Ronald G. Slaght

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity scale to the respondents and cross-appellants, Father Reed and the Diocese, in the amount of $18,000.

The Phoenix group of insurers and the Ecclesiastical Insurance Office were each awarded costs of $5,549.02.

The plaintiff brought an action against a priest and a diocese for sexual assault.

The parties settled the main action, but a third party action continued regarding insurance coverage.

The trial judge found that the appellant insurer had a duty to defend the claims under its policy.

The insurer appealed, arguing the policy did not cover sexual assaults by an employee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the policy language broad enough to cover the claims.

On cross-appeal, the Court upheld the trial judge's allocation of defence costs among the insurers but allowed the cross-appeal regarding costs of the third party proceedings, holding that the insureds were entitled to costs on a solicitor-and-client basis due to the insurer's wrongful denial of the duty to defend.

The appellant, a sales representative, breached its fiduciary duty to the respondent manufacturer by failing to disclose an equity interest in a customer.

The respondent terminated the agreement upon discovering the breach two years later.

The trial judge declared that the respondent owed no further commissions to the appellant, finding that the respondent would have terminated the agreement earlier had it known of the breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld this equitable remedy, preventing the appellant from profiting from its non-disclosure.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, finding that the appellant's conduct, while a serious breach, was not reprehensible enough to justify costs on a solicitor and client scale.

The respondents sought leave under s. 246 of the Business Corporations Act to commence a derivative action.

The appellants, who were the intended defendants in the proposed action, moved to intervene in the leave application.

The motions judge dismissed the motion to intervene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 246 permits the proceeding to be brought by application rather than motion, and that the motions judge did not err in exercising his discretion to deny intervention, as the intended defendants' rights would be fully protected once the action was commenced.

The appellant challenged an order striking its amended statement of claim alleging that brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and a related generic seller marketed pseudo-generic drugs through misleading origin representations and anti-competitive pricing practices.

The Court of Appeal held that the pleading could support a claim under s. 52 of the Competition Act, as well as related tort claims for unlawful interference with economic relations and conspiracy, because the alleged false statement of origin could have been made to promote a business interest and in a material respect.

The court agreed, however, that the double ticketing claim under s. 54 of the Competition Act and the Business Practices Act allegations were not viable on the pleaded facts.

The court also held that it was not plain and obvious that the Food and Drugs Act claim against the generic seller must fail.

The appeal was allowed in part with costs to the appellant.

The appellant oral surgeon appealed a trial judgment enforcing a handwritten non-competition clause that barred him from practising within five miles of the respondent's office for three years after leaving an associate position.

The Court of Appeal held that although the respondent had some proprietary interest in regular referring dentists, this was not an exceptional employment case justifying a broad non-competition covenant.

Applying the governing framework for restrictive covenants in employment contracts, the court emphasized that non-competition clauses will generally not be enforced where a non-solicitation clause would adequately protect the employer's legitimate interests.

The appellant's role was that of a junior associate, he did not personify the practice, and no confidential information or trade secrets justified the broader restraint.

The appeal was allowed, the action dismissed, and costs awarded to the appellant.

The appellant appealed an order striking part of its statement of claim that sought a declaration that the respondent airport authority lacked jurisdiction to impose fees and charges on airport users.

The court held it was unnecessary to resolve the pleaded delegation and Crown-operation issues because the respondent's authority arose from its leasehold interest and corporate capacity, as recognized by the applicable federal legislation and regulations.

The court further held Parliament did not intend to create a complete code restricting airport user charges to those set by ministerial regulation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondents sought to bring a class action on behalf of all purchasers of 1971 and 1972 Firenza motor vehicles in Ontario, claiming damages for breach of warranty.

The appellant applied to strike out the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action under Rule 75 of the Ontario Rules of Practice.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the action could not proceed as a class action because the members of the proposed class did not have the 'same interest' within the meaning of Rule 75, given the varying contractual arrangements and the need for individual damage assessments.

The appeal was allowed and the action was directed to proceed as a joined action by the named plaintiffs.