SCJ 2026

The applicant sought a declaration under s. 31 of the Marriage Act that her 2005 religious marriage to the deceased was valid, despite the marriage licence never being registered.

The deceased and the applicant lived together as husband and wife for 18 years before the deceased, struggling with severe addiction, purportedly married the respondent in a civil ceremony in 2023.

The court found that the 2005 marriage was solemnized in good faith, the parties intended to comply with the Act, neither was disqualified, and they cohabited as a married couple.

The application was granted, the 2005 marriage was deemed valid, and the 2023 marriage to the respondent was declared void ab initio and annulled.

The plaintiff suffered a severe wrist injury after falling on unsecured wooden steps at the defendant's property.

The defendant's pleadings were struck, resulting in a default judgment on liability.

The court found the defendant 100% liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act for failing to ensure the premises were reasonably safe.

The plaintiff was awarded $280,000 in damages, plus an OHIP subrogation claim and substantial indemnity costs, due to the permanent and debilitating nature of her injury.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking and possessing a loaded firearm after police stopped the rental vehicle in which he was a passenger.

The officers claimed they stopped the vehicle to check licensing and insurance under the Highway Traffic Act.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention based on racial profiling.

The court found that the officers concocted a reason to approach the vehicle and that the decision to detain was informed by the race of the occupants.

The court concluded that the stop was an unlawful pretext and a serious violation of section 9 of the Charter.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and the accused was acquitted.

The appellant, a building superintendent, was convicted of sexually assaulting a tenant in her apartment.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, scrutinized evidence unevenly, and improperly relied on his bad character.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge engaged in impermissible moral reasoning by rejecting the appellant's evidence based on his misogynistic views and lack of respect for the complainant.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a $200 million action against the provincial Crown, the Secretary of the Cabinet, a hospital, and various physicians, alleging medical malpractice and abuse of power.

The Crown requested a dismissal under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the claim against the government defendants lacked any legal basis or material facts, and the claim against the other defendants was an abuse of process as it duplicated an existing action.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The applicant, having been convicted of drug trafficking offences, brought an application to re-open his trial prior to sentencing based on fresh evidence.

The applicant discovered that the police source handler involved in the search warrant had received a negative judicial credibility assessment in an unrelated case.

The court applied the Palmer test for fresh evidence and dismissed the application, finding that the evidence did not bear on a decisive issue and would not have affected the result, as cross-examining the source handler on unrelated credibility findings would not have advanced the challenge to the search warrant.

The Ottawa Hospital requested leave at a case conference to bring a summary judgment motion to be heard alongside the University's scheduled anti-SLAPP and Rule 21 motions.

The self-represented plaintiff opposed the request.

The court denied the hospital's request, finding that the proposed summary judgment motion was a 'step in the proceeding' and was therefore barred by the non-discretionary automatic stay under section 137.1(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court also found that hearing the motions together would not improve efficiency and that the hospital would not suffer prejudice by waiting.

The moving party, a respondent in the underlying application, brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2) to vary a consent order that had approved a share purchase agreement, alleging newly discovered fraud by the responding party.

The moving party sought to have the share sale proceeds paid into court as security for claims in related actions, or alternatively, a Mareva injunction restraining the responding party from dealing with the proceeds.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that Rule 59.06(2) cannot be used to amend the terms of a contract approved by a consent order.

The court also denied the Mareva injunction, finding no evidence to support a reasonable inference of a real risk that the responding party would dissipate or remove the assets to avoid a judgment.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to properly name the defendants, who were previously identified as John Doe and James Doe, while seeking to use initials to protect their identities.

The defendants included a young person dealt with under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) and his father.

The court held that section 110 of the YCJA applies to civil proceedings, prohibiting the publication of information that would identify a young person dealt with under the Act.

The court granted leave to amend the pleadings using initials for the young person and his father, and ordered that the unredacted motion materials be sealed from the public record.

The defendants moved to compel the plaintiff to complete his examination for discovery, arguing that as three separate defendants, they were entitled to 7 hours each for a total of 21 hours under Rule 31.05.1(1).

The plaintiff, who had already been examined for 5.3 hours, agreed to submit to a total of 9 hours.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a mechanical application of the rule would be disproportionate because the defendants shared an identical interest, filed a joint defence, and were represented by one lawyer.

The court held that 9 hours was reasonably required and reserved costs of $3,500 to the trial judge.

