Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The defendants brought a motion to strike two statements of claim issued by the self-represented plaintiff, which alleged defamation and misrepresentation related to the transfer of cord blood samples.

The court struck the defamation claims without leave to amend, finding the allegedly defamatory statements were not made by the defendants and did not refer to the plaintiff.

The misrepresentation claims were struck with leave to amend for failing to plead material facts with sufficient particularity.

Several paragraphs were also struck as scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious.

The court ordered the two actions consolidated.

Following a successful trial in a slip and fall action, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on an offer to settle and the defendant's conduct.

The court found the offer to settle was served six days before trial, missing the mandatory seven-day requirement under Rule 49.10, and thus did not trigger substantial indemnity costs.

The court also found the self-represented corporate defendant's conduct was not abusive or reprehensible.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $170,000 in fees plus disbursements and HST, along with prejudgment interest.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action against a car rental company, alleging systemic misclassification of branch managers and seeking unpaid overtime.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the proposed common issues regarding misclassification could not be resolved on a class-wide basis due to significant variability in the actual job functions performed by managers across different branch locations.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's proposed methodologies for calculating aggregate damages, which relied on computer log-in data and anonymous crowdsourced internet reviews.

The applicant brought an urgent ex parte motion seeking the recovery or interim preservation of his vehicle, which had been repossessed by the respondents under the Repair and Storage Liens Act (RSLA).

The applicant alleged the respondents relied on forged invoices and failed to comply with RSLA requirements.

The court declined to order the interim recovery of the vehicle on an ex parte basis due to significant factual disputes, adjourning those requests to be heard on notice.

However, the court granted an interim preservation order under Rule 45.01, restraining the respondents from selling or dealing with the vehicle pending a full hearing.

The plaintiff suffered a wrist fracture and attended the emergency room, where she was assessed by the defendant physician.

The physician discharged the plaintiff to follow up with her family health clinic but failed to provide adequate verbal instructions regarding the need to see an orthopedic surgeon within 7-10 days, nor did he document this timeframe in his chart.

The plaintiff experienced a delayed referral to an orthopedic surgeon, resulting in the fracture healing in a malposition that required surgery.

The court found that the defendant physician breached the standard of care by failing to provide and document adequate discharge instructions, and that this breach caused the plaintiff's poor outcome.

Judgment was issued in favour of the plaintiffs for an agreed-upon amount of damages.

In a pre-trial motion for an action concerning latent structural defects in a residential property, the plaintiffs moved to strike the self-represented defendant's defence for failing to comply with a Trial Management Report and to exclude a late expert report.

The defendant brought a cross-motion for leave to file the late expert report and to call more than three experts.

The court declined to strike the defence, finding it a disproportionate remedy.

The court granted the defendant leave to file the late expert report under Rule 53.08, concluding that any prejudice to the plaintiffs could be cured by adjusting the trial schedule to allow them to respond.

At the sixth case management conference, the court addressed the scheduling of various motions proposed by the parties, including motions for summary judgment, undertakings, and further examinations.

The court granted a motion on consent to allow a plaintiff who had reached the age of majority to continue the action in her own capacity.

The court directed that the motions regarding undertakings and refusals be heard by the Case Management Master before any summary judgment motions are scheduled, emphasizing the need for effective case management.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligence and breach of contract, arguing that it was barred by the principles of res judicata, collateral attack, and/or abuse of process.

This argument was based on a prior Small Claims Court default judgment obtained by one of the defendants against the plaintiff for unpaid invoices.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that section 107 of the Courts of Justice Act prevented the application of res judicata in these coincident actions.

Furthermore, the court determined that the parties were not identical in both proceedings, and the issues in the Superior Court action (negligence and breach of contract) were distinct from the Small Claims Court action (unpaid invoices) and not fundamental to the default judgment.

The court also concluded that the action was neither a collateral attack on the Small Claims Court judgment nor an abuse of process, as the Ontario Racing Commission investigation was not a prior legal proceeding.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that Trussler Road, located in an unorganized township, is a public road under the Municipal Act, thereby allowing them access to their rural property.

The court found that while the Municipal Act definition of a public highway applies to unorganized townships, the evidence did not establish that Trussler Road was a colonization road, that statute labour was usually performed on it, or that it had been dedicated and accepted for public use.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, dismissed the plaintiffs' action in its entirety.

The defendant son brought a motion under Rule 45.02 for an order requiring the plaintiff mother to pay into court all rents received from a disputed property, as well as occupancy rent, pending the outcome of her action for a declaration of beneficial ownership.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that anticipated future rental revenues and disputed occupancy rent do not constitute a 'specific fund' within the meaning of the rule.

The court also found that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff, who relied on the rental income to pay for the property's utilities and expenses.

The plaintiff moved under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing the action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The action sought repayment of approximately $58,000 in alleged loans, but little progress occurred after a failed summary judgment motion, leading to administrative dismissal.

Applying the Reid factors and relevant Court of Appeal jurisprudence, the court found that although the plaintiff failed to adequately explain the litigation delay, the dismissal resulted from inadvertence, the motion to set aside was brought promptly once discovered, and the defendants failed to establish prejudice.

