SCJ 2020

The plaintiff brought a motion for an interim order for recovery and possession of two dogs following the breakdown of his relationship with the defendant.

The defendant conceded the plaintiff owned one dog but claimed the other was a gift to her.

The court rejected the defendant's jurisdictional argument that the matter belonged in Family Court.

Applying the test for interim recovery of personal property, the court found the plaintiff did not demonstrate substantial grounds for the recovery of the disputed dog due to conflicting evidence, including a veterinary bill paid by the defendant.

The court granted the interim order for the conceded dog but dismissed it for the disputed dog.

The mother was successful in dismissing the father's motion to vary his child support obligations retroactively.

The mother sought costs of $12,975.84, while the father argued each party should bear their own costs.

The court found the mother was presumptively entitled to partial indemnity costs and that her claimed amounts were reasonable, especially compared to the father's legal fees.

The court ordered the father to pay $8,500 in costs, enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as a child support order.

Following a five-week trial where the plaintiffs succeeded in claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conspiracy, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The plaintiffs sought over $6.2 million on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court rejected substantial indemnity costs, finding the defendants' litigation conduct did not warrant such a sanction and the pre-litigation conduct was already addressed through punitive damages and disgorgement.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $2,200,000 for the action and $20,000 for the counterclaim, apportioning liability among the defendants based on the claims.

The accused was charged with assault, sexual assault, and extortion following encounters with a complainant he met on a dating app.

The accused provided a timely and particularized alibi for the extortion charge, supported by employment and Ministry of Transportation records, which the court found highly persuasive.

The court also found significant reliability and credibility issues with the complainant's evidence regarding the assault and sexual assault allegations, including inconsistencies about a photograph of her alleged injuries.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt on all counts and found the accused not guilty.

The offender was found guilty of child luring and obtaining sexual services offences following an undercover police operation.

During sentencing, the offender brought a Charter challenge arguing that the mandatory minimum sentences of one year and six months for these offences violated section 12 of the Charter.

The court applied the gross disproportionality test and considered reasonable hypotheticals, finding that the mandatory minimums could result in grossly disproportionate sentences.

The court declared the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions under sections 172.1(2)(a), 172.2(2)(a), and 286.1(2)(a) of the Criminal Code to be of no force or effect.

The applicant sought to invalidate a foreign divorce obtained by the respondent in Ukraine in 1998, arguing lack of notice, jurisdiction, and residency.

The respondent had since remarried and had a child.

The court considered expert evidence on Ukrainian family law and found that the foreign court had jurisdiction and the divorce was properly obtained.

Applying the Divorce Act and common law principles, the court recognized the foreign divorce, noting the applicant's unreasonable delay in challenging it and the inequity of invalidating it after the respondent's remarriage.

The application was dismissed.

In a trial for possession of cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, the Crown sought to qualify a police sergeant as an expert witness on the sale and distribution of drugs.

The accused opposed the qualification, arguing the officer lacked special knowledge and was biased because he belonged to the same drug enforcement unit as the investigating officers.

The court applied the Mohan and White Burgess frameworks, finding the officer had the requisite experience and understood his duty to be fair and impartial.

The court held that being from the same police service did not automatically disqualify the expert, and admitted the evidence.

The applicants brought a motion to strike a notice of objection filed by the deceased's former common-law spouse regarding the deceased's will and powers of attorney.

The respondent alleged that the deceased lacked capacity and was unduly influenced by the applicants.

The court found no evidence to support the allegations of incapacity or undue influence.

Furthermore, the respondent was bound by comprehensive minutes of settlement executed prior to the deceased's death, in which she released her rights to his estate.

The court struck the notice of objection as frivolous and vexatious and awarded partial indemnity costs to the applicants.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of excess blood alcohol.

The trial judge had ruled that the qualified technician's viva voce evidence regarding the certification of the alcohol standard solution was hearsay and inadmissible without a Certificate of Analyst.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law.

The court held that the presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code can be proven by the viva voce evidence of an intoxilizer technician without the need to tender a certificate of an analyst.

A finding of guilt was entered.

The personal defendant brought a motion to exclude the plaintiff from her examination for discovery.

The underlying action involved claims of defamation and wrongful dismissal following the plaintiff's termination for allegedly sexually assaulting the personal defendant at work.

The personal defendant adduced evidence from her treating psychologist that the plaintiff's presence would be significantly re-traumatizing and exacerbate her PTSD and depressive symptoms.

