SCC 2003

The Crown appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that overturned the accused's convictions for sexual offences and entered acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the Court of Appeal did not intend to impose a strict rule of law requiring expert evidence to corroborate a change in a child's behaviour in all circumstances.

However, the Supreme Court agreed that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, rendering the trial judge's verdict unreasonable.

The respondent, a registered Indian, was charged under the Forest Practices Code for cutting Crown timber.

He raised an aboriginal right defence before the Forest Appeals Commission.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal held that s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 precluded the province from conferring jurisdiction on the Commission to determine aboriginal rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a province can validly empower an administrative tribunal to decide questions of constitutional law, including aboriginal rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, arising incidentally in the course of its statutory mandate.

The Court found that the Code granted the Commission the power to decide questions of law, which presumptively includes the power to apply the Constitution.

The appellants, who suffered from chronic pain attributable to work-related injuries, challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Nova Scotia Workers' Compensation Act and related regulations that excluded chronic pain from the regular workers' compensation system.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of its enabling statute.

The Court further held that the blanket exclusion of chronic pain sufferers from the general compensation scheme violated section 15(1) of the Charter by imposing discriminatory differential treatment based on physical disability.

The infringement was not justified under section 1 of the Charter, as it did not minimally impair the rights of the affected workers.

The respondent was sexually assaulted by her foster father while in the care of the provincial government.

She sued the Crown for vicarious liability and breach of non-delegable duty.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying its companion decision in K.L.B. v. British Columbia, held that the Crown was not vicariously liable for the torts of foster parents and did not owe a non-delegable duty to ensure no harm came to foster children.

The Court also held that social assistance benefits received by the respondent must be deducted from her damage award for past loss of earning capacity to avoid double recovery, and that prejudgment interest on such an award should be calculated incrementally.

The appellant sought to hold a school board liable after repeated sexual assaults by a school janitor, advancing claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of non-delegable duty.

The Court held that the governing school legislation did not impose a general non-delegable duty making the board strictly responsible for abuse by employees on school premises.

It further held that fiduciary law does not guarantee a particular outcome or convert such claims into no-fault liability, and that no wrongful conduct by the board itself was established.

On the cross-appeal, the Court upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that most of the harm was indivisible and jointly caused by the janitor and later abusers.

The appellants suffered physical and sexual abuse while placed in two successive foster homes by the government.

They sued the government for direct negligence, vicarious liability, breach of non-delegable duty, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the government was directly negligent in its placement and supervision of the children, it was not vicariously liable for the torts of the foster parents, nor did it breach a non-delegable or fiduciary duty.

Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeal because the appellants' claims were statute-barred under the Limitation Act, as they had acquired sufficient awareness of the facts to start the limitation period running more than two years before commencing their actions.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal that ordered a new sentencing hearing for the respondent.

The sentencing judge had declared the respondent a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence without considering the newly enacted long-term offender provisions.

Applying the companion case of R. v. Johnson, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a sentencing judge must consider the possibility of a long-term offender designation prior to declaring an offender dangerous.

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new sentencing hearing was confirmed.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision that ordered a new sentencing hearing for an offender who had been declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term.

The sentencing judge had not considered the new long-term offender provisions, which came into force after the predicate offence was committed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge was required to consider the possibility of a long-term offender designation prior to declaring the offender dangerous, even though the predicate offence was committed prior to the enactment of those provisions.

The accused was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term for a predicate offence committed prior to the enactment of the long-term offender provisions.

The sentencing judge held that the long-term offender provisions were not available.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, applying its companion decision in R. v. Johnson, holding that the sentencing judge was required to consider the possibility of a long-term offender designation prior to declaring the accused a dangerous offender.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault and declared a dangerous offender, receiving an indeterminate sentence.

The predicate offence occurred before the enactment of the long-term offender provisions.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying its concurrent decision in R. v. Johnson, held that the sentencing judge was required to consider the long-term offender provisions before declaring the accused a dangerous offender.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed and a new sentencing hearing was ordered.

The Crown appealed a decision ordering a new sentencing hearing for an offender who was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term.

The sentencing judge had not considered the newly enacted long-term offender provisions because the predicate offence occurred prior to their enactment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a sentencing judge must consider the long-term offender provisions prior to declaring an offender dangerous.

Furthermore, under s. 11(i) of the Charter, the offender is entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment, requiring the judge to consider the long-term offender provisions even for offences committed prior to the amendments.

