G. Paul Renwick

Following a five-day trial, the offender was convicted of possessing, accessing, and attempting to distribute child pornography, as well as obstructing police by making a false statement.

The court stayed the accessing charge due to the Kienapple principle.

The offender possessed 5,602 images and six videos of child pornography, described by investigating officers as among the largest, most varied, and most vile collections encountered.

The court imposed a three-year penitentiary sentence, balancing the extreme nature of the offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence against the offender's status as a first offender with significant medical disabilities and likely deportation consequences.

The defendant was charged with one count of assault and one count of mischief under $5,000.

The trial involved testimony from the complainant and the defendant, as well as photographic evidence.

The central issues were whether the Crown proved the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, the credibility of the witnesses, and whether self-defence applied.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and rejected the defendant's account as implausible and inconsistent.

The court determined that the defendant unlawfully assaulted the complainant by grabbing her neck and subsequently damaged her cell phone.

The defendant was found guilty on both counts.

The applicant sought disclosure of school counselling records and Children's Aid Society records created following allegations of sexual assault made by a complainant.

The applicant argued the records were likely relevant to credibility and to establishing potential motive to fabricate.

The court applied the two-stage test under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code.

While the court found the likely relevance threshold was met for the school counselling records, it determined that the best interests of justice test was not satisfied due to the availability of alternative sources of evidence and the high privacy interest in therapeutic records.

However, the court ordered production of the child welfare agency records for judicial review, finding a diminished expectation of privacy in those records and that they were not created in the context of a therapeutic relationship.

The Crown charged two defendants with breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The case involved circumstantial evidence of identity, including BlackBerry Messenger communications recovered from the deceased intruder's phone.

The court admitted hearsay evidence under the present intentions exception and the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

The Crown established that the defendants were members of a conspiracy to commit the break-in through analysis of cryptic text messages, DNA evidence, and circumstantial connections.

Both defendants were convicted.

The applicant sought exclusion of breath sample evidence on the basis of alleged violations of his Charter rights under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The applicant was charged with having an excess blood alcohol concentration while driving after crashing into a tractor trailer on Highway 401.

The court found that while the applicant's section 7 and 8/9 Charter arguments failed, the applicant's section 10(b) right to counsel was violated.

Specifically, the police failed to facilitate the applicant's request to contact a police officer friend who could assist in locating counsel, and the police provided an incomplete explanation of the right to counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol concentration (over 80).

The Crown alleged the defendant was found lying in the roadway at 4:16 a.m., subsequently entered his vehicle which was running, and exhibited signs of impairment.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and the admissibility of breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found the arrest was lawful based on reasonable and probable grounds, any Charter violations were technical and cured, and the Crown proved both charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol concentration.

The Crown's case was straightforward with three police witnesses and breath sample evidence.

The defendant, self-represented and not an anglophone, raised a Charter application alleging a breach of his s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The trial judge found that although the defendant appeared to understand his rights and declined counsel, the police were aware of language difficulties but failed to ensure the defendant understood his rights in a meaningful and comprehensible manner.

The application was granted, finding a Charter violation.

The defendant was charged with failing to provide a roadside breath sample into an approved screening device (ASD) at a R.I.D.E. spot-check.

The defendant claimed he was unable to provide the sample due to panic attacks that had remained undiagnosed until after the charge was laid.

The Crown proved the actus reus and mens rea of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant's defence of reasonable excuse failed because medical evidence did not establish any respiratory impairment, and mere physical discomfort does not constitute a reasonable excuse under the law.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with one count of criminal harassment for repeatedly communicating with the complainant, causing her to reasonably fear for her safety.

The Crown called several witnesses, including the complainant.

The defendant testified on his own behalf.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and truthful, while rejecting the defendant's testimony as incredible and unsupported.

The defendant made unwanted sexual remarks, insisted on providing contact information despite being asked not to, and returned to the complainant's workplace multiple times without legitimate commercial purpose.

The court found that the defendant recklessly persisted in his conduct without regard for the complainant's obvious rejection and distress.

The defendant was found guilty as charged.

The defendant brought a Charter application to exclude a loaded prohibited firearm and ammunition from trial, alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of a traffic stop, arrest, and vehicle search conducted by Constable Corona of the Peel Regional Police.

The court found that the initial detention was arbitrary, the arrest was unlawful, the search was unreasonable, and the defendant's right to counsel was violated.

The court excluded the firearm evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that all three Grant factors favored exclusion.

The defendant brought an application for disclosure of statements, witness accounts, and video evidence relating to a public complaint of unlawful detention and excessive use of force filed against the main prosecution witness, Constable Darrell Corona, arising from an unrelated incident occurring two months after the defendant's alleged offence.

