Ryder Leigh Gilliland

The defendants brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiffs' $27 million defamation action as a SLAPP suit.

The plaintiffs, who own a large tobacco manufacturing company, sued over a magazine publication alleging they smuggled contraband tobacco and were associated with organized crime.

The court found the publication related to a matter of public interest but concluded the plaintiffs' claim had substantial merit and the defendants failed to establish valid defences of justification, responsible communication, qualified privilege, or fair comment.

The motion to dismiss was denied.

Two competing class actions were commenced following a cyberattack and privacy breach at Casino Rama.

The plaintiffs in the Kaplan Action and the plaintiff in the Harman Action both sought carriage of the proceeding.

The court applied the seven non-exhaustive factors for determining carriage, noting that the Kaplan Action counsel had more class action experience, a better class definition, and a more refined theory of the case.

The Harman Action counsel argued that their action would proceed faster in the Oshawa court, providing speedier access to justice.

The court rejected the speed argument as determinative on the facts and granted carriage to the Kaplan Action, staying the Harman Action.

Media organizations applied for access to previously sealed informations to obtain (ITOs) relating to a production order and search warrant issued during a criminal investigation.

The accused sought continuation of a publication ban, arguing that publication of intercepted communications referenced in the ITOs would compromise his right to a fair trial on an extortion charge.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court held that the accused failed to demonstrate a real and serious risk to trial fairness, given existing publicity, the passage of time before trial, jury instructions, and the challenge for cause process.

A third party mentioned in the ITOs argued that publication would damage his reputation, but the court held that third parties generally lack standing to seek publication bans absent exceptional circumstances.

The court concluded that the open court principle prevailed and lifted the remaining publication bans.

Media organizations applied for access to and the ability to publish the contents of an Information to Obtain supporting a search warrant in a major police investigation.

The Provincial Crown and an accused sought a publication ban on references to non-consensual intercepted private communications, arguing protection of the wiretap regime and fair trial rights.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court held that generalized concerns about the wiretap regime and speculative risks to a future jury trial were insufficient to justify restricting openness.

The court emphasized the strong presumption of open courts and the public interest in scrutiny of judicial authorizations and police investigations.

Balancing the competing interests, the court concluded that the salutary effects of a publication ban did not outweigh the significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression and public accountability.

The accused was charged with stunt racing contrary to s. 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act for driving at 161 km/h in a 100 km/h zone on Highway 401, exceeding the speed limit by 61 km/h.

The Crown relied on Lidar speed detection evidence from a trained officer.

The defence challenged the accuracy of the Lidar reading and suggested the officer's vehicle was moving when the reading was taken.

The court found stunt racing to be a strict liability offence with a due diligence defence available.

The Crown proved the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused failed to establish the due diligence defence on a balance of probabilities.

The accused was convicted.

Media organizations applied for access to portions of a sealed information to obtain (ITO) used to secure a search warrant in a criminal investigation.

The Crown had released a version with extensive edits, including redactions relating to innocent third parties.

Applying the open court principle and the Dagenais/Mentuck test under s. 487.3 of the Criminal Code, the court held that the Crown failed to establish a serious risk to the administration of justice justifying continued secrecy.

Assertions that the redacted material constituted non‑essential narrative or could harm innocent persons were unsupported by evidence.

The court ordered disclosure of the redacted material subject to limited exceptions for personal identifiers, certain references involving the mayor’s spouse, and portions potentially affecting the accused’s fair trial rights.

Media organizations sought certiorari to review and set aside a decision refusing access to a sealed information to obtain (ITO) used to obtain search warrants in a large criminal investigation.

The Crown argued that disclosure was prohibited by s. 193 of the Criminal Code because the ITO contained references to non-consensual wiretap interceptions.

The court held that s. 193 is an offence-creating provision and does not govern public access to court materials; instead, access to a sealed ITO is governed by s. 487.3 of the Criminal Code informed by the Dagenais/Mentuck test and the open court principle.

Alternatively, even if s. 193 applied, the disclosure fell within the exception in s. 193(2)(a) because an ITO constitutes evidence given in a criminal proceeding.

The prior order denying access was set aside and the applicants were permitted to proceed with their application to vary or terminate the sealing order.

Media organizations applied under section 487.3(4) of the Criminal Code to unseal and publish portions of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant in Project Traveller proceedings.

The court had previously ordered the unsealing of a heavily redacted version with a publication ban.

The accused sought to maintain restrictions on publication regarding: (1) evidence adduced at bail hearings, (2) criminal antecedents, and (3) references to a prior search warrant.

The court declined to rule on bail hearing evidence, continued the publication ban on criminal antecedents, and lifted the ban on prior warrant references except for the name of the individual searched.

Media organizations sought to unseal search warrant Information to Obtain (ITO) documents and related judicial authorizations from Project Traveller, a major criminal investigation.

The Crown sought to maintain certain redactions based on investigative technique privilege and wiretap disclosure restrictions under s. 193 of the Criminal Code.

The court ordered the unsealing of the May 31, 2013 ITO in its current redacted form with a temporary publication ban pending further submissions from counsel for the accused.