The applicant, TD Waterhouse, brought a motion seeking to appoint an implementation monitor to oversee the repatriation of its data from the respondent, EIS, and to amend a prior mandatory injunction.

TD Waterhouse alleged that EIS breached their agreement by commingling backup data and failing to report an attempted data breach.

The court found a technical breach regarding the commingled backup CDs but no breach regarding the thwarted cyberattack.

The court declined to appoint an implementation monitor or reduce the applicant's costs for data repatriation, finding such remedies unwarranted.

However, the court amended the injunction to require the respondent to continue providing transition services until 12 months after the data repatriation is complete.

The applicant sought a declaration regarding the interpretation of a unanimous shareholders agreement for a family-owned steel distribution business.

The applicant argued the agreement required the board of directors to consist of the registered holders of voting shares, while the respondent argued the board was to be elected by a resolution of those shareholders.

Applying the principles of contractual interpretation, the court found the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the provision, read in context with the surrounding circumstances, supported the respondent's interpretation.

The application was dismissed.

The offender pled guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking (108 grams).

The Crown sought a 9-year sentence reduced to 8 years for harsh pre-trial conditions, while the defence sought 4-5 years less time served plus additional credit for lockdowns and triple bunking.

The court determined the appropriate global sentence was 7 years, reflecting the mid-level commercial quantity and the offender's prior record, balanced against his guilty plea and rehabilitative potential.

After applying 29 months of standard pre-sentence custody credit and an additional 12 months of Duncan/Marshall credit for severe lockdown and triple-bunking conditions, the net sentence imposed was 43 months.

The applicant brought an urgent application in Toronto challenging the deceased's will and seeking dependent's support, after being excluded from the deceased's home in Burlington.

The court, on its own initiative, raised the issue of venue under Rule 13.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding no rational connection to Toronto other than the location of the parties' lawyers, and noting the strain of forum shopping on judicial resources, the court ordered the proceeding transferred to Milton in the Central West judicial region.

The applicant brought an application against the respondent, his niece and attorney for property for his mother, alleging breach of duty and conversion.

The applicant abandoned the application shortly before the hearing.

The respondent sought her costs.

The court found the allegations were unfounded and the respondent was entitled to full indemnity costs.

The court ordered the respondent's costs of $29,191.82 to be paid $5,000 by the estate and the balance by the applicant.

The defendant requested the dismissal of the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The statement of claim consisted of only two lines of text alleging various wrongs and claiming $1 million, but lacked any material facts or particulars.

The plaintiff failed to provide submissions after being notified of the court's concerns.

The court found the action to be clearly frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and dismissed it without costs.

The applicant mother sought final parenting and financial orders in an uncontested trial after the respondent father failed to participate or provide financial disclosure.

The court granted the mother primary parenting time, finding it in the children's best interests due to concerns about the father's ability to meet their needs and his refusal to support the mother's relationship with them.

The court imputed the father's income at $124,729, ordered ongoing child support, awarded a lump sum of $25,000 for retroactive spousal support, and ordered an equalization payment of $325,000 based on the estimated value of the matrimonial home.

The father was also ordered to pay $28,000 in substantial indemnity costs.

Following a judgment awarding the applicants $1,628,666.66 in damages, the parties could not agree on costs.

The applicants sought costs on a partial indemnity scale up to the date of their Rule 49 offer to settle, and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, as the judgment exceeded their offer.

The respondents argued the claimed amounts were disproportionate.

The court found the applicants' claimed costs reasonable given the stakes and the respondents' vigorous defence, awarding $226,920.44 in fees plus HST and $2,411.56 in disbursements.

The moving party brought a motion for directions in the context of competing applications for the passing of accounts, seeking extensive additional financial disclosure from the responding party regarding their late parents' real estate and financial assets.

The responding party opposed, arguing the requests were disproportionate and that the moving party was delaying court-ordered mediation.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering specific disclosure regarding a $300,000 line of credit and cooperation on the sale of a foreign property, but denied the broader requests as disproportionate and directed the parties to proceed to mediation and set a date for the passing of accounts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in her handling of a s. 276 application regarding prior sexual conversations with the complainant.

The summary conviction appeal court found that while the trial judge correctly subjected the evidence to the s. 276 regime, she erred by dismissing the application at stage 1 and failing to advance it to an admissibility hearing.

The trial judge further erred by maintaining her ruling in the face of shifting evidence at trial, which prevented the appellant from advancing a defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.