The defendant sought this material to demonstrate a pattern of police misconduct, to cross-examine the officer, and to support a Charter application.

The Crown and police opposed the application, arguing the material constituted third-party records subject to privacy protections and that no proper third-party disclosure application had been filed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown had satisfied its first-party disclosure obligations by providing the charges, a summary, and the hearing date, and that the investigative materials sought fell outside the scope of mandatory first-party disclosure.

The defendant was charged with accessing, possessing, and attempting to distribute child pornography, as well as obstructing police by giving a false statement.

The charges stemmed from an investigation following an attempt to distribute child pornography via email to a recipient in the United States, execution of a search warrant at the defendant's residence, and discovery of child pornography on two cellular telephones seized from the defendant's bedroom.

The defendant claimed that a friend named Chris had used the phones without his knowledge.

The court found the defendant guilty of all four offences after determining that the defendant's testimony was not credible, that he had knowledge of and control over the child pornography, and that he deliberately misled police to obstruct the investigation.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop in a parking lot.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results.

The defendant, self-represented, raised a Charter breach under section 10(b) regarding the right to counsel.

The court found that the defendant had clearly requested to speak to his counsel of choice, Reid Rusonik of the Reid Pinkofsky firm, but the officer failed to adequately facilitate this request.

Although the defendant eventually spoke to duty counsel, the officer's failure to make reasonable efforts to contact the defendant's counsel of choice constituted a serious Charter violation.

The court excluded the breath test evidence as a remedy and acquitted the defendant.

At a preliminary hearing, the Crown sought committal of two defendants on various charges arising from a shooting investigation and subsequent search warrants.

The Crown did not seek committal of D.H. on the shooting or drugs charges, and D.H. conceded committal on a firearm charge.

The central issue was whether R.W. should be committed to stand trial for possession of drugs and proceeds of crime found in her apartment.

The justice found sufficient evidence to commit R.W. on counts for possession of marijuana, possession of methamphetamine for trafficking, and possession of heroin for trafficking, but discharged her on the proceeds of crime count.

The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The charges arose from a traffic stop initiated for an expired validation sticker, during which police claimed to smell marijuana and subsequently searched the vehicle, discovering packaged drugs.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of evidence based on alleged breaches of Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b)).

The court found that the police officers' testimony was unreliable due to significant discrepancies regarding timing and sequence of events, contradictions between the two officers' accounts, and inconsistencies with independent dispatch records.

The court determined that there were no objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and search, and that the defendant's right to counsel was breached.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration following a multi-vehicle collision.

The Crown alleged the defendant caused a chain-reaction rear-end collision involving four vehicles.

The central issue was whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the driver of the vehicle involved in the collision.

The court found that while the defendant was present at the scene and possessed a key to the vehicle, the identification evidence was weak due to its generality, cross-racial nature, and discrepancies in the witness's description of the driver's age.

The court concluded that the evidence fell short of the requisite standard of proof and acquitted the defendant.

The Crown applied for an order permitting witnesses residing outside Ontario to testify via video link in a sexual assault trial arising from an alleged incident on an international flight.

The defendant opposed the application, arguing it would be unfair to require him to attend in person while allowing prosecution witnesses to testify remotely.

The court granted the application for a secondary witness and an American witness but dismissed it for the complainant, finding insufficient evidence regarding technology quality and witness inconvenience, and concerns about the appearance of fairness given the defendant's out-of-province residence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a traffic stop.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging that the police failed to make an approved screening device demand forthwith after forming reasonable suspicion, contrary to s. 254(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, and that the delay infringed ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found several unexplained delays in the investigation and concluded that the officer did not act promptly, rendering the seizure of the roadside breath sample unconstitutional and requiring exclusion of the Certificate of Analysis.

The court further held that, even absent the Charter breach, the accused’s “last drink” defence supported by corroborating testimony and expert toxicology evidence raised a reasonable doubt about the accused’s blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while having an excess blood alcohol concentration.

He brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant abandoned the section 8 argument during the hearing.

The sole issue was whether police failed to facilitate the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b).

The court found that although the investigating officer was credible and his conduct was unimpeachable, the defendant established a breach of his section 10(b) Charter rights by requesting to contact his wife to arrange for specialized counsel.

The breath testing results were excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, and the charge was dismissed.

A 67-year-old first-time offender was sentenced for importing approximately 11-14 kilograms of cannabis hashish into Canada as a drug courier.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of two to three years, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence based on the offender's age, health, prior good character, and remorse.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day in the community followed by 18 months of probation, finding that while denunciation and deterrence were paramount, the offender's age and serious health conditions warranted a community-based sentence.

The court emphasized the seriousness of drug importation and the violation of national border security.