SCC 2004

The Crown brought a motion to quash the accused's appeal and strike the notice of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motions, holding that the dissenting opinion in the court below was on a question of law, which gave the accused an appeal as of right.

The respondent Attorney General of Quebec brought a motion to strike portions of the appellant's record and factum.

The Attorney General argued that certain material filed by the appellant during the leave to appeal application constituted fresh evidence that was not before the lower courts, and that a new constitutional argument under s. 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867 was improperly raised.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the motion in part.

The Court struck the material from the record, finding it did not meet the test for fresh evidence as there was no due diligence and the evidence was not determinative.

However, the Court declined to strike the s. 121 argument, holding that it was relevant to the stated constitutional questions and should be determined by the Court.

The appellant was served a notice of ascertained forfeiture under the Customs Act for allegedly attempting to export stolen automobiles using false statements.

He appealed the Minister's decision upholding the forfeiture to the Federal Court.

The Minister sought to examine the appellant for discovery, which the appellant resisted, claiming protection against self-incrimination under section 11(c) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was not a 'person charged with an offence' because ascertained forfeiture is an administrative, civil collection mechanism, not a penal proceeding, and does not impose true penal consequences.

Therefore, section 11(c) of the Charter did not apply, and the appellant could be compelled to submit to examination for discovery.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and uttering threats after beating the victim with a baseball bat.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, specifically regarding whether the victim's life was endangered.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming the stringent standard from R. v. Morrissey.

The Court held that to set aside a conviction, a misapprehension of evidence must go to the substance rather than detail, and must play an essential part in the reasoning process resulting in the conviction.

In a federal reference concerning proposed civil marriage legislation, the Court held that Parliament had jurisdiction to define civil marriage as the lawful union of two persons, but not to legislate protections for religious officials in relation to solemnization, which falls within provincial authority.

The Court further held that extending civil marriage to same-sex couples was consistent with the Charter and that freedom of religion broadly protects religious officials from state compulsion to perform marriages contrary to their beliefs.

Exercising its residual discretion under the Supreme Court Act reference jurisdiction, the Court declined to answer whether the pre-existing opposite-sex requirement for civil marriage was Charter-compliant, given the government's legislative position, the reliance interests created by lower-court rulings, and the risk of legal confusion.

The infant respondents suffer from autism and sought funding from the Province of British Columbia for applied behavioural analysis (ABA) or intensive behavioural intervention (IBI) therapy.

The Province refused to fund the therapy, arguing it was an emergent and controversial treatment and citing financial constraints.

The respondents argued this refusal violated their equality rights under section 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the legislative scheme does not promise funding for all medically required treatment, but only for core services provided by medical practitioners.

Since ABA/IBI therapy is a non-core service and the Province had not designated its providers as health care practitioners, the benefit claimed was not provided by law.

The Court concluded there was no discrimination and allowed the Province's appeal.

The accused was charged with historical sexual offences.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the accused, finding no evidence of non-consent, despite the complainant's testimony that he did not want to engage in the activity.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari, but the Court of Appeal restored the discharge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, specifically the direct evidence of lack of consent, and thus exceeded his jurisdiction.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon and obstruction of justice after failing to properly investigate and secure a knife found at his son's school.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the accused on both counts, finding no evidence that the knife handle was made of metal.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari, but the Court of Appeal restored the discharge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a preliminary inquiry judge commits a jurisdictional error reviewable on certiorari if they fail to consider the whole of the evidence as required by section 548(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant developer agreed to construct $1.08 million in extra infrastructure improvements for the respondent municipality in exchange for an implied commitment to maintain zoning for a waterfront development.

After the developer completed the improvements, the municipality down-zoned the property, preventing the development.

The Supreme Court of Canada previously ruled the municipality's zoning commitment was ultra vires and unenforceable as a contract.

In this unjust enrichment claim, the Court held that the municipality could not rely on the ultra vires contract as a juristic reason to retain the benefit of the improvements without paying for them.

The appeal was allowed and the municipality was ordered to reimburse the developer $1.08 million.