The court granted the motion, finding that the risk of psychological harm to the personal defendant outweighed any prejudice to the plaintiff, who already had access to the investigative report detailing her allegations.

The defendant brought a motion for a status hearing under Rule 48.14(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to dismiss the plaintiffs' lawyer negligence action for delay.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing a prior order scheduling a summary judgment motion precluded dismissal.

The Master found the prior order did not prevent the status hearing but concluded the plaintiffs provided an acceptable explanation for the delay and rebutted the presumption of prejudice.

The motion to dismiss was denied, and the action was permitted to continue.

Two competing applications were brought seeking the interpretation of a commercial lease between a tenant operating a nutritional supplement store and a landlord.

The landlord alleged the tenant breached the lease and a restrictive covenant in favour of another tenant by preparing made-to-order protein shakes, selling weight loss products, and operating a juice bar.

The court found that the lease did not permit the tenant to prepare or mix shakes on-site, constituting a breach.

However, the tenant was permitted to sell weight loss products, and there was insufficient evidence that it operated a juice bar.

A permanent injunction was granted restraining the tenant from selling on-site prepared beverages.

The plaintiffs sued the City of Barrie and several of its employees for misfeasance in public office and intentional interference with economic relations.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants unlawfully interfered with their negotiations to lease a portion of their property to Rogers Communications for a cell phone tower.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the city employees did not engage in deliberate unlawful conduct or intend to harm the plaintiffs.

The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to prove causation or damages, as Rogers had other options and the lease contained an escape clause.

The offender, a police officer, pleaded guilty to careless use of a firearm after firing his weapon at a fleeing vehicle in a busy shopping area without legal justification.

The defence sought an absolute discharge, while the Crown sought a conviction and a fine.

The court held that an absolute discharge would be contrary to the public interest, as it would fail to adequately address the objectives of denunciation and general deterrence given the offender's breach of public trust.

A conviction was entered and a $5,000 fine was imposed.

The offender pled guilty to possessing a loaded prohibited firearm and breaching his bail conditions.

He was a 23-year-old first-time offender.

The court sentenced him to 20 months for the firearm offence and 4 months less a day for the breach of bail, to be served consecutively.

The court granted enhanced pre-sentence credit of 1 day for each day spent in lockdown at the Toronto South Detention Centre due to staff shortages, resulting in a total credit of 712 days.

The offender was ordered to serve a further 17 days in custody followed by 2 years of probation.

The accused, an Indigenous man with a significant criminal record including a prior manslaughter conviction, pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the beating death of the victim.

The court considered the brutal nature of the assault, the use of weapons, and the accused's callous disregard for the victim's life as aggravating factors.

Applying Gladue principles, the court acknowledged the accused's traumatic background but emphasized the need for denunciation, deterrence, and public protection.

The accused was sentenced to 16 years' imprisonment, reduced to approximately 12 years after credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting statements made in the breath room, that the trial judge was biased, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter violation regarding the breath room statements, no evidence of judicial bias, and no ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court preferred the evidence of trial counsel over the appellant regarding the circumstances surrounding the agreed statement of facts and trial strategy.

The respondent father brought a motion to change seeking the termination of his child support obligations.

The parties' separation agreement stipulated that child support would terminate upon the child completing her first post-secondary degree.

The father provided evidence that the child became a Registered Practitioner Nurse in August 2016.

As the mother resided outside the jurisdiction, the court issued a provisional order under s. 44 of the Family Law Act terminating the father's child support obligations effective August 31, 2016.

The accused brought an application to adjourn his joint jury trial for drug importation, scheduled to commence in less than three weeks, in order to retain counsel of choice.

The accused had previously discharged counsel and had been warned multiple times that the trial would proceed with or without counsel.

The court dismissed the adjournment application, finding that the accused had not acted diligently or in a bona fide manner to retain available counsel, and that the application was a deliberate attempt to manipulate the system to achieve a de facto severance from his co-accused.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a final order regarding the children's school enrollment and the respondent mother's imputed income for child support.

The father sought to move the children to a school in Georgetown following his relocation, and to impute a higher income to the mother.

The court held that a material change in circumstances was required under section 17 of the Divorce Act to vary the order.

Finding no material change in circumstances regarding either the children's needs or the mother's financial situation, the court dismissed the motion to change.