Robert P. Armstrong

The appellant commercial landlord appealed a decision allowing the respondent tenant to deduct hydro payments from its gross rent.

The lease contained a general clause stating gross rent included utilities, but a specific clause required the tenant to pay hydro directly to the utility company.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, applying the principle that specific provisions qualify general ones.

The court found the specific requirement to pay hydro directly meant it was not an expense to be paid by the landlord and passed on as part of gross rent, and the tenant was not entitled to deduct these payments.

The plaintiff was injured in a car accident by an unidentified driver and claimed the $200,000 policy limit under his unidentified driver coverage with the defendant insurer.

The plaintiff also received $102,400 in disability benefits from a private disability policy.

The defendant insurer sought to deduct the disability benefits from the $200,000 limit pursuant to s. 2(1)(b) of O. Reg. 676.

The motion judge held the deduction was not permitted due to the common law private insurance exception to the rule against double recovery.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the regulation abrogated the common law exception and the insurer was entitled to deduct the disability payments.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment which found that money received from the deceased was not a gift and that the storage of property at an abandoned school did not constitute a bailment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's conclusions were well-supported by the record, and awarded costs of $7,000 to the respondents.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action by the trial judge.

The trial judge had dismissed the action due to a pattern of non-compliance with two different court orders over more than a year, which prevented the scheduled trial from proceeding.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to interfere with the trial judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant appealed an order regarding whether he was acting qua councillor in a suit brought against him by electors concerning his election expenses, and whether a City Council resolution to pay his legal fees was ultra vires.

The Court of Appeal agreed entirely with the motion judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $5,000 to the respondent.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual touching of his teenage stepdaughters and appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in denying a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that a conditional sentence was inappropriate due to the appellant's lack of sincere remorse and failure to take responsibility.

The court held the sentence was within the appropriate range given the seriousness of the offences.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing their claim that the respondent's mortgage amounted to a fraudulent conveyance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no evidentiary foundation capable of supporting an inference of fraud.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of s. 267(1) of the Railways Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's determination that maintenance is a necessary part of the operation of a subway system.

Costs of $1,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants, a Michigan law firm and one of its members, appealed an order finding that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had jurisdiction over the claims against them and that Ontario was the forum conveniens.

The plaintiffs, an Ontario transportation company and its president, sued the appellants for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from their representation in a Michigan action.

The Court of Appeal applied the Muscutt factors and upheld the motions judge's finding of a real and substantial connection to Ontario, emphasizing the multiplicity of parties and the risk of inconsistent findings.

The Court also upheld the finding that Michigan was not clearly the more appropriate forum, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of the first-degree murder of a three-and-a-half-year-old child.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt, the assessment of evidence, and consciousness of guilt based on post-offence statements to the police.

The Court of Appeal found that the reasonable doubt instruction substantially complied with the law, the jury was properly instructed to consider all evidence, and any shortcomings in the consciousness of guilt instruction did not prejudice the appellant given the overwhelming DNA and forensic evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a sexual offence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence regarding whether she yelled during the incident.

The trial judge also failed to adequately address the complainant's prior inconsistent statement made under oath to the police, in which she denied any sexual activity.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully reviewed all appropriate factors and the sentence was not manifestly unfit nor did it reflect any error in principle.

The court noted that the appellant's rehabilitation efforts were a matter for parole authorities.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that he did not make an informed waiver of his s. 10(b) Charter rights because he was not told the details of the complainant's allegations.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's findings of fact supported the conclusion of an informed waiver, and that the appellant was not entitled to know the details of the allegations before waiving his right to counsel.

The court also found no error in the jury charge on consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondents by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge gave careful consideration to the competing interests in what was a difficult sentencing problem.

Finding no error in principle, the Court deferred to the trial judge's assessment and dismissed the appeals.

The appellant father appealed an order requiring him to pay child support in accordance with the Guidelines.

He argued that the separation agreement, which gave the mother a greater share of the matrimonial property and in which he waived spousal support, constituted 'special provisions' benefiting the children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the applications judge that parents cannot contract away a child's right to support and that there was no objective, child-centred evidence of a special benefit to the children from the separation agreement.

The father was ordered to pay costs of $4,500.

The young person appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge was not obliged to articulate a Vetrovec warning and adequately cautioned himself regarding a witness's evidence.

However, the Crown conceded the sentence was illegal.

The Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, reducing the probation period from two years to one year and varying the assault sentence to one year concurrent to correct the illegality.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the ground that the trial judge's numerous and discourteous interventions during the trial rendered it unfair.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the interventions undermined defence counsel's integrity and interfered with his ability to cross-examine police officers effectively.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants, who were self-represented at trial, appealed the trial judgment on the grounds that the trial judge failed to grant an adjournment to retain counsel and failed to warn them that evidence from the counsel table was inadmissible.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, noting the appellants never requested an adjournment and the trial judge repeatedly warned them about giving evidence from the witness box.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings regarding the payables for a group of bridal gowns and dismissed a motion to admit fresh evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,500.

The appellants appealed an order striking their counterclaim, which sought punitive damages based on an independent actionable wrong akin to defamation arising from allegations in the respondent's statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that allegations in a statement of claim are absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis of such a counterclaim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellants appealed an order granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motions judge's conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial.