Robert N. Beaudoin

The offender was found guilty of multiple offences including offering a bribe to an immigration officer, possession of identity information, forgery, and misrepresentation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, relating to 170 fraudulent refugee sponsorship applications.

The court rejected the application of the Kienapple principle to stay the forgery charges.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the sophisticated, profit-driven nature of the scheme and the harm to the integrity of the immigration system, the court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed a global penitentiary sentence of 45 months.

The court issued a notice to the plaintiff under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering the dismissal of the action.

The plaintiff requested and received an extension of time to respond but failed to provide written submissions.

Consequently, the court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

Intact Insurance Company brought an application seeking a declaration on the interpretation of s. 44(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS), specifically whether an insured is required to sign any consent form dictated by the insurer for a s. 44 examination.

The respondent, Anne Beaudry, argued that such consent forms must be "reasonable and justifiable." The court found that any required consent form must be "reasonable," based on the language of s. 44, the insurer's duty of utmost good faith, and the Unfair and Deceptive Practices Regulation.

The court dismissed Intact's request to unilaterally dictate consent terms, emphasizing the need for reasonableness and negotiation.

The defendant brought a requisition under Rule 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to have the plaintiff's professional negligence claim dismissed as frivolous or vexatious.

The defendant argued the claims were statute-barred and precluded by res judicata and issue estoppel.

The court declined to apply Rule 2.1, finding that the statement of claim on its face did not suggest frivolousness and that pending summary judgment motions would provide a more appropriate forum for a complete evidentiary record to address the substantive defences.

The requisition was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol level exceeding 80 mg, arguing arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter and seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The trial judge found no detention until the approved screening device demand.

The appeal court upheld this finding, concluding that the initial police interaction was a general inquiry, not a detention, and that the officer's subjective belief was not determinative.

Applying the principles from *R. v. Suberu* and *R. v. Grant*, the court found no Charter breach.

Even if a breach had occurred, the court determined that excluding the reliable breath sample evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, considering the officer's good faith and the seriousness of the offence.

The defendant sought to dismiss the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court reviewed the statement of claim and the plaintiff's submissions, finding no recognizable cause of action.

The claim, alleging the defendant failed to provide disclosure from the Bermuda Police Service, lacked essential pleadings regarding duty, breach, and resulting loss.

The court also noted the claim appeared to be statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff initiated an action claiming $300,000,000 in damages for events that occurred in Bermuda, naming multiple Bermuda residents and entities as defendants.

The Registrar's Office referred the matter to the court under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure following a request from the defendants.

The court found that the action involved events in a foreign country with foreign residents as defendants, indicating no apparent jurisdiction in Ontario.

The court determined the action might be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and consequently ordered a notice to the plaintiff regarding potential dismissal under Rule 2.1.01 and stayed the action pending a written hearing.

The defendants, Buset & Partners LLP, brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01(1) to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, Buhendwa Musole, sued the defendants for their representation of a third party in prior family and civil court proceedings, alleging they misled the court and obstructed his pursuit of "Truth and Justice." The plaintiff's underlying claims against the third party involved "violation fraud and pregnancy entrapment," which the court found lacked legal precedent.

The court, reviewing the pleadings and the plaintiff's submissions, concluded that the action was an attempt to re-litigate issues and was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The action was dismissed.

The court, on its own initiative, considered dismissing the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure for being frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

Despite notice being given to the plaintiff, no written submissions were received within the prescribed 15-day period.

Consequently, the action was dismissed.

The applicant sought immediate implementation of custody and access assessment recommendations, including a change to primary residence with the mother and alternate weekend access for the father.

The respondent opposed, arguing the recommendations were contentious and the existing shared parenting arrangement, in place for a year, should be maintained until trial.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding that the proposed changes were significant, the applicant's affidavits were problematic, and the assessor's report was contentious and required cross-examination at trial.

The court emphasized that interim implementation of assessment reports should be discouraged, especially when there are serious credibility issues and a hotly contested factual record.

The Superior Court of Justice considered a requisition under Rule 2.1.01(6) to review the plaintiff's statement of claim for being frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, M.S. (Manorama Sennek), sued the defendant lawyers for their representation of a condominium corporation in other proceedings, alleging disclosure of identity and seeking various declarations and substantial damages.

The court found insufficient factual pleading for most claims and noted the plaintiff's history of litigation, including a prior order for a mental capacity assessment in related cases.

The court ordered notice to the plaintiff regarding the potential dismissal of the action, stayed the action, and restricted further filings pending the Rule 2.1 hearing.

