SCC 2005

The applicant applied for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the application for an extension of time.

Following the granting of leave to appeal, the Official Languages Act was amended by Bill S-3.

The Supreme Court of Canada determined that the questions of law for which leave was granted were no longer of public importance due to the legislative amendments.

Consequently, the Court withdrew the leave to appeal and declared it of no effect, with no order as to costs.

The appellant pleaded guilty to producing cannabis and challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory firearms prohibition order under s. 109(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the mandatory order constituted cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the prohibition has a legitimate connection to drug offences and relates to the recognized sentencing goal of protecting the public.

The Court found that the loss of the privilege to possess firearms is not grossly disproportionate, especially given the ameliorative provision in s. 113 of the Criminal Code.

The parties were involved in a motor vehicle accident in California.

The appellant brought an action in Alberta after the one-year California limitation period had expired, but within the two-year Alberta limitation period.

The appellant argued that s. 12 of the Alberta Limitations Act applied the Alberta limitation period to the exclusion of the California one.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the substantive law of California, including its limitations law, governed the action.

Section 12 does not revive an action that is already time-barred by the substantive law of the place where the tort occurred.

The appellant inmates, serving life sentences, were involuntarily transferred from a minimum-security to medium-security institutions based on a computerized reclassification scale.

They applied to the provincial superior court for habeas corpus.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that provincial superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Court to hear habeas corpus applications from federal inmates and should not decline jurisdiction merely because an alternative remedy exists.

The Court further held that while the transfers were not arbitrary, the Correctional Service of Canada breached its statutory duty of disclosure under s. 27(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act by failing to provide the scoring matrix used in the reclassification.

This breach of procedural fairness rendered the transfer decisions null and void for want of jurisdiction.

The accused operated a licensed bar where couples paid an entrance fee to engage in or observe group sex activities.

He was charged with keeping a common bawdy-house for the practice of indecent acts under s. 210(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying the harm-based test for criminal indecency established in the companion case of R. v. Labaye, held that the conduct did not constitute criminal indecency.

The Court found no significant risk of harm to the autonomy and liberty of members of the public, as access was restricted to informed and willing participants, and no evidence of physical, psychological, or anti-social harm.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed and the acquittal affirmed.

The appellant operated a club where members and guests engaged in consensual group sex.

He was convicted of keeping a common bawdy-house for the practice of acts of indecency under s. 210(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, establishing a new harm-based test for criminal indecency.

The Court held that the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct causes harm or presents a significant risk of harm to individuals or society, and that the harm is of a degree incompatible with the proper functioning of society.

The Court found no evidence that the consensual acts behind closed doors caused such harm.

The accused was acquitted of aggravated assault after the trial judge instructed the jury on the definition of assault under s. 265(1)(a) of the Criminal Code but refused to instruct on s. 265(1)(b).

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial, but restricted the new trial solely to the definition under s. 265(1)(b).

The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the order for a new trial but held that the Court of Appeal erred in restricting its scope, as the two subsections do not create separate offences but define two ways of committing the same offence.

The new trial was ordered without restriction.

These companion youth sentencing appeals considered the meaning of “violent offence” in s. 39(1)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, one of the statutory gateways to custody.

The Court rejected both a force-based definition and the broader Alberta approach that included offences where bodily harm was merely reasonably foreseeable.

It held that a “violent offence” is one in the commission of which a young person causes, attempts to cause, or threatens to cause bodily harm.

Because the record did not establish that the appellants’ offences met that definition, the custodial sentences were quashed and the matters remitted to youth court for fresh sentencing.

The appellant optometrist sought judicial review of the College's 1996 decision refusing to renew his license for failing to provide evidence of continuing education, and its 2001 decision imposing conditions on his application for a new license.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the pragmatic and functional approach, determining the standard of review was reasonableness.

The Court upheld the 1996 refusal to renew and the 2001 condition requiring a jurisprudence examination as reasonable.