The Province of British Columbia granted a project approval certificate to a mining company to reopen a mine, which included building an access road through the traditional territory of the Taku River Tlingit First Nation (TRTFN).

The TRTFN objected, arguing their unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims were not adequately accommodated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown has a duty to consult and, where indicated, accommodate Aboriginal peoples prior to proof of rights or title claims, grounded in the honour of the Crown.

However, the Court found that the environmental assessment process engaged in by the Province fulfilled this duty, as the TRTFN was consulted and its concerns were reasonably accommodated in the project approval conditions.

The Haida Nation claimed title to Haida Gwaii and objected to the Province of British Columbia's replacement and transfer of a Tree Farm Licence to Weyerhaeuser Company Limited.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown has a legal duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests prior to making decisions that might adversely affect their as yet unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims.

This duty is grounded in the honour of the Crown and applies to both federal and provincial governments.

However, the Court found that third parties, such as Weyerhaeuser, do not owe an independent duty to consult or accommodate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm, driving while disqualified, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, holding that the frailties of the eyewitness identification evidence rendered the convictions unsafe.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada found that the trial judge misapprehended the DNA evidence by assuming the complainant's DNA was found on the inside of the appellant's trousers, a finding unsupported by the record.

As this misapprehension was central to the trial judge's finding of guilt, the appeal was allowed, the conviction vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal, which had set aside his acquittal on a charge of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was sufficient material before the Justice of the Peace to support the issuance of the search warrant.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which quashed the accused's conviction for sexual offences and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence without the benefit of the Court's reasons in R. v. Handy.

The trustee in bankruptcy of a wholly-owned subsidiary sued the directors of the subsidiary, alleging they breached their fiduciary duty and duty of care under the Canada Business Corporations Act by implementing a joint inventory procurement policy that favoured the parent company to the detriment of the subsidiary's creditors.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation, not to its creditors, even when the corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency.

The Court also held that while directors owe a duty of care to creditors, the directors' actions in this case were reasonable business decisions protected by the business judgment rule.

The trustee's claim under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act for reviewable transactions was also dismissed.

The RCMP used an airplane equipped with a Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) camera to overfly the accused's home without a warrant.

The FLIR image, which detected heat emanations consistent with a marijuana grow operation, was used to obtain a search warrant.

The accused argued the FLIR overflight violated his right against unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the use of FLIR technology did not violate s. 8, as the accused did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat distribution patterns on the external surfaces of his home.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.

The provincial government signed a Pay Equity Agreement in 1988 to address systemic gender discrimination in the health care sector.

In 1991, facing a severe financial crisis, the government enacted the Public Sector Restraint Act, which deferred the pay equity adjustments and extinguished arrears.

The appellant union grieved the legislation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the legislation infringed the equality rights of female hospital workers under s. 15(1) of the Charter, the infringement was justified under s. 1 due to the exceptional financial crisis.

The Court also rejected the Court of Appeal's suggestion to add an explicit separation of powers step to the Oakes test.

The respondent sought a survivor's pension under the Canada Pension Plan after her former common law partner died.

She had ended the relationship permanently prior to his death.

Her application was denied because she did not meet the definition of 'spouse', which required common law partners to be cohabiting at the time of death.

She argued this violated her equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter based on marital status, comparing herself to separated married spouses.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Minister's appeal, holding that the correct comparator group was divorced spouses, not separated married spouses.

Since former common law spouses and former married spouses are both denied survivor's pensions, there was no discrimination.

The debtor bought property from a dealer in instalment sales, and the dealer assigned its rights to the appellant bank.

The debtor later made an assignment in bankruptcy and the respondent was appointed trustee.

The bank sent a proof of claim for its reservation of ownership, which the trustee disputed because the bank had not published the reservation within the time limit provided for in art. 1745 C.C.Q. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the reservation of ownership could be set up against the trustee.

The trustee is vested with only the rights the bankrupt had in the property and cannot be considered a third person acquirer for the purposes of art. 1749 C.C.Q.