SCJ 2020

Following a successful motion to enforce a settlement agreement, the plaintiff sought costs for both the motion and the underlying action.

The court found that the settlement agreement explicitly provided for the plaintiff's legal costs of the action in the event of default.

After deducting amounts related to a separate union claim, the court awarded the plaintiff $12,000 in partial indemnity costs for the action and $6,500 in partial indemnity costs for the motion.

Three sets of defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims arising from a 30-vehicle winter highway pileup.

The court granted the motion for one defendant (Seney), finding his vehicle was far removed from the main collision and did not contribute to the plaintiffs' injuries.

However, the court dismissed the motions for the other two defendants (Gill and McCallum), holding that while the case against them was not strong, granting partial summary judgment posed a significant risk of inconsistent verdicts at trial, as a jury could still apportion liability to them for allegedly blocking escape routes.

The defendant pled guilty to assault using an imitation weapon, uttering death threats, and failure to comply.

The court considered the aggravating factor of using an imitation firearm in broad daylight and the mitigating factors of a guilty plea, rehabilitation efforts, and a difficult childhood.

The court imposed a 12-month sentence, which was reduced to a suspended sentence after applying pre-sentence custody and Duncan credits for lockdown conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre, followed by two years of probation.

The applicant, one of four co-accused charged with a home invasion, brought an application to sever his trial from his co-accused.

The joint trial was scheduled for a date when the applicant's counsel of choice was unavailable, largely due to the court's efforts to schedule the trial within the Jordan ceiling.

The applicant agreed to waive his s. 11(b) Charter rights if severance was granted.

The court granted the severance, finding that forcing the applicant to proceed without his counsel of choice, when he was not responsible for the scheduling conflict, would violate principles of fairness and the interests of justice.

The respondents brought a motion for security for costs in an application where the applicant sought the appointment of an arbitrator pursuant to a co-ownership agreement.

The respondents argued that the applicant was a nominal corporation with insufficient assets in Ontario.

The court found that the respondents met the initial onus under Rule 56.01(1)(d) and that the applicant failed to rebut it.

Applying a holistic approach, the court ordered the applicant to post security for costs in the amount of $15,000.

The plaintiffs obtained a Mareva injunction after advancing $139,000 to the defendants to rebuild their fire-destroyed home.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants misappropriated the funds, performed no work, and submitted forged engineering plans to the municipality.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge the injunction, while the plaintiffs brought a motion for contempt.

The court dismissed the motion to discharge, finding a strong prima facie case of fraud and risk of dissipation of assets, but varied the order to allow the defendants to receive deposits and post security.

The contempt motion was adjourned pending cross-examinations.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff, who resides in Ottawa, to attend a neuropsychological independent medical examination in Mississauga.

The plaintiff objected, providing medical opinions that the 450 km travel would be medically detrimental to her recovery from a traumatic brain injury.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while a defendant generally has the right to choose their medical expert, the choice must not be unreasonably inconvenient or compromise the plaintiff's medical well-being, especially when alternative experts are available closer to the plaintiff's residence.

The accused was charged with break and enter, assault, arson, uttering threats, and damage to property following a home invasion.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrator.

The Crown relied on the eyewitness identification of the two complainants and a corroborating witness.

The court found the identification evidence to be unreliable due to the fleeting nature of the observations, the stressful circumstances, the influence of marijuana, and the fact that the witnesses had collaborated on a collective narrative before speaking to police.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt as to identity and acquitted the accused on all counts.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiffs, who reside in South Korea.

The plaintiffs commenced an action seeking repayment of loans and a share of the equity from the sale of a property.

The court found that the defendants met their initial onus as the plaintiffs reside outside Ontario.

However, the plaintiffs successfully rebutted the onus by demonstrating that they are impecunious and that their claim is not devoid of merit.

The motion for security for costs was dismissed.

The defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim, which sought contribution and indemnity, damages, and disgorgement arising from the defendants' alleged involvement in a Ponzi scheme operated by Golden Oaks.

The court struck the claims for contribution and indemnity without leave to amend, finding no common liability to third parties and no viable duty of care owed to the unsecured creditors.

The claims for damages were struck with leave to amend to properly plead the losses suffered by the company.

The claims for disgorgement and accounting were permitted to proceed.

The plaintiff brought a summary judgment motion to enforce a settlement agreement resolving long-standing environmental contamination litigation.

The defendant had failed to pay the agreed settlement funds, relinquish its claim to trust funds, or permit the plaintiff access to install a barrier to stop the migration of contaminants.

