appeal regarding the CTO and CTP was dismissed as moot because the May 2021 CTO had expired, a new CTO was issued based on a fresh capacity assessment, and this new CTO was subsequently confirmed by the Board.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issues, citing a change in the evidentiary basis of the dispute and judicial economy.

The plaintiff, Lisa Spry, brought a motion to add Dr. James Shin as a defendant in her medical malpractice claim, relying on the doctrine of misnomer or, alternatively, arguing the motion was brought before the expiry of the limitation period.

Dr. Shin opposed, contending it was not a misnomer and the claim was statute-barred.

The court granted the motion, finding it was a case of misnomer because the plaintiff intended to sue all negligent healthcare professionals and the error in not naming Dr. Shin initially was unintentional and understandable given the records.

The court also found no non-compensable prejudice to Dr. Shin.

Alternatively, the court determined the limitation period began when Dr. Mak's statement of defence revealed another physician took over care, making the motion timely.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board, which upheld a psychiatrist's finding that the appellant was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication for schizophrenia.

The appellant argued the Board misapplied the legal test for capacity and made a palpable and overriding error in its factual findings.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and that its factual findings regarding the appellant's inability to appreciate the manifestations of his mental condition and the foreseeable consequences of treatment decisions were supported by the evidence.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, commenced an action for damages against several physicians, the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB), and Providence Care Hospital.

The CCB and the defendant doctors requested an order under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the claim as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Public Guardian and Trustee, appointed as the plaintiff's litigation guardian, did not oppose the dismissal on the condition that no costs be ordered against the plaintiff personally.

The court found the statement of claim to contain hallmarks of vexatious proceedings and that the substance of the claim fell within the CCB's jurisdiction, thus dismissing the action without costs.

This summary judgment motion addressed a dispute between separated parents regarding healthcare decision-making for their three children, specifically concerning vaccinations.

The parties had partial minutes of settlement, but the vaccination issue remained outstanding.

The court considered the children's capacity to consent to medical treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and the allocation of decision-making authority.

The court ordered specific vaccination protocols for the youngest child and made the middle child's vaccination contingent on his consent, while affirming the applicant's decision-making authority for the eldest child.

The defendants, a doctor and a medical centre, moved for summary judgment to dismiss a medical negligence action, arguing it was statute-barred and lacked expert evidence.

The plaintiffs sought a further adjournment, claiming COVID-19 travel restrictions prevented them from obtaining necessary evidence from Nigeria.

The court denied the adjournment, finding the plaintiffs' reasons vague and the sought evidence irrelevant to the limitation period or the Canadian standard of care.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, concluding there was no genuine issue for trial regarding the limitation period and the absence of a qualified expert report.

The defendants, Dr. Yasser Khan, Dr. Yasser A. Khan Medicine Professional Corporation, and Carrot Eye Surgery Clinic, brought motions to set aside a noting in default entered by the self-represented plaintiffs, Larry Westcott and Sharon Lea Westcott.

The court applied the test for setting aside a noting in default, considering the behavior of both parties, the length and reasons for delay, the complexity and value of the claim, and the absence of prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The court found that the defendants acted promptly upon discovering the default, intended to defend the action, and that the plaintiffs' conduct (noting default without prior notice, then demanding excessive costs for consent) was not ideal.

Given the complexity of the medical negligence claim and the significant damages sought, the court emphasized the preference for resolving disputes on their merits.

The motions were granted, setting aside the noting in default, with no costs awarded to any party.

S.S. appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that found her incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

S.S. argued the Board applied an incorrect legal test by focusing on her best interests and failed to consider evidence supporting her capacity.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the legal test, which requires assessing a patient's ability to understand information and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their decision, not whether they act in their best interests.

The court also found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's assessment of the evidence regarding S.S.'s capacity to appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment, despite her understanding of medication side effects.