Paul S. Rouleau

The appellants, representing members of a church congregation who voted to leave the Anglican Diocese of Huron due to theological differences, appealed a trial decision declaring that the diocese held the church property and a charitable foundation in trust for the static parish, not the departing members.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that 'parish' refers to a static entity that continues in perpetuity regardless of changes in membership, and that the departing members could not take the property with them.

The Court also allowed the diocese's cross-appeal on costs, finding that the costs judge erred in ordering each party to bear its own costs to promote harmony, and awarded $100,000 in costs to the diocese.

The appellant law firm acted for the purchaser in a commercial real estate transaction.

After closing, the purchaser discovered a 0.3 metre reserve on the property that required a significant cost recovery payment to the municipality for road access.

The purchaser successfully sued the law firm for negligence.

On appeal, the law firm challenged the negligence finding and the dismissal of its cross-claim against the vendor for contribution and indemnity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the law firm failed to properly investigate the access issues raised by the reserve, and that the vendor had no legal or equitable obligation to disclose the unregistered cost recovery agreement.

The appellants sought to certify a class action against the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation on behalf of problem gamblers who had signed self-exclusion forms but were subsequently permitted to enter gambling venues and suffered losses.

The action alleged breach of contract, negligence, and occupiers' liability.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' decisions denying certification, finding that the claims required highly individualized inquiries into each class member's vulnerability, gambling history, and personal autonomy.

The court concluded that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure as the common issues would not significantly advance the litigation.

The applicant, whose extradition was requested by the United States, consented to committal but resisted surrender, arguing it would violate his s. 7 Charter rights because he risked being killed in U.S. custody in retaliation for cooperating with law enforcement.

After the Minister ordered his surrender, the applicant sought judicial review and brought a motion to seal the court record and hold the hearing in camera to protect his informer privilege.

Media intervenors argued for greater disclosure.

The court found the applicant qualified as a confidential informer and ordered the record redacted to omit information tending to reveal his identity.

The hearing was directed to proceed in public to the greatest extent possible, with in camera portions only where necessary.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for three home invasions involving robbery and sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding his risk of recidivism and amenability to treatment, and erred by applying the pre-July 2008 Criminal Code sentencing regime.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of the expert evidence, which supported a high risk of violent or sexual recidivism.

The court also held that applying the new regime would not have changed the outcome, as the appellant met neither the test for a long-term offender designation nor a determinate sentence.

The application to admit fresh evidence was also denied.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and threatening death, as well as his sentence and designation as a long term offender.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting and instructing the jury on bad character evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence was necessary narrative and largely elicited by the defence.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal due to a procedural fairness error where the trial judge denied submissions on whether the offences constituted serious personal injury offences.

However, the Court found the offences met the statutory definition and imposed the same sentence, adjusting the community supervision order to reflect time already served.

The appellant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences following a home invasion.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting in-dock identification evidence and in failing to adequately warn the jury about the frailties of eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the in-dock identification was properly admitted and the trial judge's instructions on the frailties of the identification evidence were strong, unequivocal, and adequate.

The appellant college appealed a trial judgment finding it negligently misrepresented the benefits of its graduate international business management program in its course calendar, breaching the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that a special relationship existed giving rise to a duty of care, that students are 'consumers' under the CPA, and that proof of individual reliance is not required to establish an unfair practice under the CPA.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking a person and receiving a financial benefit, arguing the trial judge failed to give an appropriate Vetrovec warning regarding the complainant and failed to adequately identify the defence's position in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's Vetrovec warning functionally sufficient and noting that the trial judge had properly incorporated the defence's written position into the charge.

The applicant, a self-represented litigant, moved to set aside an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal that dismissed her motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision.

The underlying action involved a personal injury claim arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant also sought to compel the production of an article used by an expert at trial and to set aside the Divisional Court's costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no error in the single judge's discretionary ruling that the proposed appeal raised issues of significance only to the parties.

The court also held that the production request should have been made at trial and found no reversible error in the costs award.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her appeal from a trial decision making her child a Crown ward.

She argued the appeal judge erred in applying s. 57(4) of the Child and Family Services Act by failing to properly consider fresh evidence of community members willing to care for the child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the appeal judge that the fresh evidence did not present an actual plan of care, though it noted positive developments regarding a relative's new plan of care.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion to set aside a chambers judge's decision dismissing her motion for leave to extend time to file a notice of appeal.

The appellant argued the chambers judge misapplied the test for extending time by failing to consider prejudice to the appellant and the justice of the case.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the chambers judge properly applied the test and that the proposed fresh evidence did not meet the test for admission.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the motion, emphasizing the need to view the test through a mental health lens for self-represented litigants with mental health issues.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her detention in a secure forensic unit at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The amicus curiae argued the Board erred by not permitting community living and failing to consider the least onerous disposition under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition reasonable given the appellant's recent decompensation and significant risk to public safety, and noting the order allowed for transfer to a general unit upon clinical improvement.

The appellant, a former federal cabinet minister, sued the prime minister, his staff, and other officials for defamation, conspiracy, and other torts after she was removed from Cabinet and the Conservative Party caucus amid allegations of misconduct.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim, finding the claims non-justiciable due to Crown prerogative and parliamentary privilege, and that the alleged defamatory statements were either not capable of being defamatory or were protected by absolute privilege.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the claims against all defendants except one Member of Parliament, finding her public statements had a possible defamatory meaning that should be determined at trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences involving a 12-year-old complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) test, assessing credibility, and relying on demeanour evidence.

He also argued the trial judge failed to give credit for his restrictive bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and demeanour.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge appropriately treated the restrictive bail conditions as a mitigating factor in the global sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, assault, assault with a weapon, unlawful confinement, and weapons dangerous arising from an incident in a crack house.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence, and rendered inconsistent verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons met the required threshold, adequately addressed credibility, and demonstrated a careful consideration of the evidence for each count.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence and improperly drew an adverse inference from his right to silence upon arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were well-reasoned and that the trial judge permissibly considered the inconsistency between the appellant's statement to police and his trial testimony.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of 26 pounds of raw marijuana found in the trunk of his car.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and search based on an officer smelling raw marijuana, and that the trial judge failed to reconcile conflicting officer testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in relying on the smell evidence to establish grounds for arrest.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in rejecting a conditional sentence given the appellant's antecedents and the quantity of marijuana.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was firmly rooted in the evidence, reasonable, untainted by legal error, and did not constitute a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault.

At trial, he argued the complainant consented, relying on evidence from the complainant's former common law spouse.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, characterizing the issue as mistaken belief in consent and failing to address the spouse's evidence.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the courts below fundamentally misunderstood the defence advanced and failed to consider critical evidence, rendering the reasons inadequate for appellate review.