Ravin Pillay

The accused, charged with fraud over $5,000 for allegedly defrauding the government of customs duties, brought a pre-trial motion to adduce alternate suspect evidence implicating five employees.

The Crown conceded for three employees but opposed for two.

The court granted the accused's application, finding sufficient connection between the employees and the crime.

The Crown also brought a motion to admit the videotaped statement of a deceased employee.

The court dismissed the Crown's application as premature, without prejudice to renew it before the close of its case.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to import cocaine after a controlled delivery of a package containing over 3.5 kilograms of cocaine.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, misapplied the law on importing and post-offence conduct, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge made minor factual errors, they were not essential to the convictions given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence of guilt, including the appellant's possession of shipping details, phone records, and flight from police.

The three accused, charged with conspiracy to import cocaine and breach of trust, brought applications under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude intercepted private communications.

They alleged their s. 8 rights were violated because the police affiant deliberately misled the authorizing judge regarding the investigative plan to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the wiretap.

The court found the affidavit was materially misleading, though not deliberately so, and that without the misleading information, the authorization lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court concluded the wiretap violated s. 8 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the serious police carelessness and subsequent false testimony by the affiant outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The appellant was convicted of threatening death, intimidation by threats of violence, obstruction of justice, and criminal harassment arising from two separate incidents: a 2013 Family Court proceeding and a 2015 incident involving the distribution of nude photographs.

The trial judge admitted evidence of prior discreditable conduct (a 2012 similar nude photo incident) and used cross-count evidence from the Family Court incident when convicting on the criminal harassment charge.

The appellant appealed his convictions; the Crown appealed the sentence as illegal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's use of evidence.

The Crown's sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was modified from a blended custodial and conditional sentence exceeding two years to a global custodial sentence of two years less a day.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash the decision of a preliminary inquiry judge who discharged the respondent on charges of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by drawing inferences favourable to the respondent and failing to consider the evidence as a whole.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge properly applied the Shephard test and engaged in the permissible limited weighing of circumstantial evidence without choosing between competing inferences.

The accused, charged with drug importation offences, brought a pre-trial Charter application challenging five successive wiretap authorizations.

The Crown objected to his standing to challenge the first authorization, as he was not named and his communications were not intercepted under it.

The court held that the accused lacked standing to challenge the first authorization directly because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

However, the court ruled he had standing to challenge the subsequent authorizations that did intercept his communications, and in doing so, he could seek to excise information from their supporting ITOs that was allegedly obtained in violation of his co-accused's Charter rights under the first authorization.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cocaine.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence, including surveillance observations and items seized from vehicles.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in finding the only reasonable inference was guilt; (2) the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons; and (3) the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Villaroman standard for circumstantial evidence and that the verdict was supportable on a reasonable view of the evidence.

The court also allowed an appeal of sentence and set aside the victim surcharge.

The appellant was convicted of fraud in excess of $5,000 following an 11-day judge-alone trial and sentenced to three years imprisonment.

The fraud involved the negotiation of a stolen and forged TD Canada Trust bank draft in the amount of $1,895,751, which was deposited into a lawyer's trust account and used to purchase gold bars.

The appellant's role was to coordinate with an unidentified person inside the TD branch who facilitated the fraud.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

Dellen Millard was convicted of the first-degree murder of his father, Wayne Millard, his third first-degree murder conviction.

The court considered whether the mandatory 25-year parole ineligibility period for this murder should be served concurrently or consecutively to his existing 50-year parole ineligibility for two previous first-degree murders.

Applying the totality principle and considering the paramount sentencing objectives of denunciation and retribution, the court ordered the 25-year parole ineligibility period to be served consecutively, resulting in a global parole ineligibility of 75 years.

Appellants were convicted of production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a trial in Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellants appealed on grounds that evidence seized in breach of their Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, and 10(b)) should have been excluded under s. 24(2), and that the trial judge erred in procedural matters and in accepting co-accused evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the evidence of marijuana odour and a water bill should have been excluded due to a serious and deliberate s. 10(b) breach, the convictions were nonetheless supported by ample remaining evidence, including the appellants' extended presence in a sophisticated grow operation and corroborating testimony from the co-accused.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with the first degree murder of his father, who died from a gunshot wound to the eye while sleeping.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's purchase of the murder weapon, his presence near the scene at the time of death, and his fabrication of a false alibi.

The court rejected the defence theory of suicide, finding that the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence led to the inescapable conclusion that the accused planned and deliberated the intentional killing of his father.

The accused was found guilty of first degree murder.