The court found no exceptional circumstances to set aside the settlement, which was negotiated with counsel, environmental advisors, and a mediator.

The court ordered the defendant to pay the settlement amount of $685,000, declared it had no right to the trust funds, and awarded $117,670 in damages for costs incurred due to the defendant's breach.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to set aside a noting in default and stay the action in favour of arbitration, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The defendants sought $20,000 in fees and $4,709.22 in disbursements.

The court reduced the requested amount by approximately 50%, noting that the defendants had improperly scheduled the first return date, relied on legal arguments from a previous similar case, and claimed excessive disbursements for photocopying.

Costs were fixed at $12,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The applicant brought a motion to exclude evidence of a submachine gun, ammunition, and utterances obtained during a warrantless search of his home.

The police attended the applicant's home to investigate a gun allegation made by his intoxicated girlfriend.

The officers searched the home without a warrant and without advising the applicant of his right to refuse the search or his right to counsel upon detention.

The court found that the applicant was psychologically detained and did not give informed consent to the search, resulting in breaches of his s. 8 and s. 10(b) Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the officers' conduct was serious and the impact on the applicant's rights was significant, warranting the exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Following the dismissal of the applicant unit owner's application regarding a noise complaint, the respondent condominium corporation sought full indemnity costs of $89,580.36.

The court rejected the respondent's argument that it was entitled to full indemnity costs under s. 134(5) of the Condominium Act, as the respondent was not an applicant.

However, because the applicant failed to accept a generous without-costs dismissal offer made by the respondent, the court awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, fixing the total costs award at $70,000.

The responding party alleged that members of her former spouse's family and related corporations conspired to deprive her of interests in a U.S. luggage business and a related opportunity to participate in refinancing or rescuing the business.

The moving defendants sought summary judgment dismissing the conspiracy claim, arguing the impugned transactions were undertaken for legitimate business reasons in response to severe financial distress and secured creditor enforcement risk.

The court reviewed the tests for predominant-purpose and unlawful-conduct conspiracy, as well as the loss of chance doctrine, and concluded that while parts of the record undermined the claim, there remained genuine issues of fact regarding the terms, purpose, and implementation of an agreement among family members and whether the plaintiff lost a real business opportunity.

Summary judgment was therefore refused and the action was left for trial, with the judge remaining seized and inviting submissions under Rule 20.05.

The moving defendant, an orthopedic surgeon, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the medical malpractice action against him, arguing the limitation period had expired.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to correct a misnomer, seeking to replace 'John Doe' with the moving defendant.

The court found that there was a genuine issue for trial regarding when the plaintiffs reasonably could have discovered the moving defendant's potential liability for delayed care.

Both the summary judgment motion and the misnomer cross-motion were dismissed, with the issues left to be determined by the trial judge.

The applicant, jointly charged with two co-accused for importing cocaine, brought an application for an adjournment of the trial due to his counsel's unavailability, or alternatively, for severance from his co-accused or severance of one count.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the request for an adjournment, finding that the applicant's right to counsel of choice did not override the co-accused's right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The court also dismissed the severance applications, concluding that the factors, including the risk of inconsistent verdicts and the legal nexus between the counts, strongly favoured a joint trial.

On the eve of a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident claim, the plaintiff brought a motion to exclude late-served video surveillance reports or, alternatively, for an adjournment.

The court found that the recent surveillance was not substantially different from previously disclosed surveillance and did not unfairly surprise the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the motion to exclude the evidence, granting the defendant leave to use the reports for substantive purposes subject to a mid-trial voir dire.

A short adjournment was granted to allow the plaintiff to review the new surveillance.

The applicant mother sought sole custody of the two children of the marriage and child support, while the respondent father also sought sole custody or increased access.

The court found that the mother had been the primary caregiver and that the children were well cared for, despite the father's allegations of abuse which were contradicted by Children's Aid Society evidence.

The court granted sole custody to the mother and ordered the father to pay table child support.

The father was granted weekly access, to be expanded to include overnight access after a six-month period to allow him to rebuild his relationship with the children.

The moving party challenged the validity of the testator's 2007 Will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, lack of knowledge and approval, suspicious circumstances, and undue influence.

The testator, who had a lifelong history of bipolar disorder, changed her Will to name her niece as the sole beneficiary, removing the moving party.

The court found that the Will was duly executed and that the propounder of the Will satisfied the burden of proving capacity.

The court preferred the evidence of the respondent's medical expert and concluded the change in beneficiary was not the result of any delusion or disease of the mind.

The 2007 Will was declared valid.