SCJ 2022

The plaintiff, a university instructor, brought a motion for default judgment in a defamation action against a former friend who posted false and malicious tweets accusing her of being a sexual predator.

The defendant did not defend the action.

The court found the tweets were highly defamatory, widely published, and motivated by malice.

The court awarded $75,000 in general and aggravated damages, $10,000 in punitive damages, and ordered a permanent injunction and a 60-day retraction on the defendant's Twitter account.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion seeking an order that Ontario has jurisdiction over the parties' child and for the child's return from India.

The respondent mother, who travelled to India with the child for a vacation and did not return, sought an adjournment.

The court granted the adjournment but made an interim, without prejudice finding that the child is habitually resident in Ontario and that the court has jurisdiction under the Children's Law Reform Act, citing compelling documentary evidence of the family's life in Ontario.

The defendant employer brought a motion to stay the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal action, arguing the parties were bound by a mandatory arbitration clause in the plaintiff's employment contract.

The court first determined that the plaintiff, an insurance field agent, was an employee rather than an independent contractor.

The court then found that the second and third contracts, which introduced the arbitration clause, were invalid for lack of fresh consideration because they diminished the plaintiff's rights without providing any new benefit.

Consequently, the arbitration agreement was invalid under section 7(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, and the motion to stay the action was dismissed.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding undertakings and refusals from examinations for discovery in an action for malicious prosecution and negligence arising from a failed business loan application and subsequent fraud charges.

The court ordered the plaintiff to answer questions regarding the estate trustee's previous business dealings, prior fraud conviction, and the factual basis for the malicious prosecution claim.

The court also ordered the defendants to answer specific questions regarding the information provided to the RCMP, while upholding refusals for questions that were argumentative, irrelevant, or already answered.

The defendants were largely successful on the motion.

Sentencing following convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from a teacher's sexual abuse of a 14-year-old student during after-class meetings.

Applying the principles in s. 718, s. 718.01, and the Supreme Court's direction in Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, the inherently violent nature of sexual offences against children, the complainant's vulnerability, the offender's grooming behaviour, breach of trust, and the lasting psychological harm caused.

The court rejected reliance on pre-Friesen sentencing authorities that minimized non-penetrative abuse and found that a community-based sentence or one-year custodial term would be unfit.

A total sentence of 18 months' imprisonment followed by three years' probation was imposed, together with ancillary protective orders and conditional stays on the remaining counts.

The plaintiff brought an action for wrongful dismissal, human rights damages, and intentional infliction of mental suffering against his employer and its principal, as well as against a related corporation, claiming they were common employers.

The related corporation brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the action against it.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that this was not one of the rare cases where partial summary judgment is appropriate, as the claims against the moving party were factually intertwined with the claims against the other defendants, creating a material risk of inconsistent findings.

The applicant sought costs of $15,552.88 following a successful motion regarding parenting time and the sale of the home.

The respondent argued costs should be in the cause.

The court found the applicant was the successful party, though not fully successful, and had made a reasonable offer to settle.

The court fixed the applicant's costs at $10,000, inclusive of costs thrown away from a prior adjournment, with payment deferred until the final determination of the case due to income disparity and the holding of house sale proceeds in trust.

The offender was convicted of attempted murder, unauthorized possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, wearing a disguise with intent, and occupying a vehicle with a firearm after shooting the victim in an apartment parking lot.

The court weighed the extreme gravity of the planned shooting and the offender's prior criminal record involving firearms against his youth, difficult background, and rehabilitative potential.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a global sentence of 125.25 months, which was reduced to 102 months after applying Summers and Duncan credits for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant father brought a motion for non-compliance against the respondent mother regarding her failure to obey court orders relating to parenting time, therapy for the children, her own therapy, and costs.

The mother brought a cross-motion alleging the father failed to pay child support arrears.

The court found the mother non-compliant with multiple orders, noting her ongoing alienating behaviour and failure to facilitate the children's relationship with the father.

The mother's cross-motion was dismissed as no arrears were owed.

The court ordered specific remedies under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, including the resumption of virtual parenting time, the appointment of specific therapists for the children, and an order restricting the mother from bringing further motions without leave of the court.

The defendant brought a motion for directions on where and before whom he could bring a bail application.

The Court of Appeal had previously upheld his convictions but overturned his dangerous offender designation, directing a new sentencing hearing before a different judge.

Because no judge had yet been assigned to the new sentencing hearing, the defendant sought clarity on bail jurisdiction.

