Sandra Nishikawa

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order finding her child in need of protection and placing the child in extended society care.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence alleging ineffective assistance of former counsel, claiming she was coerced into signing a Statement of Agreed Facts.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it could have been adduced earlier and did not meet the relaxed test for child protection cases.

The court upheld the motions judge's decision to admit the Statement of Agreed Facts and grant summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial and no error in principle.

The self-represented applicant, an adult over 21, sought judicial review of the school board's student interest program admission policy and by-laws after being denied admission to two secondary school programs.

The school board brought a motion to quash the application.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the applicant lacked both private and public interest standing, as he had no legal right to attend the programs.

Furthermore, the court held it lacked jurisdiction because the school board's admission policy and by-laws were not the product of a statutory power of decision.

The respondents brought a motion for an order declaring that the appellants required leave to appeal a costs order under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellants argued that leave was not required because the costs were not discretionary, relying on Rule 49.07(5) regarding accepted offers to settle.

The court dismissed the respondents' motion, finding the appellants raised an arguable issue, but did so without prejudice to the respondents raising the leave issue at the hearing of the appeal.

The applicant, a forensic pathologist, sought judicial review of a reporting letter issued by the Death Investigation Oversight Council regarding her complaint against the Chief Forensic Pathologist.

The applicant alleged that the Chief Forensic Pathologist abused his authority by interfering with her conclusion that a child's death was due to natural causes rather than abuse.

The Council investigated and issued recommendations to improve the death investigation system but did not recommend the Chief Forensic Pathologist's dismissal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Council is an advisory body, not a disciplinary tribunal, and its decision not to make findings of fact or recommend dismissal was reasonable.

The appellant owner appealed a motion judge's order directing the release of holdback funds to subcontractors under the Construction Act.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in calculating the minimum holdback and in ordering payments without a formal summary judgment motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the law regarding basic holdback obligations and set-off, and properly utilized the summary procedure under s. 67 of the Act to expedite payment to subcontractors.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated February 17, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the fixed amount of $4,700.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of the motion judge dated January 24, 2023.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated January 16, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed at $2,000 all inclusive.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that declined to order a special award under s. 10 of Regulation 664 for the respondent's alleged unreasonable withholding of Income Replacement Benefits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the issues raised regarding the adjudicator's assessment of expert evidence and the respondent's conduct were questions of fact or mixed fact and law, not extricable questions of law.

The court concluded there was ample evidence to support the adjudicator's factual findings.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order requiring them to continue a joint retainer with an accountant and to produce documents to assist the accountant.

The appellants had lost confidence in the accountant and purported to terminate the relationship.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge committed a palpable and overriding error by effectively ordering specific performance of a professional relationship where the client had lost confidence.

As the order for the continued retainer was quashed, the order for document production was also set aside.

The defendants appealed an interlocutory order regarding the admissibility and production of compelled evidence in a civil contempt motion arising from alleged breaches of a Mareva order.

The plaintiffs cross-appealed the motion judge's decision that answers to undertakings and further document production could not be compelled while the contempt motion was outstanding.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that evidence compelled prior to the contempt motion was admissible and did not violate sections 7, 11(c), or 13 of the Charter.

However, the court allowed the cross-appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in prematurely ruling on the admissibility of future answers to undertakings and in deferring the production motion.

The court held that the obligation to comply with the Mareva order continues despite the contempt motion, and admissibility should be determined when the evidence is tendered, based on whether the contempt motion is predominantly coercive or penal.

Dr. Kustka, a family physician, and several of her patients brought applications for judicial review challenging the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario's decision to investigate her COVID-19 practices, including prescribing ivermectin and providing mask exemptions.

The patients challenged the College's ability to access their medical records, arguing it violated their Charter rights.

The Divisional Court quashed the patients' applications for lack of public and private interest standing.

The Court dismissed the physician's applications as premature, noting that challenges to the appointment of investigators should be raised before the Discipline Committee.

The Court also found the College's interim restrictions and investigation decisions were reasonable.

The self-represented applicants brought an application for judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board regarding a complaint about their father's death at a hospital.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the application as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, noting it was duplicative of a previously dismissed application.

The court found the notice of application failed to meet basic legal requirements, did not state proper grounds, and sought unavailable relief.

The application was dismissed as frivolous and vexatious on its face, with no costs ordered.

The applicant, a residents' association, sought judicial review of a municipal council decision approving a site plan application and heritage impact assessment for a large warehouse development in a heritage conservation district.

The applicant argued the council breached its procedural by-law by reconsidering the application without notice and acted in bad faith.

The Divisional Court granted the applicant public interest standing and found the application was not moot.

However, the court dismissed the application, holding that the city did not owe the applicant a duty of procedural fairness.

While the council did breach its procedural by-law regarding notice for the reconsideration motion, the breach did not amount to illegality or bad faith sufficient to quash the decision.

The moving parties, Canada School of Public Service and Pierre Leduc, brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Hackland J. dated December 1, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order dated December 19, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing and awarded costs of $10,000 inclusive to the responding party.

The applicant attempted to file a human rights complaint on the final day of the limitation period but was delayed past 5:00 PM due to printing issues at the Tribunal office.

Tribunal staff refused to accept the application, and the Tribunal subsequently ruled the later filing was out of time.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court found the Tribunal's decision unreasonable, noting it failed to consider the applicant's good faith efforts to file on time and the severe consequences of denying the application.

The application was allowed and remitted to the Tribunal.

The parties attended before the Divisional Court to advise that a conditional resolution had been reached in the application for judicial review.

On consent, the court adjourned the application to the next available date, to proceed only if the resolution is not completed.

No costs were ordered for the attendance.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing his application for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant alleged he was assaulted by a coworker and subsequently terminated from his temporary assignment, claiming discrimination on various grounds.

The HRTO dismissed the application because the applicant failed to allege any nexus between a protected ground under the Human Rights Code and the alleged discriminatory conduct.

The Divisional Court found the HRTO's decision reasonable and concluded there was no denial of procedural fairness, as the HRTO acted in accordance with its rules.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondents damages for oppression.

The trial judge found that the parties had entered into an oral agreement and a shareholders' agreement for the respondents to receive a 20 percent equity share in a new car dealership, which the appellants breached by excluding the respondents and obtaining the dealership through a different corporate entity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or extricable error of law in the trial judge's conclusions regarding the existence of the agreements, the breach, the respondents' standing as complainants under the Business Corporations Act, and the finding of oppression.