Richard A. Lococo

The applicant, representing indirect waterfront property owners, sought judicial review of the Town of Georgina's process for addressing ownership and use of lakeside properties along a municipal road allowance.

The applicant argued the Town unfairly denied building permits and unilaterally determined road allowance boundaries.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Town's adoption of an action plan was a work in progress and did not constitute the exercise of a statutory power subject to judicial review.

The court also declined to grant mandatory relief, noting that the ownership dispute could be more appropriately resolved through other legal processes, such as an appeal under the Building Code Act or an application under the Boundaries Act.

The applicant sought judicial review of a municipality's decision to invoice him $9,445.44 for fire department response costs after he started an open-air fire on his property.

The applicant had previously pleaded guilty to a provincial offence for violating the burning by-law and was fined $250.

He argued the invoice decision lacked procedural fairness and was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the informal process provided was procedurally fair given the emergency context and statutory scheme, and that the decision to issue the invoice was reasonable and transparent.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) that granted development charge credits to a group of developers for both work performed and cash contributions made under a Core Infrastructure Agreement.

The Divisional Court held that while the LPAT had jurisdiction to review the City's refusal to grant credits, it erred in law by treating cash contributions as 'work performed' under section 38(1) of the Development Charges Act.

The Court concluded that cash contributions are not eligible for development charge credits.

The Court also found that a complaint filed by some developers was not out of time.

The appellant appealed an order refusing his motion to change a final order regarding child support arrears.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, the self-represented respondent requested an adjournment to retain new counsel.

The appellant consented to the adjournment, noting that the parties were involved in another family law proceeding and a global mediation might resolve all issues.

The Divisional Court granted the adjournment sine die to allow the parties an opportunity to seek a global resolution.

The applicant purchased a gas station and convenience store and was subsequently served with a notice of prohibition under the Smoke-Free Ontario Act, 2017, suspending tobacco sales for six months.

The notice was based on tobacco sales convictions against the previous owner.

The applicant sought judicial review, arguing the prohibition was arbitrary and breached procedural fairness since it had no connection to the offences.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the legislation mandates an automatic prohibition upon repeat convictions at a specific location, intentionally placing the onus on prospective purchasers to conduct due diligence.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness as the Minister's duty to issue the notice was mandatory.

The appellant appealed orders of the Superior Court to the Divisional Court.

At the hearing, the court raised a preliminary question regarding its jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 19(1)(a.1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court adjourned the appeal sine die and directed the parties to provide written submissions on the jurisdictional issue and whether the appeal should be transferred to the Court of Appeal.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their request for reimbursement of a $1,695 cancellation fee charged after the respondent failed to attend a consent independent medical examination.

The motion judge had found she lacked jurisdiction to order costs for a missed appointment not scheduled by court order.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court has broad jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to order costs for missed appointments where the examination was consented to in writing.

The court ordered the respondents to pay the $1,695 missed appointment fee and $8,500 in costs.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated July 15, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

In the absence of a costs outline, costs were fixed at a reduced amount of $2,500 payable to the responding parties.

Following a six-day family law trial, both parties sought costs against the other, each claiming to be the more successful party.

The trial involved multiple issues including spousal support, imputation of income, and calculation of net family property, resulting in divided success.

The court reviewed the parties' respective offers to settle and litigation conduct.

Concluding that neither party was unequivocally more successful and that neither acted unreasonably in rejecting the other's offers, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The parties separated after a 27-year marriage.

The applicant sought a divorce, child support, spousal support, equalization, sale of the matrimonial home, and occupation rent.

The respondent sought a stay of the divorce, child support, spousal support, unequal division of net family property, and a vesting order for the matrimonial home.

The court granted the divorce, ordered the applicant to pay child support and a proportionate share of section 7 expenses, and dismissed both parties' claims for spousal support.

The court equalized the net family properties, ordering the applicant to pay $11,646.65, and ordered the sale of the matrimonial home with the net proceeds divided equally, subject to deductions from the applicant's share for amounts owed to the respondent, including a $12,000 advance on child support.

Following a motion for interim child support where the respondent father was partially successful, both parties sought costs.