The parties sought costs for a motion where the applicant sought a change in exchange time for their daughter and the respondent sought leave to abridge timelines for an expert report and an increase in child support.

The court found that success on the motion was divided, as the respondent was unreasonable on the exchange time issue but the applicant should have recognized an increase in child support was inevitable.

The court declined to make an order for costs in favour of either party.

The applicants, Andrew Pierre Makoundi (a minor represented by his litigation guardian Bruno Makoundi) and Bruno Makoundi, brought a motion to annul a settlement agreement reached in December 2013.

The respondents, Lycée Claudel and its employees, opposed the annulment and sought court approval (homologation) of the settlement and dismissal of the applicants' actions.

The court dismissed the applicants' motion to annul, finding no evidence of mental incapacity, no applicability of the Charter to the private institution, and that allegations of undue influence were directed at former counsel.

The court granted the respondents' request to homologate the settlement, exercising its discretion under the Rules of Civil Procedure to dispense with certain procedural requirements (Rule 7.08 affidavits) in the interest of justice, given the applicants' conduct.

The court ordered the payment of $5,000 to the applicants' former counsel as per the settlement.

This decision addresses costs following two motions where the Bank of Montreal and Surgeson Carson Associates, Inc. (the Receiver) successfully obtained summary judgment dismissing claims by Jean-Luc Cardinal, Linda Cardinal, The Estate of Raymond Cardinal, and Ferme Lanidrac (the Borrowers), and successfully defended the Borrowers' motion to set aside a consent judgment.

The Bank and Receiver sought substantial indemnity costs, citing the complexity, importance, and unfounded allegations of fraud and abuse of process made by the Borrowers.

The Borrowers argued for partial indemnity costs, claiming shared success on a legal test and that the defendants' evidence was excessive.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the Bank ($110,000) and the Receiver ($50,000), finding the Borrowers' conduct in re-litigating settled claims and making serious, unsubstantiated allegations of dishonesty warranted higher costs, despite acknowledging minor success on a legal argument.

The Defendant's counsel requested a referral under Rule 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to consider dismissing the action.

The court declined to apply the attenuated procedures of Rule 2.1, noting that a previous judicial determination had already established an "arguable case" in the matter.

The Defendant was directed to seek other relief under appropriate provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendant brought a request under Rule 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's statement of claim, alleging it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found that despite the statement of claim leaving much to be desired, it could not be dismissed solely based on a review of the pleading, as there might be an arguable case.

The defendant's request to dismiss the proceeding was denied, and the court advised the defendant to seek other appropriate relief under the Rules.

The applicant sought to enforce a foreign Letter of Request for Judicial Assistance by requesting oral examination of a respondent's representative.

The request for oral examination was dismissed, though the respondent had previously agreed to produce documents.

The respondent sought full indemnity costs, arguing that as a stranger to the foreign litigation, it should not bear costs for successfully opposing the request.

The applicant argued for divided success and lower costs.

The court found the respondent wholly successful in opposing the oral examination and awarded full indemnity costs of $13,926.31.

This application concerned the enforcement of a Letter of Request for Judicial Assistance from a Florida court, seeking an oral examination of a representative from the National Gallery of Canada (NGC) regarding the ownership of Monet paintings by Frederic Bouin, who was involved in matrimonial litigation with the applicant.

The NGC had previously produced documents but opposed the oral examination.

The court applied a six-factor test for enforcing letters rogatory, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate that the sought-after examination evidence was relevant, necessary, or not otherwise obtainable, as Mr. Bouin himself was available for examination in the US proceedings.

Consequently, the court declined to order the oral examination.

The court issued an amended endorsement concerning the appointment of a psychologist for a family assessment under section 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.

Initially, the parties could not agree on an assessor, leading to submissions on proposed candidates.

One party alleged parental alienation and proposed a specific psychologist, while the other party alleged domestic violence and proposed a different psychologist, raising concerns about the first psychologist's potential bias due to their involvement with parental alienation concepts.

The original decision was based on information later found to be untrue.

Subsequently, the parties reached an agreement on an alternative assessor, rendering the court's prior determination on the initial choice moot.

The endorsement was amended to reflect this development and remove references to the now-moot appointment.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order from Justice Kershman, which mandated a mental capacity assessment under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The original order was prompted by concerns regarding the applicant's ability to conduct litigation, stemming from perceived bizarre behaviours related to identity, numerous complaints against opposing counsel, and disproportionate legal costs incurred by the respondent.

The applicant argued procedural errors and substantive issues, including a lack of prior notice for the motion and a failure to consider privacy expectations.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions on principles of judicial discretion and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary decision.