However, the Court quashed the 2001 condition requiring an ethics course, finding it unreasonable because no such course was accredited or prescribed by the College.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder at their retrial after their initial convictions were overturned.

At the retrial, they testified voluntarily but gave different accounts than they had at their first trial.

The Crown cross-examined them on these prior inconsistent statements to impeach their credibility.

The appellants argued this violated their right against self-incrimination under s. 13 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, overruling its previous decision in R. v. Mannion.

The Court held that s. 13 does not protect an accused who voluntarily testifies at a retrial on the same indictment from being cross-examined on prior voluntary testimony, as the compulsion required to trigger the s. 13 quid pro quo is absent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge's lengthy jury charge was misleading and that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the murder occurred during a sexual assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the 2.5-day charge was not perfect and the practice of reading extended passages from notes is discouraged, it did not mislead the jury or impact trial fairness.

The Court also found sufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude the murder occurred during a sexual assault.

The appellant brought an application in French against the respondent municipality.

The municipality presented its pleadings in English.

The appellant objected, arguing that section 22 of the Official Languages Act required the municipality, as an 'institution', to adopt the official language chosen by the other party in civil proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the definition of 'institution' in the Act does not include municipalities, and therefore the municipality was not obliged to use the appellant's chosen language.

The Court also held that the obligation under section 22 does not extend to translating evidence or case law.

The appellant obtained student loans under the Quebec Act respecting financial assistance for students.

His loan certificate provided for an interest exemption period after completing his studies.

Subsequent legislative amendments reduced and then eliminated this exemption period.

The financial institution charged the appellant interest based on the new legislation.

The appellant brought a class action against the government.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant had a vested right to the interest exemption period specified in his contract, and the legislative amendments did not clearly indicate an intention to interfere with vested rights or apply retroactively to existing contracts.

The appeal was allowed.

The accused was charged with operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

At trial, he testified he had consumed two large beers, and a defence expert testified that based on this consumption, his blood alcohol level should have been much lower than the breathalyzer results.

The trial judge rejected the accused's testimony as not credible and therefore rejected the expert opinion based on it, convicting the accused.

The Superior Court and Court of Appeal overturned the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that an expert opinion based on rejected testimony cannot constitute 'evidence to the contrary' to rebut the statutory presumption of accuracy of breathalyzer results.

The accused, a black man, was charged with robbing an East Indian man.

At trial, the judge permitted the defence to challenge potential jurors for cause based on potential bias against a black accused, but refused to extend the challenge to include the race of the complainant.

The accused was convicted and appealed, arguing he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge did not err in the exercise of his discretion.

The Court declined to take judicial notice of a general theory of race-based 'natural sympathy' between jurors and complainants of the same race.

The appellant was fired from her position as bookkeeper and office manager of the respondent trade union after reporting alleged financial misconduct by her supervisors to the International Union of Iron Workers.

The trial judge found she was terminated for reporting the misconduct but held that the union was not a 'lawful authority' under s. 74 of The Labour Standards Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'lawful authority' includes individuals within the employer organization who exercise lawful authority over the employee or the activity, thereby protecting employees who report misconduct 'up the ladder'.

The federal government approved the construction of a winter road through Wood Buffalo National Park, which would traverse the traditional hunting and trapping grounds of the Mikisew Cree First Nation.

The Mikisew argued this infringed their rights under Treaty 8.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Crown has a treaty right to 'take up' lands for purposes such as transportation, this right is subject to the honour of the Crown and the duty to consult.

The Court found that the Crown failed to adequately consult the Mikisew before approving the road, thereby breaching its duty.

The appeal was allowed and the Minister's approval was quashed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in the recharge to the jury regarding his criminal record and by failing to instruct the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the recharge on the criminal record could not have misled the jury when read in context.

The Court also held there was no error in failing to instruct on post-offence conduct, noting such an instruction was not requested at trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the trial judge committed no error in finding the necessary criminal intent.