SCC 2003

On an appeal in a life insurance coverage dispute, the court considered whether a policy covering death by “accidental means” was narrower than coverage for “accidental death”.

The court held the phrases have essentially the same meaning and both turn on whether death was unexpected, with the central inquiry being whether the insured expected to die.

Where the insured’s actual expectation is unclear, the court may consider whether a reasonable person in the insured’s position would have expected death.

Applying that approach, the court found the overdose resulted from a miscalculation rather than an expected death, and upheld coverage under the accidental death benefit provision.

The Crown appealed as of right from a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal which had overturned the respondents' manslaughter convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals, agreeing with the dissenting appellate judge that it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the severe assaults by the respondents caused the victim's death.

The convictions and sentences entered by the trial judge were restored.

The respondent employees were transferred from the Ottawa Police Force to the City of Ottawa.

They alleged that prior to the transfer, the City entered into a pre-employment agreement guaranteeing they would retain their previous terms and conditions of employment.

After the transfer, they were placed under a collective agreement with reduced benefits and brought an action for damages.

The City moved to strike the claim, arguing the dispute fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the essential character of the dispute concerned a pre-employment contract, not the collective agreement, meaning the courts had jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the factual dispute regarding the existence of the contract could not be resolved on a preliminary motion to strike.

The respondents' positions in the Alberta public service were privatized, and they accepted employment with a new private association.

A letter of intent between the government and the union stated that employees accepting such employment would not be entitled to severance pay under the collective agreement.

The respondents brought a civil action seeking a declaration of entitlement to severance pay, alleging their resignations were procured under duress.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the essential character of the dispute arose from the collective agreement.

Therefore, the claim fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator, and the civil action was properly struck.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with intent to steal money, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable due to issues with identification evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing with the Manitoba Court of Appeal that the verdict was reasonable.

The Crown appealed as of right from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal upholding the accused's acquittal on dangerous driving counts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that while there was evidence upon which a trier of fact could make a finding of dangerous driving, the failure to do so did not amount to an error of law.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal finding an Internet lottery scheme unlawful under the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, adopting the reasons of the Chief Justice of Prince Edward Island.

The taxpayer failed to pay federal and provincial taxes for the 1980 to 1985 taxation years.

Revenue Canada assessed the taxpayer in 1986 but took no collection action until 1998.

The Crown appealed a decision holding that it was statute-barred from collecting the tax debts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the six-year limitation period prescribed by section 32 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act applies to the statutory collection procedures under the Income Tax Act.

The Court also held that the provincial tax debt was barred by the six-year limitation period under the British Columbia Limitation Act.

The Information Commissioner appealed a refusal by the RCMP to disclose historical postings and employment information of four RCMP officers requested under the Access to Information Act.

The RCMP claimed the records were exempt as 'personal information' under the Privacy Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the information constituted personal information relating to employment history, it fell within the exception for information relating to the position or functions of a government employee.

The Court ruled that this exception applies retroactively to past positions and ordered the disclosure of the officers' historical postings, ranks, years of service, and anniversary dates.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge's pre-Lifchus charge to the jury on reasonable doubt was defective.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied its decision in R. v. Rhee and found no reason to interfere with the majority of the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the charge was in substantial compliance with the principles articulated in Lifchus.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment, with an order delaying his parole eligibility for six years under s. 743.6 of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, he argued the delayed parole order required evidence of exceptional circumstances, advance notice from the Crown, and more detailed reasons.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 743.6 does not require exceptional circumstances or formal advance notice, but rather a two-step sentencing process prioritizing deterrence and denunciation.

The Court found the trial judge's reasons sufficient and the process procedurally fair.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, and related offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury on alibi and failed to give an adequate Vetrovec warning regarding the evidence of an accomplice and an admitted perjurer.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, with the majority adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal.

Two dissenting justices would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the basis that the Vetrovec warning was inadequate.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant's hearsay statements to her mother and a videotaped statement to police under the necessity exception.

The complainant was unavailable to testify on the trial date for medical reasons.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary decision that the necessity requirement was met, as there was evidence that the complainant would not be available to testify within an acceptable period of time.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of Manitoba's Gaming Control Local Option (VLT) Act, which allowed municipalities to hold binding plebiscites to prohibit video lottery terminals (VLTs).

Section 16 of the Act specifically deemed a prior non-binding plebiscite in the Town of Winkler to be binding, resulting in the termination of the appellants' VLT siteholder agreement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the legislation was intra vires the province under its property and civil rights and local matters powers, and was not an unconstitutional encroachment on the federal criminal law power.

The Court also dismissed the appellants' Charter claims under ss. 2(b), 7, and 15(1), finding no violation of freedom of expression, liberty, or equality rights.

The appellant appealed his convictions for second degree murder, aggravated assault, and break, enter and robbery.

The appeal concerned the adequacy of the trial judge's charge to the jury on s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code and whether the Crown's closing address amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the charge was adequate as a whole and the Crown's remarks did not cause a miscarriage of justice.

The Crown appealed as of right from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, which had set aside the accused's convictions for second degree murder, aggravated assault, and break, enter and robbery on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal.