ODC 2022

The self-represented appellant appealed an application judge's order enforcing an arbitral award that expelled him from the respondent union.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 considering dismissing the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that it lacked jurisdiction, as appeals under the Arbitration Act lie to the Court of Appeal.

Furthermore, the appeal constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the underlying arbitral award, which the appellant had failed to challenge within the statutory timeframe.

The appeal was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

The appellant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order evicting him as an unauthorized occupant.

He argued he was denied procedural fairness when the Board refused an adjournment, denied his request for human rights accommodation, and removed him from the virtual hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was the author of his own misfortune due to his disruptive behaviour and refusal to follow the adjudicator's directions.

The Court also found no errors of law in the Board's determination that the appellant was an unauthorized occupant rather than a tenant.

The appellants brought a motion in writing to amend a previous decision of the Divisional Court, which had allowed their appeal but did not award costs of the underlying action due to a misunderstanding that they were not sought.

As no order had yet been issued or entered, the court remained seized under Rule 59.06(2)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court granted the motion, finding that the appellants were entitled to costs of the action based on their successful appeal, and awarded $25,000 in costs.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating his tenancy on the basis that he did not receive notice of the hearing.

The matter had previously been adjourned sine die on consent pending criminal charges.

The Divisional Court found that the tenant did not receive notice of the reconvened hearing, noting his prompt action upon learning of the decision and his prior attendance.

The appeal was allowed, the termination order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a rehearing.

The applicant sought judicial review of four Licence Appeal Tribunal decisions that denied his appeals and reconsideration requests regarding the impoundment of his vehicle.

The vehicle was impounded twice after the applicant drove while his license was suspended for impaired driving convictions.

The Divisional Court found no procedural unfairness and held that the Tribunal's decisions, including its findings on exceptional hardship and the non-retroactive effect of a criminal driving prohibition stay, were reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order requiring her to reimburse the respondent for half of a child support overpayment.

The motion judge had found both parties at fault for the overpayment and split the responsibility equally.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's decision.

The defendants appealed a decision certifying a class action for intrusion upon seclusion.

The claim arose after a hospital nurse improperly accessed thousands of patient records to steal narcotics from an automated dispensing unit.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the certification order, finding that the nurse's fleeting access to limited health information for the sole purpose of stealing drugs did not meet the 'highly offensive' threshold required for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.

The applicants sought an order in the nature of mandamus to compel the Chief Medical Officer of Health to halt the pediatric COVID-19 vaccination program in Ontario.

The respondent moved to quash the application for judicial review.

The court granted the motion to quash, finding it plain and obvious that the application could not succeed because the Chief Medical Officer of Health's authority to issue directives is discretionary and conditional on forming specific opinions, which were not pleaded.

The court also found that the applicants lacked public interest standing.

York University and York University Development Corporation (YUDC) sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decision denying their request for reconsideration of an order requiring the production of certain records.

The applicants argued the Adjudicator erred in finding the records were under the control of York University pursuant to s. 10(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and in her approach to the reconsideration threshold.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the Adjudicator reasonably applied the two-part control test from National Defence and reasonably placed the onus on the applicants to establish grounds for reconsideration.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Minister's Designee decision upholding a plugging order that required him to plug 11 inactive oil and gas wells.

The applicant argued he was not an 'operator' under the Oil, Gas and Salt Resources Act, that the corporate veil should not have been pierced, and that the regulatory obligations were extinguished by bankruptcy proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it was reasonable for the Designee to conclude the applicant had management and control of the wells, to pierce the corporate veil to enforce environmental remediation, and to determine the non-monetary regulatory order was not a provable claim in bankruptcy.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding them jointly and severally liable for $11,250 based on unjust enrichment after allegedly failing to deliver money to the respondent's relatives in Egypt.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the Deputy Judge's reasons were insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review because they failed to explain why contradictory evidence was resolved in the respondent's favour.

The court also found the Deputy Judge erred in law by admitting a bank document obtained through bribery without ensuring compliance with the rules of evidence, and made a palpable and overriding error by misapprehending the contents of a translated Egyptian police report.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award finding it had violated a collective agreement by ceasing to produce engine blocks at its Windsor plant.

The arbitrator had interpreted a 'sole source' clause in a Memorandum of Settlement, concluding the employer could not move the work simply because production volumes fell below projections.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the arbitrator's interpretation was reasonable, properly considered the context of the negotiations, and did not violate the parol evidence rule.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to appeal the orders of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondents fixed at $2,000.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order dated December 20, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to one responding party on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $5,000.

No costs were awarded to the other responding parties as no factum was filed.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of the motion judge.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and awarded costs of $2,500 to the moving parties.

The proposed appellant brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal concerning a pleading amendment, but granted leave to appeal concerning privilege and the real estate solicitor's file.

As success was divided, no costs were awarded.

The self-represented moving party requested a short adjournment of his motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal due to technical challenges, illness, and the need to cross-examine a responding witness.

The Ontario Land Tribunal and the City of Toronto took no position, while the respondent developer opposed the request.

The court granted the adjournment on peremptory terms, setting a schedule for cross-examination and the filing of materials.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their statement of defence without leave to amend.

The underlying action sought to enforce costs awards against the appellants.

The Associate Justice struck the defence after finding the appellants had flouted multiple peremptory court orders and a 'last chance' order regarding discovery and case management steps.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or palpable and overriding error in the Associate Justice's exercise of discretion to strike the pleading due to contumelious disregard for court orders.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that awarded her only $1,897.89 on a claim of over $880,000 against the respondent, who was a guarantor of a second mortgage.

The appellant sought to add various payments she allegedly made for repairs, renovations, and to keep a first mortgage in good standing to the principal of the second mortgage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings and no errors of law in rejecting the appellant's claims, including her late assertion of equitable subrogation.

The cross-appeal regarding the trial judge's decision to award no costs was also dismissed.

The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal from an order dismissing her motion for summary judgment on her counterclaim.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning whether the order was final or interlocutory.

The court determined that an order dismissing a summary judgment motion is interlocutory, meaning leave to appeal is required under section 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

As no leave was obtained, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.