SCC 2005

A Quebec business sued a Quebec supplier in damages for failure to deliver equipment.

The supplier brought an incidental action in warranty against the German manufacturer of the equipment.

The German manufacturer moved to dismiss the action in warranty based on a choice of forum clause in its contract with the supplier, which granted exclusive jurisdiction to a German court.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the fundamental rule of party autonomy prevails over the procedural rule of a single forum, meaning the choice of forum clause must be enforced and the Quebec court must decline jurisdiction over the action in warranty.

The Crown appealed from a provincial appellate acquittal after conceding insufficient proof of attempted incest and seeking substituted convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The majority held that fair notice of legal jeopardy must be ascertainable from the offence charged, the enactment creating it, or the wording of the count, and that the Crown could not rely on trial evidence or the accused's personal knowledge to expand the charge.

Because incest does not necessarily include non-consensual touching or an underage complainant, sexual assault and sexual interference were not included offences under s. 662 of the Criminal Code on this indictment.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding that sexual assault was included on the facts and notice given.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard multiple appeals from New Brunswick, Ontario, Alberta, and Quebec regarding the constitutional requirement for independent judicial compensation commissions.

The Court clarified the principles from the Provincial Judges Reference, establishing a three-stage analysis for determining whether a government's response to a commission's recommendations meets the standard of rationality.

The Court upheld the government responses in New Brunswick and Ontario, found the Alberta government's response partially irrational but globally effective, and struck down the Quebec government's response for failing to address the committee's core recommendations.

The accused, Mi'kmaq Indians in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, were charged with cutting and possessing timber from Crown lands without authorization.

They argued they had a right to log for commercial purposes pursuant to the treaties of 1760-61 and aboriginal title.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the treaties did not confer a right to commercial logging, as it was not the logical evolution of a traditional Mi'kmaq trading activity.

The Court also held that the accused did not establish aboriginal title to the cutting sites, as the evidence did not show sufficiently regular and exclusive use of the lands at the time of British sovereignty.

The convictions were restored.

The accused was stopped by police and refused a roadside demand for a breath sample.

He was arrested and taken to the police station, where over an hour later he provided a sample after speaking with counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the sample was not provided 'forthwith' as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The delayed compliance could not be considered a response to the initial roadside demand, and the subsequent demand at the station was invalid.

The appeal by the Crown was dismissed.

The Crown obtained search warrants under the Provincial Offences Act relating to a meat packing business.

The Crown subsequently obtained an ex parte sealing order for the warrants and informations, arguing disclosure could identify a confidential informant and interfere with an ongoing criminal investigation.

Media outlets successfully applied to quash the sealing order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Dagenais/Mentuck test applies to all discretionary court orders that limit freedom of expression and freedom of the press, including sealing orders at the investigative stage.

The Court found the Crown failed to meet its burden, as it relied only on a generalized assertion that publicity could compromise the investigation rather than demonstrating a serious and specific risk.

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration sought to deport the respondent, a permanent resident, alleging that a speech he delivered in Rwanda in 1992 constituted incitement to murder, hatred, and genocide, and a crime against humanity.

The Immigration and Refugee Board (Appeal Division) upheld the deportation order, but the Federal Court of Appeal set it aside after reassessing the factual findings.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Minister's appeal, holding that the Federal Court of Appeal exceeded its judicial review function by substituting its own findings of fact.

Applying customary international law and the Criminal Code, the Court found that the speech constituted incitement to murder, hatred, and genocide, and amounted to persecution as a crime against humanity.

The deportation order was restored.

The respondents brought a motion for a permanent stay of proceedings in an immigration deportation appeal, alleging abuse of power by federal ministers and institutional bias on the part of the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion relied on claims that the decision to pursue the appeal was improperly influenced and that the voluntary recusal of one judge tainted the entire Court.

The Court held that a stay is a drastic remedy reserved for the clearest cases of abuse of process and found no factual or legal basis for either allegation.

It also reaffirmed the presumption of judicial impartiality and rejected the proposition that one judge’s recusal compromises the integrity of the whole court.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The respondent was involved in a motor vehicle accident with the deceased.

Unaware that the deceased had died of unrelated causes, the respondent issued a statement of claim within the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, but outside the shorter limitation period under the Survival of Actions Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that neither the discoverability rule nor the confirmation provisions of the Limitations Act applied to extend the Survival of Actions Act limitation period.

Furthermore, the Court established the test for estoppel by convention and found that the requirements were not met, as there was no shared assumption or detrimental reliance.