The appellant was convicted of procuring a person to become a prostitute and exercising control, direction or influence over her movements to compel her to engage in prostitution, contrary to sections 212(1)(d) and 212(1)(h) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was acquitted of similar charges relating to a second complainant.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of two years' incarceration on each charge, to be served concurrently, with six months' credit for pre-trial custody.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment and argued the verdicts were unreasonable and inconsistent.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and that a conditional sentence should be imposed.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit expert opinion evidence on shooting scene reconstruction.

The court ruled on the admissibility of Detective Constable Grant Sutherland's expert testimony.

While evidence concerning the general operation of revolvers and the specific firearm's design and gunshot residue (GSR) dispersal was deemed admissible, the expert's opinions on the gun's position, orientation, and the likelihood of the deceased discharging the shot were excluded.

The exclusion was primarily due to concerns about the expert's methodology and demonstrated confirmation bias, indicating an unwillingness or inability to provide impartial, independent, and unbiased evidence.

Garey Harris, charged with drug trafficking and firearm offences, brought an application under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained through police search and seizure.

The court found Harris had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his condominium unit but not in the common areas or in video images of another person.

The court determined there were reasonable grounds for Harris's arrest and exigent circumstances justified the initial warrantless entry to secure the unit.

However, police remaining in the unit for approximately seven hours pending the issuance of a search warrant constituted a breach of Harris's Charter right to be free from unreasonable search.

Despite this breach and material omissions in the Information to Obtain a warrant, the court found the warrant was valid as it could have been issued even with full disclosure.

Applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court concluded that the Charter breach was not egregious, no evidence was obtained as a result of the breach, and the evidence was highly reliable and vital to the serious charges.

Therefore, admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and the application to exclude the evidence was denied.

Dellen Millard, charged with first-degree murder of his father, Wayne Millard, elected trial by judge alone.

The Crown sought to introduce a photograph from the accused's online gaming profile, depicting him with a bloody eye wound, posted two weeks before his father's death by a gunshot wound to the eye.

The Crown argued its relevance to whether the death was suicide or homicide, suggesting it indicated a contemplation of murder or an improbable reaction if it were suicide.

The defence opposed, arguing irrelevance or excessive prejudice.

The court ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding it not relevant and material, as the Crown's reasoning was speculative propensity reasoning rather than logical inference.

Even if relevant, its minimal probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The accused was charged with perjury for allegedly falsely testifying during a previous trial that he did not speak to a co-accused in a courthouse washroom.

The Crown relied on the eyewitness identification evidence of two jurors from the previous trial.

The court found significant frailties in the eyewitness identification evidence, including the fleeting nature of the observation, cross-racial identification issues, and inconsistencies.

The court also found that the statutory corroboration requirement under s. 133 of the Criminal Code was not met.

The accused was found not guilty.

The Crown sought an order vacating the appellant's bail pending appeal and detaining him in custody.

The appellant had been convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and production of marijuana, and was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment and two years' probation.

While on bail pending appeal, the appellant was arrested on charges of sexual assault and forcible confinement.

The Court of Appeal addressed the jurisdiction to revoke appeal bail when an appellant remains out of custody and determined that while the court cannot directly revoke bail in such circumstances, it may issue an arrest warrant under the Criminal Code provisions governing bail violations and new indictable offences committed while on release.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

He argued the trial judge made several errors, including shifting the burden of proof on a section 8 Charter application, misapprehending evidence regarding the officer's grounds for the demand, misapplying the W.(D.) test for credibility, relying on hearsay, and failing to prove he operated a vehicle within the preceding three hours.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors, properly assessed credibility, and reasonably concluded that the officer had the requisite grounds to make the demand.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit various pieces of circumstantial evidence, including firearms purchases, text messages, and statements made by the accused.

The court applied the test of balancing probative value against prejudicial effect.

The court ruled that evidence of a handgun purchase shortly before the victim's disappearance was highly probative of intent and planning and thus admissible.

However, evidence of other firearms purchases and certain highly prejudicial text messages referring to other criminal activities were excluded or ordered to be edited.

Evidence of the financial relationship between the co-accused was deemed admissible to show the nature of their relationship.

The Crown brought pre-trial motions to admit similar fact evidence and discreditable conduct evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior murder conviction involving the disposal of remains in an incinerator, as well as prior criminal acts, text messages, and rap lyrics.

The court dismissed the similar fact motion, finding the moral prejudice of introducing a prior murder outweighed its probative value.

The court also excluded most of the discreditable conduct evidence, but allowed an edited calendar entry and the first verse of a rap song that had a strong circumstantial link to the alleged disposal of the victim's body.