Emphasizing the preference for deciding cases on their merits and the lack of demonstrable prejudice, the court exercised its discretion to set aside the dismissal order and allow the action to proceed subject to a timetable.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing a civil action, the defendant sought costs for both the motion and the action.

The court considered s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the principles of indemnification, encouragement of settlement, and deterrence of improper litigation conduct.

The plaintiff, who was self-represented, challenged aspects of the claimed costs but did not provide persuasive grounds to reduce them.

The court found the claimed fees modest given the complexity and seriousness of the allegations, which included claims of misconduct by a police officer and damages of $1,000,000.

Costs were awarded to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking specific performance of a settlement agreement resolving disputes among siblings relating to estate assets, including a residential property.

The agreement contemplated the applicant purchasing the property from the estate in exchange for relinquishing other estate interests.

The responding party argued that the agreement never came into force or had become void when the closing deadline passed without completion.

The court found the agreement had been validly formed and that the responding party’s inaction and failure to cooperate in executing further documents prevented closing and constituted repudiation.

Specific performance was granted because the property was unique and damages would be inadequate.

The plaintiff, a 70-year-old machine operator with 20 years of service, was dismissed without cause and brought a motion for summary judgment for wrongful dismissal damages.

The defendant employer brought a cross-motion to stay the summary judgment motion until it could conduct an examination for discovery.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding it had failed to put its best foot forward or present any contradictory evidence.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, fixing the reasonable notice period at 22 months and awarding $69,139.03 in damages.

The defendants in a section 38 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act fraudulent conveyance action brought a motion for leave to amend their Statement of Defence, issue a third party claim, and discharge certificates of pending litigation.

The court granted leave to amend the Statement of Defence in part, allowing unopposed amendments and certain 'state of mind' amendments subject to strict discovery conditions.

The court refused leave for amendments related to limitations and solicitor negligence, finding them irrelevant or already decided.

The motion to issue a third party claim was dismissed as the proposed claims lacked a factual nexus to the main action.

The request to discharge the certificates of pending litigation was also dismissed because the certificates were reinstated by a Court of Appeal order, which the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to vary.

Les requérants demandaient le recouvrement de dépens à la suite d’un litige relatif à la vente d’un bien‑fonds appartenant à une fondation.

Dans une requête antérieure, ils s’étaient opposés à la vente du bien-fonds et avaient été déboutés, la cour concluant qu’ils n’avaient pas respecté les obligations du vendeur prévues à la convention d’achat‑vente.

La cour a conclu que leur opposition infructueuse à la conclusion de la vente avait provoqué le litige et que leur conduite ne justifiait pas l’octroi de dépens en leur faveur.

Le recouvrement des dépens demandé par les requérants a donc été rejeté.

La motion incidente et toute compensation des dépens ont également été rejetées, sans ordonnance de dépens en faveur des intimés.

The respondents in the underlying proceeding brought a motion seeking recovery of $15,159.17 in costs allegedly incurred in a prior vendor–purchaser motion.

The court held that the relief sought fell outside the scope and jurisdiction of the files in which the motion was brought.

The evidence showed that the moving parties had resigned as directors of the foundation and therefore lacked authority to retain counsel or act on behalf of the foundation in the earlier proceeding.

Applying rule 57.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court declined to award costs to the moving parties and rejected their claim for recovery of those costs.

The motion was dismissed without costs.

Following a prior decision on competing motions, the court determined the appropriate costs award between the plaintiff and the statutory third party.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs as the successful party on the statutory third party’s motion, while the statutory third party sought a set-off based on costs incurred responding to the plaintiff’s motion for directions, which was later withdrawn.

The court held that both motions arose from the same litigation context and that some allowance should be made for the additional work caused by the withdrawn motion, but not to the extent claimed by the statutory third party.

The court emphasized that the task was to fix costs rather than assess them through a strict formula.

After considering the circumstances, the court fixed the plaintiff’s costs at a reduced amount following set-off.

A self-represented plaintiff brought motions to amend her statement of claim, strike a third party claim, and seek personal costs against opposing counsel.

The court allowed the amendments to the statement of claim with modifications, striking portions characterized as scandalous and vexatious and preserving causes of action in nuisance and negligence.

The motion to strike the third party claim against contractors and a municipality was dismissed because consent to its issuance had previously been provided and the presence of the additional parties was necessary for a just determination of the dispute.

Allegations seeking personal costs against defence counsel were unsupported and resulted in a substantial indemnity costs award against the plaintiff.

The defendant also received partial indemnity costs for the motion.

The Attorney General sought an order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant and prohibiting further proceedings without leave.

The court reviewed the respondent’s extensive litigation history, including numerous meritless habeas corpus applications, contempt proceedings, collateral attacks on prior decisions, abandonment of proceedings, and repeated unsuccessful appeals.

Applying the principles articulated in Re Lang Michener and Fabian and other authorities, the court found the respondent had persistently instituted proceedings without reasonable grounds and conducted litigation in a vexatious manner.

Considering the cumulative pattern of abusive litigation and misuse of judicial resources, the court concluded that restricting future access to the courts without leave was necessary.

The application was granted and the respondent was declared a vexatious litigant in Ontario courts.