ODC 2015

The appellants, estate trustees of the deceased, appealed a trial judgment granting dependants' relief to the respondent, the deceased's common-law spouse.

The deceased had left a $17 million estate but excluded the respondent from her wills following a corporate reorganization.

The trial judge awarded the respondent a property, $100,000 per year for life, and $50,000 every five years for a vehicle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the deceased failed to make adequate provision for the respondent, nor in her assessment of the amount and duration of support or the substantial indemnity costs award.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the College of Veterinarians of Ontario removing his counsel of record due to an alleged conflict of interest arising from the counsel's former representation of a co-respondent.

The College brought a motion to quash the application as premature.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the deprivation of counsel of choice raised real issues of fairness and natural justice.

On the merits, the Court allowed the application for judicial review and set aside the College's order, concluding there was no evidence of a realistic risk of a conflict of interest or misuse of confidential information.

The appellant, a residential tenant, sued her landlord in Small Claims Court for negligence after her unit was burglarized via an adjacent unlocked unit.

The Deputy Judge dismissed the action, finding the essential character of the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the decision, confirming that the claim essentially alleged a breach of the landlord's statutory obligations regarding safety and quiet enjoyment.

The court also refused to transfer the matter to the Superior Court, as the one-year limitation period under the Residential Tenancies Act had already expired when the Small Claims action was commenced.

The appellant's appeal and two interlocutory motions were dismissed.

The respondent sought costs of $10,000 on a partial indemnity basis, while the self-represented appellant argued for no costs against him and $1,300 in his favour.

The Divisional Court found no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event.

The court awarded the respondent $10,000 in costs, noting the extensive preparation and helpful submissions of respondent's counsel compared to the appellant.

The applicant and respondent both sought costs following a leave to appeal application where success was divided.

The applicant sought $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis, arguing they were successful on the dominant issue regarding the appointment of a litigation guardian.

The respondent sought $10,000, arguing they were successful on five of the six issues.

The court found that success was divided and ordered that no costs be payable by either party.

The applicant sought judicial review of a FSCO Delegate's decision upholding an arbitrator's finding that his entitlement to WSIB benefits precluded him from receiving statutory accident benefits (SABS).

The applicant argued the insurer was estopped from relying on his suspended licence to deny benefits and that the arbitrator erred in interpreting the onus under s. 59(2) of the SABS Schedule.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Delegate's decision reasonable.

The insurer did not mislead the applicant, and the applicant failed to discharge his onus to prove his civil action was not commenced primarily for the purpose of claiming SABS.

The moving party defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to strike the plaintiff insurer's conspiracy claim.

The defendants argued the conspiracy claim should be struck based on the doctrine of merger, as it was redundant to the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on the merger issue, finding that there were conflicting decisions on whether the doctrine of merger could be applied at the pleadings stage, satisfying the test under Rule 62.02(4)(a).

The applicant contractor sought leave to appeal a costs order made by the Regional Senior Judge following a construction lien trial and subsequent motion.

The applicant claimed over $158,000 in costs on a $60,000 claim, which the Regional Senior Judge reduced to $45,000 on the basis of proportionality.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error in principle and agreeing that the costs claimed were grossly excessive and disproportionate to the amounts in issue.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.

Both parties agreed the appeal should be allowed because the hearing panel improperly determined the appellant was not a victim of crime and failed to conduct the requisite analysis under s. 17(1) of the Act.

The appellant requested the court substitute its opinion for the Board's regarding compensation, citing distrust of the Board.

The Divisional Court held it is not equipped to make the necessary factual findings and remitted the matter to the Board for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding damages to the respondent for injuries sustained in a workplace altercation.

The deputy judge had relied on a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision, which found the appellant was the aggressor, to establish liability.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the deputy judge erred in law by failing to make an independent finding on liability, as the Tribunal had explicitly left that determination to the court.

The Divisional Court also found the deputy judge erred by dismissing the appellant's counterclaim without providing reasons.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Small Claims Court for a new trial before a different judge.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Grievance Settlement Board decision regarding the interpretation of a collective agreement.

