Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The appellant, Brandie Spagnolo, appealed her conviction for two counts of disobeying a court order under section 127(1) of the Criminal Code.

She argued that the underlying Family Court order was invalid because the Children’s Aid Society commenced its protection application in the wrong court.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the proceedings were properly before the Family Court and that the collateral attack rule prevented the appellant from challenging the validity of the order in this context.

The appeal was dismissed.

Andrew Francis was charged with drug offences following a warranted search.

He brought a Garofoli application to quash the search warrant and exclude evidence, arguing a lack of reasonable grounds.

The court reviewed the Information to Obtain (ITO), including redacted confidential informer privilege information, and found sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the warrant's issuance.

The application was dismissed, and no Section 8 Charter violation was found.

The applicant, Jermaine Watson, charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking, brought an application to exclude evidence seized by police following his arrest and searches of his person and vehicle, alleging breaches of his Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 9).

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the warrantless arrest, making the subsequent searches unlawful.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court determined that the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct (arrest without reasonable grounds, public search) and the significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits, despite the reliability of the evidence.

The application to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter was granted.

Gary Junichi Nishikawara pleaded guilty to second-degree murder of his 95-year-old mother.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the victim's vulnerability, breach of trust, multiple injuries inflicted, and the concealment of the body.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, the offender's age and failing health, and the harsh conditions of his pre-sentence detention.

The Crown sought a 16-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence argued for the minimum 10 years.

The court ultimately imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 13 years, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused, Jasgeen Singh, was charged with robbery under section 344 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

The Crown alleged that Singh stole a vehicle and used violence against a passenger, Bhawana, to overcome her resistance to the theft.

The defence challenged the identification of Singh as the perpetrator and argued that the violence occurred after the theft was complete.

The court found the identification evidence, including surveillance video and a key fob found on the accused, to be overwhelming.

It also determined that the struggle for a cell phone and the physical push of Bhawana from the vehicle constituted sufficient violence, occurring contemporaneously with the theft.

Singh was found guilty of robbery.

The applicant, charged with two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder, challenged a judicially authorized wiretap warrant, arguing it violated his s. 8 Charter rights due to alleged material omissions and misrepresentations in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

Specifically, he contended that the ITO failed to disclose his home address and house arrest status, which would have provided an innocent explanation for his mobile phone's location near the crime scenes.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's address was in fact present in the ITO, albeit not explicitly referenced in the mobile phone section, and that any omission was not deliberate.

The court concluded that even considering the omitted information, the totality of the evidence, particularly the coordinated movement and contact between the applicant's and a co-perpetrator's phones, provided sufficient grounds for the warrant's issuance.

The accused was convicted of intentionally discharging a firearm and several other weapons offences after firing 13 shots at a fleeing vehicle in downtown Ottawa.

At the time, he was bound by a recognizance prohibiting him from possessing firearms.

The Crown sought a 9-year sentence, while the defence sought 4 years plus credit for stringent bail conditions.

The court imposed a total sentence of 8 years imprisonment, finding the offence fell at the lower end of the range for serious firearms offences since no one was injured by the accused's shots.

The court also granted 12 months of enhanced credit for the restrictive house arrest and curfew conditions the accused endured while on bail.

The accused, Randall William Creed, was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was in possession of a Schedule 1 controlled substance.

However, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the intent or purpose of physically making the narcotic available to others.

The court found the expert evidence on drug quantity unreliable due to hearsay and lack of basis, and other seized items (baggies, scales, pipe) were deemed equivocal as to trafficking intent, with reasonable alternative explanations.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty of the charge.

The accused, a taxi driver, was charged with sexual assault after an intoxicated female passenger woke up half-naked in his bed.

The complainant had no memory of how she got into the bed or what happened.

A sexual assault kit revealed the accused's DNA on the complainant's left breast.

The Crown's expert testified about DNA transfer but could not rule out secondary transfer from the accused's bedding.

The court found the expert's evidence on DNA transference was outside her area of expertise and could not discount the possibility of secondary transfer without direct contact.

The accused was acquitted due to reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault, assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, and weapons dangerous following a late-night altercation outside a nightclub.

The victims, who were highly intoxicated, instigated the confrontation and chased the accused and his friend when they attempted to flee.

The accused, fearing for his life, used a pocket knife to stab at least one of the pursuers.

The court found the accused acted in lawful self-defence and that his possession of the knife was not for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The self-represented accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

He was charged with intimidation of a justice system participant, and the anticipated time from charge to trial was 33 months.

The court found that a four-month delay during the preliminary hearing was attributable to the accused, as he failed to complete his cross-examination in the allotted time and subsequently waived the remainder after an adjournment.

