Paul S. Rouleau

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, seeking an absolute discharge or, alternatively, permission to live in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

The court rejected the argument that there was a treatment impasse, noting that the diagnosis had been clarified and the treatment team was trying different approaches.

The appellants sued the respondent for breach of contract, defamation, negligence, and injurious falsehood, alleging that their business proposal on a reality television show was edited to misrepresent its merits.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action on the basis that the appellant had signed a comprehensive release.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the release gave the respondent sole discretion to edit the recording and barred the claims, and that there was no independent duty of good faith that could alter the express terms of the contract.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for sexual assault, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing his detention in a hospital.

The appellant argued he did not suffer from a mental illness and that the Board's reasons were insufficient to establish he posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of mental illness but agreed the Board's reasons were insufficient, particularly regarding its reliance on uncorroborated hearsay evidence and its failure to explain why the threat was deemed 'significant' despite contrary psychiatric evidence.

The matter was remitted to the Board for a new hearing.

The young person appealed a sentence of 12 months' closed custody and supervision followed by 12 months' probation for sexual interference.

The appellant, who had intellectual limitations and a high risk to re-offend, argued the trial judge erred by denying pre-sentence custody credit and imposing a sentence focused on incapacitation contrary to the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding this was an exceptional case where denying pre-sentence credit was justified, and the sentence appropriately prioritized rehabilitation and accountability in a highly structured setting.

The appellant police officer sued the respondent police association for breach of its duty of fair representation.

The motion judge struck the claim for want of jurisdiction, finding that such claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was bound by its previous decision in Renaud v. LaSalle (Town of) Police Assn., which established that an arbitrator appointed under the Police Services Act has exclusive jurisdiction over these disputes.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her detention in a minimum security facility.

She sought an absolute discharge or unsupervised community access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant posed a danger to the public and that the disposition was the least onerous and least restrictive option.

Fresh evidence regarding the appellant's absence without leave and refusal to take medication was admitted but ultimately supported the Board's decision.

The self-represented appellant applied under section 683 of the Criminal Code for an order to examine witnesses to adduce fresh evidence on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence was irrelevant, redundant, or mere speculation given the undisputed fact at trial that child pornography was found on the appellant's computer.

The proposed examinations did not meet the reasonable possibility test for fresh evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and erred in assessing witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual findings regarding the physical abuse of the children were fully supported by the record.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her motion to set aside a judgment from an undefended matrimonial trial.

The appellant's pleadings had been struck due to her continuing contempt of court orders requiring financial disclosure.

The Court of Appeal found that the respondent was entitled to proceed with the undefended trial because the appellant failed to purge her contempt or reinstate her pleadings by the court-ordered deadline.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant challenged a summary judgment dismissing its claim for alleged breaches of non-competition and non-solicitation obligations by former employees and a competing entity.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidentiary record advanced by the appellant consisted of bald allegations and a small number of suspicious incidents that were fully explained by the respondents.

Because the appellant did not cross-examine or otherwise meaningfully challenge those explanations, there were no genuine issues requiring a trial.

The court held the full appreciation test was satisfied without a trial and dismissed the appeal, with fixed costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed his conviction, seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to admit fresh evidence, finding it lacked potential cogency and was available at trial.

The Court upheld the conviction, concluding that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient and the trial judge did not err in giving substantial weight to the false alibi evidence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing that the majority of the Board misapprehended the expert evidence of a doctor.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of the evidence and held that the Board's decision was reasonable.

Giving deference to the Board's analysis, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant municipality appealed the dismissal of its motion for summary judgment, which sought to dismiss the respondent's claim for $8.9 million in unfunded transit liabilities as statute-barred.

The dispute arose from a by-law transferring transit responsibilities from the appellant to the respondent, which required the parties to negotiate the allocation of unfunded liabilities.

The Court of Appeal held that the limitation period did not begin to run until the appellant's municipal council passed a formal resolution denying responsibility and refusing to arbitrate, as the by-law imposed an ongoing obligation to negotiate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision finding he had no standing.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the appellant was not bound by the Site Plan Agreement, a conclusion also agreed to by the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $8,000.

The appellants appealed an order that included a final declaration regarding the applicability of the Repair and Storage Liens Act, which was made during an interlocutory motion.

The Court of Appeal found that the declaration was not intended to be a final determination and deprived the appellants of a substantive defence at a preliminary stage.

Despite procedural errors by the appellants, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the declaration in the interest of justice, but awarded costs of the appeal to the respondent.

The appellant employee appealed a trial judge's finding that his employer had just cause to dismiss him.

The employee had consumed four beers, driven a company vehicle without authorization, crashed it, and subsequently pled guilty to driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 milligrams.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that this constituted serious misconduct warranting dismissal despite a previously unblemished employment record.

The appellant purchaser appealed the dismissal of her application for the return of a $100,000 deposit after a real estate transaction failed to close.

The purchaser had discovered an open building permit, but the application judge found this requisition could be satisfied by title insurance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the vendors were ready to close and the purchaser's failure to respond to the vendor's proposal regarding title insurance caused the transaction to fail.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order granting a permanent injunction that restrained them from dumping fill or altering the grade of their property.

They argued the application judge erred in finding their activity was not a 'normal farm practice' and in not deferring to the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge's factual findings were supported by ample evidence and that he had jurisdiction to grant the injunction since neither party had applied to the Board.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim, which was found to be commenced outside the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

He argued the motions judge erred by not finding the limitation period was tolled due to fraudulent concealment by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that there was no basis in the evidence for the fraudulent concealment claim, as the lack of disclosure was immaterial and the appellant was a party to the telephone call he alleged was concealed.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving and provided two breath samples.

The trial judge found a breach of the accused's right to counsel before the first sample and excluded both samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal.

The summary conviction appeal court affirmed the decision, holding that all evidence obtained after the initial breach was tainted.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the lower courts erred by failing to consider whether the accused's consultation with counsel before the second sample constituted a 'fresh start' that severed the nexus between the breach and the second sample, and by failing to conduct a discrete s. 24(2) analysis for the second sample.