Robert P. Armstrong

The Crown appealed a decision granting the respondents lawful ownership of an island by way of adverse possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's weighing of affidavit evidence or his conclusion that the respondents met the three-pronged test for possessory title.

The Court upheld the finding that the land was not vacant or wasteland, rendering section 16 of the Limitations Act inapplicable.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that denied her compound interest and refused to enforce NSF, late payment, and collection letter charges on three promissory notes.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the interest calculation method was ambiguous and that the additional charges, combined with a 25% interest rate, constituted an unconscionable penalty.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision regarding entitlement to a deposit for a condominium unit.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motions judge that the appellant's interpretation of the agreement, which would make the purchaser of an individual unit liable for the purchase price of the entire building or damages flowing from breaches between the developer and Skyline, made no commercial sense.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $15,000 to the respondents.

Following an appeal that set aside an order extending limitation periods but adjourned the issues to trial, all parties sought costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that the respondents were substantially successful because they defeated the appellants' motion for summary judgment and maintained their position that the limitation issues should be decided at trial.

The respondents were awarded costs of $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant was employed by the respondent law firm for 21 years.

She was initially given 18 months' working notice of termination due to the firm's financial difficulties.

Three weeks later, the respondent unilaterally amended the notice, dismissing her immediately with six months' pay in lieu of notice.

The trial judge found the first notice was binding but awarded only 12 months' pay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding there is no functional difference between working notice and pay in lieu of notice, and the employer was bound by the initial reasonable notice of 18 months.

The Crown appealed a decision quashing a search warrant executed at a physiotherapy clinic during an insurance fraud investigation.

The application judge had ruled that the issuing justice of the peace lacked jurisdiction because the warrant did not include special post-seizure conditions to protect the privacy of patients' medical records.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 487 of the Criminal Code adequately balances state and privacy interests.

The Court found no principled basis to engraft mandatory common law conditions onto the statutory scheme for the seizure of non-privileged medical records.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation appealed a Divisional Court decision granting a property tax exemption to a non-profit children's camp operated by the Diocese of Toronto Camps.

The camp claimed exemption under the Assessment Act as land used for 'the care of children'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the application judge's finding that the primary purpose of the camp was recreational, not the care of children.

The Court held that 'care of children' in the statutory context refers to physical aspects of care such as protection, shelter, and nourishment, which were incidental to the camp's primary recreational purpose.

The appellant defaulted on a vendor take-back mortgage, leading the respondents to sell the property under power of sale.

The respondents obtained summary judgment for the shortfall of over $1.4 million.

On appeal, the appellant argued the respondents acted improvidently by listing the property for $750,000 despite an appraisal of $395,000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant failed to provide evidence showing a higher price would have been obtained but for the alleged breach.

The appellant was arrested for impaired driving and detained in a police cell for 11 hours with virtually no contact with police officers.

He sought a stay of proceedings, arguing his s. 9 Charter right against arbitrary detention was breached.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal court judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal found that the 11-hour detention was indeed arbitrary and breached s. 9 of the Charter.

However, the Court concluded that a stay of proceedings was not the appropriate remedy, as the breach occurred post-offence and did not impact trial fairness or the gathering of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding they breached fiduciary duties owed to the respondents regarding the financing of a joint venture to construct an apartment building.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellants violated their duty of full disclosure, were in a serious conflict of interest, and made secret profits on a mortgage they set up.

The court also upheld the trial judge's calculation of the amounts owing between the parties.

The appellants were charged with cruelty to animals after a search of their property under the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act (OSPCAA) resulted in the seizure of numerous animals.

The trial judge acquitted the appellants, finding the search warrant invalid because it authorized multiple officers to enter, which she held violated the OSPCAA.

On appeal, the Summary Conviction Appeal Court applied the Interpretation Act to find that the singular wording in the OSPCAA included the plural, validating the warrant and ordering a new trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming that the Interpretation Act applied, the search was reasonable, and the presence of police officers to keep the peace did not violate the appellants' Charter rights.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claim for damages arising from future sales of EPIPEN products in France.

The motion judge had concluded that a May 10, 1993 letter was merely an agreement to agree.

The Court of Appeal found the letter ambiguous, containing both language of a contract and language suggesting a future contract, and held that its proper characterization required trial evidence regarding the parties' history, industry practice, and subsequent conduct.

The respondents' cross-appeal on alternative grounds for summary judgment was dismissed as those issues also required resolving factual and credibility disputes.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to trial.

The appellants brought a second motion for summary judgment on the eve of a scheduled five-day trial.

The motion was dismissed, and the Divisional Court dismissed the subsequent appeal.

The Court of Appeal declined to address whether a party can bring more than one motion for summary judgment or the application of res judicata, finding that the Divisional Court did not err in dismissing the appeal given the timing of the motion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed a judgment granting the respondent a discharge of a charge upon payment of $25,000 plus interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge did not err.

The Court held that the mandatory language of section 93(2) of the Land Titles Act, which requires a charge securing the payment of money to state the principal sum it secures, dictated the result.

The appellant appealed an order varying the amounts owed by the respondent under a separation agreement.

The motion judge had found a material change in circumstances based on a finding that the respondent's income had decreased to $48,000.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the $48,000 figure was demonstrably wrong and that the respondent's actual income was at least $207,000.

The Court held that this decline in income did not provide a sufficient basis for variation given the recent signing of the agreement and the cyclical nature of the respondent's real estate business.

The appellant appealed an order of Justice Hockin.

On consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without costs.

The moving party sought to set aside an order of the Chief Justice of Ontario, which had dismissed his motion to set aside a deputy registrar's order.

Ultimately, the moving party sought to re-open a summary judgment granted by the Superior Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal, alleging newly discovered evidence of fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a motion to set aside a Superior Court order based on fresh evidence of fraud, and that such a motion must be brought in the Superior Court.

The young person appealed their convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching of a person under the age of fourteen.

The convictions were based on the complainant's testimony regarding an incident during a sleepover.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in failing to consider the reliability of the complainant's testimony, noting inconsistencies in her statements and her initial belief that another child was the assailant.

The Court concluded the convictions were unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered acquittals.

The appellant insurance company appealed a decision regarding the cancellation of an insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the calculation of a premium refund.

The uncontradicted evidence showed that the insured requested the cancellation of the policy due to dissatisfaction with the broker.

The Court concluded that the entire policy, including the completed operations hazard provision, was cancelled.

The appeal was allowed and the application dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding a dispute over a duty owed by a workers' compensation representative and the commutation of a percentage of non-economic loss.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors in fact or law, and that all elements of the duty owed by the respondent were met.

Costs were fixed at $5,000.