The respondent sought $8,000 in partial indemnity costs, while the applicant mother sought $1,500 or that each party bear their own costs due to divided success.

The court found the respondent was the successful party but reduced the quantum due to divided success and the fact that his offer to settle was not more favourable than the result.

The respondent was awarded $3,500 in costs.

Following a nine-day family law trial involving property trust claims, equalization, and spousal support, both parties sought substantial or partial indemnity costs.

The court reviewed the trial outcomes, noting that success was divided across the various complex issues.

Neither party's offers to settle met the conditions for full indemnity costs under the Family Law Rules, nor did they significantly alter the assessment of success.

Finding no unreasonable conduct by either side, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The respondent father brought a motion for interim child support, including retroactive support for a period when he had primary care of the children after restricting the applicant mother's parenting time due to her impaired driving arrest.

The mother opposed the retroactive claim, arguing it would reward the father's unilateral self-help, and questioned his ongoing entitlement due to his fluctuating self-employment income.

The court granted retroactive support effective from the date the father gave formal notice of his claim, finding that the children should not be penalized for the father's conduct.

Ongoing offset support and proportionate sharing of section 7 expenses were also ordered based on the parties' 2021 stated incomes.

The parties separated after a short marriage.

The applicant claimed a 50 percent beneficial interest in three properties purchased in the respondent's name during the marriage, relying on resulting trust and unjust enrichment principles.

The court found the applicant had a 50 percent interest in one property (Front Street condo) based on a resulting trust, but dismissed the trust claims for the other two properties, finding that funds advanced by the respondent's parents were a gift to him alone, and funds advanced by a family friend were a loan to him alone.

The court ordered the respondent to repay loans to the applicant's parents, pay an equalization payment of $72,080.16, and pay lump-sum non-compensatory spousal support of $26,864.

The appellant father appealed a child protection order that placed his child in the extended care of the Children's Aid Society of Toronto.

He alleged that the trial judge made factual errors regarding his insight into the mother's drug abuse, his focus on the mother, the safety of his care plan, and his credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying the standard of palpable and overriding error for factual findings, dismissed the appeal.

The court found no obvious error in the trial judge's assessment of the father's credibility and the viability of his care plan, emphasizing the high degree of deference owed to trial judges in child protection proceedings where the child's best interests are paramount.

The applicant, Noel Paragua, sought to terminate his spousal support obligation to the respondent, Silva Lola, following his retirement, arguing it constituted a material change in circumstances.

He also sought extended terms for reimbursing a joint debt.

The respondent opposed, asserting the retirement was not involuntary and the applicant's income was not materially different.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion to change, finding he failed to establish a material change in circumstances, particularly that his retirement was involuntary or that his income had materially decreased.

The court also rejected arguments for reducing the applicant's income due to "double-recovery" or imputing income to the respondent.

The applicant was ordered to reimburse the respondent for his share of a joint debt with specific payment terms.

The appellant father (B.K.) appealed a final order from the Ontario Court of Justice that placed his children in the care and custody of the respondent mother (D.A.) subject to the Society's supervision.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings regarding who had pre-intervention charge of the children and the children's true wishes, and alleged misconduct by the Society and the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL).

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings of fact and mixed fact and law, emphasizing the high degree of deference owed to trial judges in child protection proceedings.

The court also dismissed the appellant's motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the required standard of being highly relevant and decisive to the children's best interests.

The appellant contractor appealed a summary judgment decision enforcing a stipulated remedy in a mediated settlement agreement.

The settlement required the appellant to remediate construction deficiencies by a deadline, failing which $30,000 held in court would be forfeited to the respondent.

The motion judge found the appellant failed to remediate the deficiencies and declined to grant relief from forfeiture.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's characterization of the clause as a forfeiture rather than a penalty, nor in her conclusion that enforcing the forfeiture was not unconscionable.

The moving party defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order and a subsequent costs order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $3,500 to the responding party plaintiff.

The statutory third party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of J. Ramsay J. dated December 23, 2021.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and directed the appellant to schedule a case conference.

No costs were ordered.