Ronald G. Slaght

The appellant was taken to the hospital by police under a Form 2 of the Mental Health Act and detained for a psychiatric assessment by the attending physician under a Form 1.

She was assessed and released within four and one-half hours.

The appellant sued the physician and hospital for false imprisonment and Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's dismissal of the action, finding that the detention complied with the Mental Health Act and that the provision of written notice of the right to counsel satisfied the appellant's Charter rights in this context.

The trustee in bankruptcy appealed an order restricting it from providing the bankrupt estate's inspectors and creditors with access to the bankrupt's documents.

The restriction was initially imposed due to concerns that an inspector, representing a competitor creditor, would use the information for collateral purposes.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that inspectors require access to documents to fulfill their statutory supervisory duties.

The court ruled that the proper remedy for concerns about misuse of information is to restrain the collateral use of the documents or remove the inspector, rather than denying access entirely.

Following the release of the court's reasons for judgment in the appeal, the parties were unable to agree on the quantum of costs.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the written submissions and fixed the respondents' costs of the appeal at $50,000 for fees, plus disbursements and GST.

The plaintiff suffered catastrophic brain injuries when her vehicle struck the rear of a tractor-trailer that was blocking the roadway.

The trial judge awarded approximately $4.9 million in damages and substantial costs, including a premium.

The defendants appealed the quantum of damages, the non-deductibility of statutory non-earner benefits, the modified discount rate, and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding damages, non-earner benefits, and the discount rate, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part regarding costs, setting aside the portion of counsel fees that exceeded the maximum permitted under the costs grid and setting aside the costs premium awarded against the no-fault insurer.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action in Ontario against McDonald's and Simon Marketing Inc. alleging wrongdoing in relation to promotional contests.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the action on the basis that the claims had been finally disposed of in an Illinois class action settlement.

The motion judge refused to stay or dismiss the action, finding that the notice given to the Canadian members of the plaintiff class in the Illinois action was so inadequate as to violate the rules of natural justice.

The defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that before enforcing a foreign class action judgment against Ontario residents, the court must ensure the foreign court had a proper basis for jurisdiction and that the interests of Ontario residents were adequately protected.

The Court found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's finding that the notice given to the non-resident class members was inadequate, and therefore the Ontario courts should not recognize and enforce the Illinois judgment against the plaintiff and the non-attorning Canadian class members.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion to set aside a default judgment and an order striking its statement of defence for failure to satisfy undertakings.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant's former solicitors failed to act appropriately in its defence and failed to communicate with the appellant regarding the motion to strike.

Applying the principle that a client should not be irrevocably prejudiced by the neglect of their solicitor, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the default judgment and the order striking the statement of defence, and permitted the appellant to defend the action.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) confirming the suspension of his hospital privileges until he completed a remedial anaesthetist review program.

The appellant argued he was denied procedural fairness when confronted with multiple complaints without prior notice.

The Divisional Court found that while the initial process was flawed, the hospital cured the defect by agreeing to an independent expert review.

Applying a standard of reasonableness, the Court held the HPARB properly concluded there was a legitimate concern for patient safety warranting remedial action.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, had a pending civil action against the respondent law firm.

The trustee in bankruptcy took no steps regarding the action and was subsequently discharged.

Years later, the bankrupt's status to pursue the action was challenged, prompting the trustee to solicit offers for its interest in the action.

The bankrupt moved for an order that the trustee assign the action to him, which was granted by the Deputy Registrar but reversed on appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the bankrupt's appeal, holding that under section 40(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the trustee's prolonged inaction indicated the property was incapable of realization, and it was too late for the trustee to assert an interest.

The appellant, a former director and executive, appealed a trial judgment that set aside his employment contract using the oppression remedy under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The appellant argued the oppression remedy should only be available to minority shareholders unable to use normal corporate machinery, and that the trial judge improperly substituted her view for the Board's business judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the oppression remedy addresses abuse of power and is not limited to minority shareholders.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the Board's process in approving the contract was seriously flawed and fell outside the range of reasonableness.

Leave to appeal the costs award was also refused despite the respondents failing to prove fraud, given the appellant's egregious conduct.

Following the release of the appeal judgment, the appellants requested clarification on the effect of the judgment on two aspects of the trial judge's order for interest.

The Court of Appeal clarified that interest on the respondents' share of Vicbir's RDTOH remains at 6% per annum from January 1, 2001.