The Superior Court held that under section 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, since the defendant was currently being tried before 'a court' but no specific judge was conducting the trial, jurisdiction for the bail application rested with the Superior Court of Justice generally until a specific judge was assigned.

The plaintiff brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim, arguing it was a SLAPP intended to silence his allegations of a poisoned workplace.

The plaintiff also moved to strike the counterclaim under the Rules of Civil Procedure, amend his statement of claim, and for summary judgment.

The court dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, finding the plaintiff failed to show the counterclaim arose from his expressions.

The court also denied leave to amend the statement of claim as the proposed claim for deferred bonuses was statute-barred.

The remaining motions were deferred pursuant to the mandatory stay in s. 137.1(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The moving party father brought a motion for an interim order expanding his parenting time to a week-about shared parenting schedule.

The responding party mother opposed the motion, arguing there was no material change in circumstances and that the change would be too disruptive for the child.

The court found that the previous interim order did not establish a status quo that required a material change in circumstances to vary.

Applying the maximum contact principle under the Divorce Act and Children's Law Reform Act, the court concluded it was in the child's best interests to expand parenting time, as there were no safety concerns and the father had a flexible work schedule and childcare plan.

The motion was granted.

The respondent mother brought a motion for an interim order granting her sole decision-making responsibility and sole discretion over the applicant father's parenting time, citing his ongoing alcohol addiction.

The father opposed the motion, seeking to reinstate supervised parenting time after the mother withheld access for ten months.

The court dismissed the mother's request for sole discretion, finding no material change in circumstances, and ordered supervised in-person and virtual parenting time for the father, along with reunification therapy.

The court maintained joint decision-making, granted a time-limited police enforcement clause, and ordered the father to pay child support arrears based on his actual income.

The applicant law firm sought payment of $119,495.63 from the respondent law firm under a referral agreement, and requested that a portion of the funds be paid to its lawyers for legal fees and business expenses.

The respondent acknowledged owing $82,157.90 but sought to pay the funds into court due to claims by the applicant's creditors and an existing Mareva injunction freezing the applicant's assets.

The court found the respondent owed $82,157.90 and ordered the funds paid into court pursuant to Rule 72, dismissing the applicant's request for direct payment as an improper collateral attack on the Mareva injunction.

The appellant, convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving a 14-year-old complainant, applied for bail pending his summary conviction appeal.

The court applied the criteria for bail pending appeal, finding that while the appeal grounds were weak, they were not frivolous.

The court further held that the appellant's detention was not necessary in the public interest, noting his low-moderate risk of re-offence and his compliance with previous release conditions.

Bail pending appeal was granted on strict terms, including a surety.

The accused, an OPP officer, pleaded guilty to breach of trust for showing preferential treatment to a specific tow truck operator when dispatching tows for stunt driving impounds.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence, while the accused sought a conditional discharge.

The court emphasized the need for general deterrence and denunciation given the accused's position of trust and the deliberate nature of the offence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with one year of probation, finding that a discharge would be contrary to the public interest.

The applicant held legal title to two properties.

His parents and brothers brought a cross-application claiming beneficial ownership of the properties based on resulting trust, constructive trust, and unjust enrichment, alleging they provided the purchase funds and paid expenses.

The court dismissed the family members' claims, finding that the father had concealed his alleged assets to receive social assistance and declare bankruptcy, thereby disentitling him to equitable relief under the clean hands doctrine.

The court granted the applicant's request for exclusive possession of the residential property.

During a criminal trial for a stabbing, the Crown applied under section 9.2 of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness on a prior inconsistent statement.

The witness testified at trial that one of the accused attempted to break up the fight, which contradicted his earlier police statement and preliminary inquiry testimony.

The court granted the application, finding the Crown could not have been expected to lead this evidence in-chief.

However, the court restricted the Crown from questioning the witness about post-offence phone calls with the accused, ruling that such questions would improperly suggest consciousness of guilt and be highly prejudicial.

The plaintiff moved for leave to amend its statement of claim to add a third party as a defendant in an action concerning environmental contamination.

The proposed defendant opposed the motion, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The court found that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the material facts giving rise to a plausible inference of liability against the proposed defendant more than two years before bringing the motion.

Consequently, the limitation period had expired, and the motion to add the party was dismissed.

During a first-degree murder trial, an alternate juror reported that another juror had expressed a belief in the accused's guilt before any evidence was called.

The offending juror was discharged.

The accused moved for a mistrial, arguing the remaining jurors may have been tainted.

The court dismissed the application, finding that several other jurors had immediately criticized the offending remark and defended the presumption of innocence, demonstrating that the jury was not tainted.