The appeal was allowed and the statement of claim was struck out.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered whether police officers can ask drivers about prior alcohol consumption and request roadside sobriety tests without first informing them of their right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court held that while such police actions do infringe the right to counsel, the infringement is a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The limit arises by necessary implication from the operating requirements of provincial highway traffic legislation and the Criminal Code.

The evidence obtained was admissible, and the orders for new trials for both accused were upheld.

The appellant was acquitted at trial on two counts of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario set aside the acquittals and entered convictions, finding that on the admitted facts and factual findings of the trial judge, consent to sexual intercourse within the meaning of s. 273.1(1) of the Criminal Code was not given.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the Court of Appeal's conclusion and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants challenged the validity of provisions in Quebec's Health Insurance Act and Hospital Insurance Act that prohibit residents from purchasing private health insurance for services covered by the public health care plan.

They argued that waiting times in the public system deprived them of access to timely care, violating their rights under the Quebec Charter and the Canadian Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal.

A majority found that the prohibition violates the right to life and personal inviolability under s. 1 of the Quebec Charter and is not justified under s. 9.1.

Three of the judges also found that the prohibition violates s. 7 of the Canadian Charter because it arbitrarily deprives individuals of life and security of the person by forcing them to endure unreasonable waiting times without the option of seeking private care.

The appellants held mortgages on a property that was destroyed by fire after being vacated by the owners.

The respondent insurer denied the appellants' claims under the standard mortgage clause, arguing that the vacancy was a material change to the risk under Statutory Condition 4 of which it was not notified.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Statutory Condition 4 conflicts with the standard mortgage clause, which explicitly preserves coverage despite any act or neglect of the mortgagor, including vacancy.

The appeal was allowed, and the insurer was precluded from relying on the statutory condition to void the mortgagees' coverage.

The applicants sought an extension of time to serve and file an application for leave to appeal from a Federal Court of Appeal judgment dismissing their appeal as moot.

The applicants missed the 60-day deadline and filed their application 106 days after the judgment, citing the need to consider recent Supreme Court decisions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, finding a lack of diligence and no valid reasons to explain the delay, emphasizing that time limits must be respected to ensure fairness to all parties.

The respondent pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and other offences.

At sentencing, she had spent 16 months in pre-sentence custody.

The sentencing judge considered this equivalent to almost three years and imposed a 14-month conditional sentence, which the Court of Appeal upheld.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, a conditional sentence is unavailable to an offender who otherwise deserves a penitentiary term.

Time spent in pre-sentence custody cannot be used to reduce the sentence range to make a conditional sentence available.

The plaintiff sued her attending physicians and a prosthesis manufacturer for medical malpractice, claiming damages for pain, suffering, and reactive depression.

During examination on discovery, the defendants sought disclosure of the plaintiff's psychiatric records.

The plaintiff refused, citing professional secrecy.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that by claiming damages for psychological harm, the plaintiff implicitly waived the confidentiality of her medical records.

The defendants demonstrated the apparent relevance of the records for their defence, and the trial judge correctly dismissed the plaintiff's objection to disclosure.

The former chauffeur to the Speaker of the House of Commons filed discrimination and harassment complaints with the Canadian Human Rights Commission after his position was declared surplus.

The Speaker and the House of Commons challenged the Commission's jurisdiction, claiming parliamentary privilege over the management of employees.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellants failed to establish a broad parliamentary privilege immunizing all employee relations from external review.

However, the Court ruled that the employee was required to pursue his complaints through the grievance procedure established under the Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act, which ousted the jurisdiction of the Canadian Human Rights Commission for this dispute.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and possession of stolen goods, arguing that the trial judge erred in relying on the doctrine of recent possession and in applying the test for determining guilt based solely on circumstantial evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that both grounds were without merit.

The appellant purchased a truck that was destroyed by a fire caused by a manufacturing defect.

The manufacturer and dealer refused to compensate her.

At trial, she was awarded general and exemplary damages under the Saskatchewan Consumer Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal set aside the exemplary damages and awarded costs against the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the exemplary damages because the manufacturer's failure to warn consumers of the known defect constituted a 'wilful' violation under s. 65 of the Act.

The Court also set aside the costs award, holding that s. 66 protects consumers from costs awards on appeal unless the action is frivolous or vexatious.

The appellant fatally shot a trespasser who refused to leave his home.

At trial for second degree murder, the appellant claimed the shooting was accidental and that he intended to use his shotgun solely to intimidate the trespasser in defence of his property.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the underlying offence of careless use of a firearm had been made out and refused to instruct the jury on the defence of property.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge erred by encroaching on the exclusive domain of the jury to decide whether an offence has been proven on the facts, and by failing to leave the defence of property to the jury.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.