The Court also clarified that interest on the share of sums payable to one of the respondents should be calculated on the net amount owing after deducting the sum she owed for reacquired shares.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that found oppressive conduct in the management of a family holding company and ordered the corporation to purchase the respondents' shares for cancellation.

The trial judge devised a valuation formula that included an unequal distribution of the corporation's capital dividend account to compensate the respondents for their share of the refundable dividend tax on hand.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's findings of oppression or his general valuation approach.

However, the Court allowed the respondents' cross-appeal in part, correcting a mathematical error in the trial judge's tax account formula to ensure the respondents were fully compensated for their pro rata share of the refundable dividend tax on hand.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity scale to the respondents and cross-appellants, Father Reed and the Diocese, in the amount of $18,000.

The Phoenix group of insurers and the Ecclesiastical Insurance Office were each awarded costs of $5,549.02.

The plaintiff brought an action against a priest and a diocese for sexual assault.

The parties settled the main action, but a third party action continued regarding insurance coverage.

The trial judge found that the appellant insurer had a duty to defend the claims under its policy.

The insurer appealed, arguing the policy did not cover sexual assaults by an employee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the policy language broad enough to cover the claims.

On cross-appeal, the Court upheld the trial judge's allocation of defence costs among the insurers but allowed the cross-appeal regarding costs of the third party proceedings, holding that the insureds were entitled to costs on a solicitor-and-client basis due to the insurer's wrongful denial of the duty to defend.

The appellant, a sales representative, breached its fiduciary duty to the respondent manufacturer by failing to disclose an equity interest in a customer.

The respondent terminated the agreement upon discovering the breach two years later.

The trial judge declared that the respondent owed no further commissions to the appellant, finding that the respondent would have terminated the agreement earlier had it known of the breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld this equitable remedy, preventing the appellant from profiting from its non-disclosure.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, finding that the appellant's conduct, while a serious breach, was not reprehensible enough to justify costs on a solicitor and client scale.

The respondents sought leave under s. 246 of the Business Corporations Act to commence a derivative action.

The appellants, who were the intended defendants in the proposed action, moved to intervene in the leave application.

The motions judge dismissed the motion to intervene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 246 permits the proceeding to be brought by application rather than motion, and that the motions judge did not err in exercising his discretion to deny intervention, as the intended defendants' rights would be fully protected once the action was commenced.

The appellant challenged an order striking its amended statement of claim alleging that brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and a related generic seller marketed pseudo-generic drugs through misleading origin representations and anti-competitive pricing practices.

The Court of Appeal held that the pleading could support a claim under s. 52 of the Competition Act, as well as related tort claims for unlawful interference with economic relations and conspiracy, because the alleged false statement of origin could have been made to promote a business interest and in a material respect.

The court agreed, however, that the double ticketing claim under s. 54 of the Competition Act and the Business Practices Act allegations were not viable on the pleaded facts.

The court also held that it was not plain and obvious that the Food and Drugs Act claim against the generic seller must fail.

The appeal was allowed in part with costs to the appellant.

The appellant oral surgeon appealed a trial judgment enforcing a handwritten non-competition clause that barred him from practising within five miles of the respondent's office for three years after leaving an associate position.

The Court of Appeal held that although the respondent had some proprietary interest in regular referring dentists, this was not an exceptional employment case justifying a broad non-competition covenant.

Applying the governing framework for restrictive covenants in employment contracts, the court emphasized that non-competition clauses will generally not be enforced where a non-solicitation clause would adequately protect the employer's legitimate interests.

The appellant's role was that of a junior associate, he did not personify the practice, and no confidential information or trade secrets justified the broader restraint.

The appeal was allowed, the action dismissed, and costs awarded to the appellant.

The appellant appealed an order striking part of its statement of claim that sought a declaration that the respondent airport authority lacked jurisdiction to impose fees and charges on airport users.

The court held it was unnecessary to resolve the pleaded delegation and Crown-operation issues because the respondent's authority arose from its leasehold interest and corporate capacity, as recognized by the applicable federal legislation and regulations.

The court further held Parliament did not intend to create a complete code restricting airport user charges to those set by ministerial regulation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondents sought to bring a class action on behalf of all purchasers of 1971 and 1972 Firenza motor vehicles in Ontario, claiming damages for breach of warranty.

The appellant applied to strike out the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action under Rule 75 of the Ontario Rules of Practice.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the action could not proceed as a class action because the members of the proposed class did not have the 'same interest' within the meaning of Rule 75, given the varying contractual arrangements and the need for individual damage assessments.

The appeal was allowed and the action was directed to proceed as a joined action by the named plaintiffs.