The issue was whether the agreement provided for 100% reimbursement for a psychologist's report diagnosing the grievor's child with autism, or if it was subject to a cap for psychological services.

The Board had relied on a clause in a subsequent Implementation Agreement that neither party had made submissions on.

The Divisional Court found the Board's decision unreasonable because it relied on a paragraph that, in context, only applied to routine eye examinations and had no relevance to the psychological assessment at issue.

The Board's decision was quashed and remitted to a differently-constituted panel.

The applicant sought judicial review of a penalty imposed by the Ontario Racing Commission for a positive drug test involving furosemide.

The Divisional Court found that the Commission erred by treating furosemide as a Class V drug without explanation, as it is not classified as such in the Uniform Classification Guidelines.

The court held the penalty decision was unreasonable, granted the application, and remitted the matter to the Commission for re-determination.

The applicants, suppression firefighters, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that summarily dismissed their age discrimination applications.

The applicants challenged the mandatory retirement age of 60, arguing the employer failed to accommodate them by not engaging in individualized testing for cardiac risk.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal reasonably relied on established precedent that mandatory retirement for firefighters is a bona fide occupational requirement, and that the applicants failed to provide the necessary individualized medical evidence of extremely low cardiac risk to trigger the narrow exception for accommodation.

The plaintiffs and defendants both sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision regarding a summary judgment motion in a professional negligence claim arising from a fraudulent mortgage transfer.

The motion judge had dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and declined the defendants' request to dismiss the action, citing the lack of expert evidence on the standard of care for paralegals performing electronic registrations.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions or good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which appropriately concluded that a trial with expert evidence was required in the interests of justice.

The respondent, Sharon Fair, brought a motion in writing to amend the Divisional Court's earlier written reasons, alleging clerical errors.

The applicant school board opposed the motion.

The court noted that the applicant had already obtained leave to appeal the judgment to the Court of Appeal.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that even if it had jurisdiction to amend its reasons, it would be unseemly to do so while an appeal was pending, and that justice would be better served by leaving the determination of any errors to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to appeal a costs order of $12,500 made against him in a family law proceeding.

He argued that leave was not required because he was seeking a set-off, and that the motion judge erred in assessing success, failing to consider his inability to pay, and failing to provide a mathematical calculation for the award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that leave was required, the motion judge made no errors in principle, and the proposed appeal did not raise matters of general public importance.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision that dismissed his motion to strike the respondent's claim as statute-barred and struck his statement of defence.

The dispute involved a $16,000 promissory note for a tractor purchase.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellant's application to introduce fresh evidence.

However, the court found the Deputy Judge made a palpable and overriding error by failing to explain how conflicting evidence regarding the date of the parties' last contact was resolved, which was crucial for determining when a demand was made under the Limitations Act.

The appeal was allowed in part, the order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to Small Claims Court for trial.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a grievance arbitration award that denied meal expense reimbursements for employees commuting daily to temporary work headquarters.

The applicant argued the arbitrator breached procedural fairness by adopting an interpretation of the collective agreement not advanced by either party, and that the decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitrator's interpretation was within the range of reasonable outcomes and that an arbitrator is not bound to choose only between the interpretations advanced by the parties.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating his tenancy so the landlords' son could move into the unit.

The tenant argued the Board erred in law regarding the good faith requirement, maintenance breaches, human rights accommodation, and the landlords' corporate status.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's determinations on good faith and maintenance were unappealable questions of fact, the eviction was unrelated to the tenant's disabilities, and the individual landlords met the statutory definition of a landlord.

Both parties brought motions before the Divisional Court.

The defendant's representative sought leave to represent the corporate defendant, which was granted as he had been representing the Society throughout the proceedings.

The plaintiff sought leave to correct the identity of the corporate defendant due to a misnomer.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding it was a simple misnomer, the defendant had not been misled, and there was no prejudice to the defendant.

No costs were awarded as success was divided.