The court also ordered the Crown to provide redacted copies of remaining Project Traveller ITOs within 30 days of completing Stinchcombe disclosure to the accused, with a detailed chart explaining redactions.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their defamation action for delay.

The action arose from statements published during a 1997 municipal election.

The motion judge found inordinate delay, noting that no steps had been taken by the appellants since 2005 and that a presumption of prejudice arose, reinforced by the loss of witnesses.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable or overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Media organizations sought an order to terminate or vary a sealing order issued by Justice Marin on May 31, 2013, which sealed documents relating to search warrants executed by the Toronto Police Service between May 31 and June 14, 2013.

The Crown sought a six-month adjournment to vet the Information to Obtain (ITO) before disclosure.

The court found the Crown's proposed timeline unreasonable and contrary to the open court principle protected by the Charter.

The court ordered the Crown to provide a redacted version of the May 31 ITO on a counsel-only basis by August 27, 2013, with a return hearing scheduled for no later than September 12, 2013.

The plaintiff invested in a limited partnership that purchased shares of a private corporation.

The investment failed, and the plaintiff sued the promoters, a minority shareholder who sold his shares, and the valuators who appraised the shares.

The minority shareholder and the valuators brought motions for summary judgment.

The court granted the motions, finding no evidence that the minority shareholder participated in any conspiracy or breached securities laws.

The court also found that the valuators owed no duty of care to the plaintiff, the plaintiff did not rely on the valuation, and any claim for negligent valuation belonged to the limited partnership under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.

The defendants brought a motion under r. 24.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a libel action for delay.

The action arose from allegedly defamatory statements published during a 1997 municipal election campaign.

Although the action was commenced in 1998, little progress occurred beyond limited discoveries in 1998, and no steps were taken after the Court of Appeal dismissed a related appeal in 2005.

The court held that the plaintiffs were responsible for inordinate and inexcusable delay and that a presumption of prejudice arose, reinforced by the death of witnesses and the unavailability of key participants.

The plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, and the action was dismissed for delay; the defendant’s counterclaim was also dismissed by consent.

In six Ontario libel actions tied to statements posted by a U.S. company and later republished in Ontario newspapers, the appellants argued Ontario lacked jurisdiction or should defer to Illinois.

The Court held that defamation was presumptively connected to Ontario because publication occurred there through reading, downloading, and republication.

It concluded the appellants did not rebut jurisdiction and did not prove Illinois was clearly the more appropriate forum under forum non conveniens.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Ontario Securities Commission order that imposed significant administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) for failing to report insider trades and failing to adequately supervise trading.

The appellants argued that the AMP provision of the Securities Act, which allows fines up to $1 million per infraction, violates s. 11(d) of the Charter because its magnitude constitutes a true penal consequence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutionality of an administrative penalty is assessed based on the actual penalty imposed, not the theoretical maximum.

The court found the fines were proportionate to the regulatory goal of deterring non-compliance in capital markets and did not amount to a penal sanction.

The court also upheld the Commission's findings regarding the appellants' failure to supervise and its consideration of the public interest in determining the sanctions.

The appellants appealed decisions of the Ontario Securities Commission finding that they breached securities laws and acted contrary to the public interest.

The Commission found that the appellant Rowan failed to file insider reports, traded during blackout periods, and failed to disclose his control over certain trust accounts.

The Commission also found that the other appellants failed to adequately supervise Rowan.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Commission's interpretation of 'control or direction' under the Securities Act, its public interest findings, or its imposition of administrative monetary penalties.

Media organizations challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory publication ban on bail hearing information under s. 517 of the Criminal Code, arguing it unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provision.

The Court found that while the mandatory ban limits freedom of expression, it is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The ban's objectives of safeguarding the right to a fair trial and ensuring expeditious bail hearings are pressing and substantial.

The mandatory nature of the ban is rationally connected to these objectives, minimally impairs freedom of expression given its temporary nature and limited scope, and its salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding an easement claim based on the doctrine of Lost Modern Grant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in limiting the relevant 20-year period to the time before the property's conversion to the Land Titles system in 2001.

The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in law but found the error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The sole witness relied upon by the appellant was deemed unreliable, and the evidence was insufficient to establish the required 20 years of open and continuous use.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant applied for a disability pension and submitted a medical opinion stating she was totally and permanently disabled.

The respondent's physician agreed she was totally disabled but disputed that the condition was permanent.

An independent medical referee was appointed under the pension plan but concluded the appellant was not totally disabled, despite this not being in dispute.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for the respondent, finding the referee was entitled to make a full determination.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the referee's role under the plan is to resolve the specific dispute between the physicians, not to substitute a new opinion on undisputed matters.

Media organizations appealed orders upholding a mandatory publication ban imposed under s. 517 of the Criminal Code during terrorism-related bail proceedings and interpreting the ban to apply to all jointly charged accused when requested by one accused.

The Court of Appeal held the appeal should be heard despite mootness because the issue was recurring, evasive of review, and remained adversarial.

A majority held that the mandatory ban infringed s. 2(b) of the Charter and was justified under s. 1 only where the charges may be tried by a jury; the provision was therefore read down to that extent.

The interpretation ruling applying the ban to all jointly charged accused was upheld, and no costs were awarded.