Deducting this defence delay brought the net delay below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, Timothy Hewton, sought an order for separate trials on two sets of charges: prostitution-related counts and firearm-related counts.

Hewton argued that a joint trial would prejudice his fair trial interests due to the risk of propensity reasoning and his intention to testify on the prostitution counts but not the firearm counts.

The Crown opposed, asserting a factual and legal nexus between the charges and concerns about increased court time and a vulnerable witness testifying twice.

Applying the principles from R. v. Last, the court found that the interests of justice required separate trials, primarily due to the danger of propensity reasoning and the objective reasonableness of the applicant's testimonial intention.

The accused, Andrew Carthew Tidey, was charged with aggravated assault.

The Crown brought a motion to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct and after-the-fact conduct to establish animus, motive, context, and to rebut a potential self-defence theory.

The defence opposed, arguing the evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.

The court applied the probative value versus prejudicial effect balancing test.

It admitted evidence concerning the accused's financial difficulties, a dispute with tenants over rent and laundry, the accused "picking a fight" with a tenant, and a "nice try" text message sent by the accused shortly after the incident.

However, the court excluded evidence of a prior alleged attack, theft, mischief, and damage to property (crib) due to low probative value and high prejudicial effect, finding that such evidence would distract the jury and risk unfair prejudice.

A young person appealed a conviction for uttering a threat to cause death under s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code following a family dispute.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.), improperly relied on demeanour evidence, and failed to adequately address conflicting testimony.

The appeal court held that the trial judge sufficiently explained why the defence evidence was rejected and properly assessed credibility, including considering motive to fabricate and the surrounding circumstances.

The court found no error in law or palpable and overriding error of fact and concluded the verdict was supported by the evidence.

In a criminal jury trial on kidnapping, extortion, and assault charges, the Crown sought to adduce hearsay statements made by an absent alleged participant through a former friend.

The court held the co-conspirators' exception did not apply because there was no direct or circumstantial evidence that a joint criminal enterprise involving the accused already existed when the statements were made.

The court also rejected alternative hearsay routes based on penal interest, present intention, motive, and credibility corroboration, finding the proposed evidence irrelevant to the live issue of the identity and participation of the accused.

The application was dismissed, subject only to a narrow allowance to refer to the Square One meeting to refresh the witness's memory about a phone number.

The police defendants moved to strike a statement of claim brought by a self‑represented plaintiff following his conviction for assault.

The plaintiff alleged police negligence, wrongful detention, Charter violations, and malicious prosecution arising from his arrest and investigation.

The court held that the claim was an attempt to relitigate issues determined in the criminal proceedings, where the plaintiff had been convicted and his appeal dismissed.

Because a conviction establishes that the charge was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the plaintiff could not establish essential elements of malicious prosecution or lack of reasonable grounds.

The court concluded the action disclosed no reasonable cause of action and constituted an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for sexual assault and breach of recognizance, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the credibility analysis required by R. v. W.(D.).

The appellate court held the trial judge improperly treated the case as a credibility contest between the complainant and the accused, rather than applying the full W.(D.) framework.

The reasons relied heavily on the complainant’s demeanour and failed to explain how the evidence as a whole established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in light of inconclusive DNA evidence and other contradictory facts.

The court concluded this constituted a palpable and overriding error of law.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with multiple offences including sexual interference and sexual assault involving a complainant under the age of 16.

The defence challenged the complainant’s credibility and reliability and argued the police investigation was incomplete.

The court assessed inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony and considered forensic DNA evidence linking the accused to semen found on the complainant’s underwear.

Applying the principles governing credibility assessments and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the court found the complainant credible and accepted the expert DNA evidence as corroborative of key allegations.

The accused was convicted on all four counts.

The accused, charged with invitation to sexual touching, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated trial date was 34.7 months.

The court found that a significant portion of the delay was attributable to the Crown's failure to disclose relevant computer forensic evidence until shortly before the original trial date, necessitating an adjournment.

Finding that the delay exceeded the guidelines and caused actual prejudice to the accused, the court granted the application and stayed the proceedings.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion alleging breaches of s. 8 of the Charter arising from a warrantless search of his iPhone by CBSA officers at an airport upon re‑entry into Canada.

The defence sought exclusion of the phone contents, subsequent wiretap authorizations, and evidence obtained through search warrants, arguing the border search was a pretext for a police investigation and that the authorizations lacked investigative necessity.

The court held that a cell phone constitutes “goods” under the Customs Act and that CBSA officers are authorized to conduct routine border searches of such goods without prior grounds.

The search was characterized as a first‑category routine border search under R. v. Simmons and therefore reasonable.

Even if a breach had occurred, exclusion under s. 24(2) was not warranted because the state conduct was not serious and the evidence was central to the prosecution.