The applicant Indian bands brought motions to vacate a unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The allegation stemmed from the fact that the judge who authored the reasons had been the federal Associate Deputy Minister of Justice over 15 years prior, during the early stages of the litigation.

The Court dismissed the motions, finding that the judge's prior involvement was limited to a supervisory and administrative role, he had no recollection of the file, and a reasonable, right-minded person would not apprehend bias given the passage of time and the nature of his involvement.

The appellant, a Manitoba Métis, was convicted of hunting deer out of season on unoccupied Crown land.

He appealed his conviction on the basis that, as a Métis, he was immune from conviction under provincial wildlife regulations because he had a constitutional right to hunt for food under paragraph 13 of the Manitoba Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA), which protects the hunting rights of 'Indians'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the term 'Indians' in paragraph 13 of the NRTA does not include the Métis, based on the historical context, the language used at the time of enactment, and the provision's objectives.

The respondents, members of a Métis community near Sault Ste.

Marie, were charged with hunting a moose without a licence and possessing game in contravention of the Game and Fish Act.

They argued they had an aboriginal right to hunt for food under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Supreme Court of Canada modified the Van der Peet test to account for the post-contact ethnogenesis of the Métis, establishing a pre-control test.

The Court found that the Sault Ste.

Marie Métis community had a historically continuous practice of subsistence hunting, and the respondents were accepted members of this community.

The provincial hunting regulations unjustifiably infringed their aboriginal right to hunt for food.

A probationary employee was discharged shortly after returning from maternity leave.

The collective agreement provided that probationary employees could be discharged at the sole discretion of the employer and such discharge was not subject to grievance procedures.

The employee filed a grievance alleging discriminatory discharge.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the substantive rights and obligations of the Human Rights Code and other employment-related statutes are implicitly incorporated into all collective agreements.

Therefore, an arbitrator has the jurisdiction to hear a grievance alleging discriminatory discharge, even for a probationary employee.

The accused had an 18-month relationship with the complainant, during which they engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse.

Five months into the relationship, the accused learned he was HIV-positive but failed to disclose this to the complainant.

The complainant later tested positive for HIV.

The Crown conceded it was possible the complainant was infected before the accused learned of his status.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the accused could not be convicted of aggravated assault because the Crown could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his post-knowledge conduct endangered her life, as she was likely already infected.

However, the Court upheld his conviction for attempted aggravated assault, finding he had the requisite intent and took more than preparatory steps.

The respondent, an Ontario insurer, paid statutory accident benefits to Ontario residents injured in a motor vehicle accident in British Columbia.

The respondent sought indemnification from the appellant, a British Columbia insurer, under section 275 of the Ontario Insurance Act.

The appellant argued the Ontario legislation could not constitutionally apply to it.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the superior court, not an arbitrator, should determine the constitutional applicability of the statute.

The Court further held that the Ontario Insurance Act was constitutionally inapplicable to the out-of-province appellant because there was an insufficient connection between Ontario and the appellant to justify the extraterritorial application of the provincial regulatory scheme.

The representative plaintiff, a disabled veteran, sued the federal Crown for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to pay interest on pension funds administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Parliament enacted legislation barring claims for interest prior to 1990.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the expropriative legislation was valid and not inconsistent with the due process or fair hearing protections of the Canadian Bill of Rights, as Parliament has the power to expropriate property without compensation using clear and unambiguous language.

The appellant, a taxi driver, repeatedly solicited fares at Pearson International Airport without a permit, contrary to regulations and notices under the Trespass to Property Act.

An airport inspector attempted to arrest the appellant for trespassing under s. 9 of the Act.

The appellant resisted, shoving his car door into the inspector and fleeing.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant of assault with intent to resist arrest, finding the inspector had no authority to use reasonable force.

The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the power of arrest under the Trespass to Property Act implicitly includes the authority to use reasonable force to effect and maintain the arrest.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Canada Elections Act requirement that a political party must nominate candidates in at least 50 electoral districts to obtain registered party status and its associated benefits.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 50-candidate threshold violates the right to meaningful participation in the electoral process guaranteed by section 3 of the Charter.

The Court found that the threshold diminishes the capacity of marginal or regional parties to communicate their ideas, thereby undermining the right of citizens to play a meaningful role in the electoral process.

The infringement was not justified under section 1 of the Charter, and the relevant provisions were declared unconstitutional.